Ebü’l-Usr el-Pezdevî’nin Hanefî Usulünden İ‘tizâlle Bağlantılı Düşünceleri Temizleme Çabası: İlletin Tahsisi Örneği
Abū al-ʿUsr al-Pazdawī’s Attempt to Purge the Ḥanafī Legal Theory from Muʿtazilite Influences: The Case of the Specification of the ʿIllah (Effective Cause)

Summary/Abstract: The fact that an effective legal cause (ʿilla muʾaththira) may fail to entail its ruling in certain cases is a recognized phenomenon in Islamic jurisprudence. The Iraqi Ḥanafīs systematized this phenomenon through the logic of the specification of legal causes (takhṣīṣ al-ʿilal). In Transoxiana, however, permitting the specification of legal causes came to be regarded as a distinctive marker of Muʿtazilī doctrine. Sunnī legal theorists in this region rejected the attempt to conceptualize the aforementioned phenomenon through the specification of legal causes. Instead, they explained it on the basis that a change occurring in the legal cause—whether through deficiency or addition—renders the cause nonexistent; and that what no longer exists cannot entail a legal ruling. According to Abū al-ʿUsr alPazdawī (d. 482/1089), treating the legal cause as non-existent due to a deficiency or addition in it corresponds to the method adopted by the Ḥanafīs in istiḥsān. A legal cause cannot remain operative as a cause in opposition to a textual proof (naṣṣ). Its failure to produce a ruling is therefore not grounded in the specification of an existing cause, but rather in the absence of the cause itself. This differs from the relation between two textual proofs standing in a general–particular relationship. Since textual proofs do not invalidate one another, specification may occur between them. In the case of legal causes, however, specification amounts to contradiction (naqḍ). For Pazdawī, applying the general–particular model of textual interpretation to legal causes would lead to the doctrine that every mujtahid is correct in his ijtihād. Thus, such a model cannot be applied to causes. Although Transoxanian legal theorists did not fully agree on the theological consequences generated by the specification of legal causes, Pazdawī maintained that it gives rise to the doctrine of taṣwīb in ijtihād. In his view, there is also a connection between taṣwīb and the doctrine of aṣlaḥ; and aṣlaḥ is an iʿtizālī doctrine. This article aims to examine Pazdawī’s understanding of the specification of legal causes, the alternative theory he proposes in its place, and the reasons for his association of this doctrine with iʿtizālī theories. Al-Pazdawī’s association of takhṣīṣ al-ʿilla with iʿtizāl is a major and widely debated issue in uṣūl al-fiqh. Since he provides the most detailed account and differs from al-Māturīdī, Abū al-Yusr al-Pazdawī, and al-Sarakhsī, his position merits independent examination. The conclusion reached in this article is that, although the specification of legal causes does not necessarily lead to conclusions contrary to Sunnī doctrine in jurisprudential matters, it is theoretically capable of serving as a basis for certain iʿtizālī doctrines in theological discussions. At theoretical level, the specification of legal causes provides direct support for taṣwīb in ijtihād and indirect support for the doctrine of aṣlaḥ. This, however, does not mean that these doctrines are necessarily entailed by the acceptance of takhṣīṣ al-ʿilal. Therefore, it is not persuasive to regard a legal theorist who accepts the specification of legal causes as Muʿtazilī, or to assume that he necessarily adopts one of the fundamental principles associated with iʿtizāl.

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