Czy trwałe wypełnianie kryteriów konwergencji z Maastricht musi zapewniać… korzyści gospodarce?
Is Meeting the Convergence Criteria From Maastricht Always Beneficial for the Economy?

Summary/Abstract: Until the world financial crisis of 2007–2008, the convergence criteria contained in the Maastricht Treaty have been commonly considered beneficial for countries that persistently observed them, although there is no economic theory from which those criteria and their specific numerical values could be derived from. Also in Poland an overwhelming majority of economists, policy makers and economic commentators claims that meeting the nominal convergence criteria, and especially the fiscal ones, will be beneficial for the Polish economy. While accepting the need to ensure consistency between fiscal and monetary policies, as well as the constrains with regard to increasing the public debt/GDP ratios in the present-day capitalism, this paper shows that the claim regarding the beneficial effects of observing those criteria is debatable and under some conditions simply wrong. In a country where there is a tendency for private savings to exceed private investments, combined with a lasting current account deficit, restricting the allowed budget deficits to merely structural deficits will depress GDP dynamics. Rigid observation of the deficit limit will then bring lasting harm to the economy. A similar conclusion is drawn regarding the public debt/GDP criterion. As regards the inflation convergence criterion, the paper argues that the problem may arise here not in relation to the objective of the policy but the particular instruments of achieving inflation targets. When the main instrument of achieving the inflation target is a restrictive monetary and fiscal policy, leading to high unemployment and slow wage growth, this way of controlling inflation becomes economically and socially extremely costly. For avoiding high permanent unemployment, setting less ambitions inflation targets may be more advisable.

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