China’s Russia Policy after 2022: Strategic Adaptation in the Wake of the War in Ukraine
China’s Russia Policy after 2022: Strategic Adaptation in the Wake of the War in Ukraine

Summary/Abstract: This paper analyses China’s strategy toward Russia since the beginning of the war in Ukraine in February 2022 by adopting the theory of predation. It argues that, although China is a rising power and Russia a declining one, Beijing has chosen to tacitly support Moscow’s war effort in order to preserve its relationship with Russia, its only available great-power ally in a hypothetical confrontation with the United States. China has done so by expanding economic and military cooperation with Russia while simultaneously assisting Moscow in mitigating the effects of Western-imposed sanctions. This behaviour reflects a calculated strategy aimed at maximising long-term strategic gains while minimising immediate political and economic costs. However, Beijing’s support for Moscow remained limited due to Russia’s military capacity, which remains potent despite losses in Ukraine, as well as the Chinese reluctance to provoke a broader conflict with the leading Western powers, most notably the United States.

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