Cultural diplomacy in Chinese style: institutional practices and perception of Confucius Institutes in Central Asia
Cultural diplomacy in Chinese style: institutional practices and perception of Confucius Institutes in Central Asia

Summary/Abstract: Introduction: In this study we examine how Confucius Institutes (CIs) operate as a channel of China’s cultural diplomacy in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan, and how their practices are perceived. The «civilizational state» frame serves as the analytical lens; CIs are examined within a four-channel model. The scope is 2004-2026; analysis is limited to observable perceived outcomes rather than causally established «influence».Methods: Qualitative comparative multiple-case design across four cases was applied. The corpus integrates: a) official communications (PRC MFA, embassies, summit declarations 2023 and 2025); b) CI and partner-university materials; c) media and digital sources, including 14 waves of the Central Asia Barometer Survey (CABS, 2017-2023; samples of 1,000-2,000 per country). Coding was conducted on five dimensions (practice type, audience, channel, tonality, perceived outcome); pilot intercoder reliability: N = 120, Cohen’s κ = 0.82. Results: The regional network comprises 13 CIs and approximately 24 Confucius Classrooms (Kazakhstan - 5, Kyrgyzstan - 4, Uzbekistan - 2, Tajikistan - 2), with aggregate annual reach of 35,000-45,000 learners. Favourability of China fell sharply between 2017 and 2021 (Kazakhstan 75%→39%, Uzbekistan 73%→32%), partially recovering by 2023 (Kazakhstan - 59%, Uzbekistan - 47%); Kyrgyzstan stayed near 50%, Tajikistan - around 60%. Concerns over Chinese land purchase reached 90% in Kazakhstan, 88% in Kyrgyzstan, and 83% in Uzbekistan (CABS, 2023). The composite profile separates two configurations: high institutional density with open public sphere (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan) and low density with constrained public sphere (Uzbekistan, Tajikistan). Discussion: Variation in perceived Confucius Institutes outcomes results from the configuration of four factors: institutional density, elite positioning, public sensitivity, and the competitive humanitarian environment. Density is necessary but insufficient: identical density yields opposite perceptual signatures in open versus constrained public spheres. Decomposition of perceptual layers shows that educational utility is recognised across levels, while general favourability of China is volatile and sensitive to economic-geopolitical context. Scientific Novelty: A reproducible Confucius Institutes module of operationalisation is proposed, linking institutional practices with observable perception categories through five tables and a four-factor explanatory synthesis. A comparable four-country matrix distinguishes stable configurations of institutionalisation and acceptability without equating perceived outcomes with causally established influence. Practical Implications: The framework supports comparison of Confucius Institutes cases on uniform criteria, informs programme calibration in environments of varying public sensitivity, and provides a baseline for Confucius Institutes benchmarking against parallel humanitarian infrastructures (Rossotrudnichestvo, American Spaces, Yunus Emre, Erasmus+) on the same regional sample.

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