Financial Leverage: The Case Against DFL
Financial Leverage: The Case Against DFL

Summary/Abstract: The degree of financial leverage, DFL, is a widely used index that is supposed to capture the size of financial leverage risk: when greater than one, it points to the more than proportional relative change in net profit compared to the corresponding relative change in operating profit. The paper debates DFL’s numerous shortcomings some of which come from the lack of definitional rigour. Even when properly defined, the index cannot be accepted as a financial risk measure. Focused on one-year accounting data, the index is deficient by its very nature. Moreover, for a given financial situation, the index may assume different values, including those less than one – a disqualifying feature for any leverage and risk measure. The value of the index depends not only on the amount of inherent risk but also on the arbitrary choice of the base value of profit against which relative changes are calculated. The paper calls for modification of the DFL concept. The proposed switch from the profit to wealth perspective would prohibit less than one values of the index, thus securing its leverage status. The switch from book to market values makes the index relevant to investor’s utility, and more importantly results in one unambiguous value of the index, which is required if it is to be a risk measure. However, even after those major redefinitions, the modified DFL is a downward biased estimator of equity multiplier – a true financial risk measure. The roots of the bias and its size are discussed. The fatal flaw of DFL is that it is a measure of relative rather than absolute deviations from expected wealth. Consequently, DFL is shown to be a bundle of risk and risk reward estimations rather than a pure risk index.

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