Buâs'ın Gölgesinde Sakîfe:Ensar'ın Hilafet Sürecindeki Tavrının Kolektif Travma ve Kabile Dinamikleri Bağlamında Analizi
Saqīfa in the Shadow of Buʿāth: An Analysis of the Anṣār's Stance in the Succession Process through the Lens of Collective Trauma and Tribal Dynamics

Summary/Abstract: The Prophet Muhammad’s death in 11/632 created a profound power vacuum in the early Muslim community. The Anṣār, the native inhabitants of Medina composed of the Aws and Khazraj tribes, gathered at Saqīfat Banī Sā’ida to select a caliph from among themselves. At the outset, the Anṣār held a strong position: they controlled the city, formed the backbone of the Muslim army and enjoyed numerical superiority. The Muhājirūn, by contrast, were a minority and militarily dependent on the Anṣār. Yet the outcome of the Saqīfa proceedings ran counter to this balance of power: the caliphate did not go to the Anṣār but instead to Abū Bakr, a Muhājir. This outcome, when considered against the tribal dynamics of the period and the Anṣār's initial position, points to a process that demands explanation. Traditional explanations typically appeal to Quraysh’s prestige among the Arabs, Abū Bakr’s personal virtues or divine providence. However, these explanations leave a critical question unanswered: without wholly rejecting Quraysh's historical standing, why did the Anṣār propose their own candidate, arguing that leadership could rest on different foundations? This study seeks to explain the outcome at Saqīfa not through a mono-causal framework but within a multi-factorial explanatory model. The reports of classical sources such as al-Ṭabarī, al-Balādhurī and Ibn Hishām are reread in the light of modern trauma psychology (Volkan, van der Kolk), social identity theory (Tajfel) and Freud’s notion of the “narcissism of minor differences.” The central thesis of this article rests on three pillars. First, the Battle of Buʿāth (5/617) between Aws and Khazraj did not end with a formal peace, and it is argued that, owing to the deep losses it inflicted, it may be read as an unresolved trauma in the Anṣār’s collective memory. The power vacuum following the Prophet’s death may have reactivated the feelings of loss, threat and betrayal associated with Buʿāth. Second, the early pledge of Bashīr b. Saʿd and the subsequent alignment of Aws with the Muhājirūn under the leadership of Usayd b. Ḥuḍayr reflect intra-Anṣār status competition, a reflex to avoid “fitna” and a strategy of “turning from a close rival to a more distant actor.” These moves appear to have fractured the Anṣār front from within and to have significantly reduced the plausibility of Saʿd b. ʿUbāda’s candidacy. Third, the Quraysh discourse (“We are the commanders, you are the ministers”) appears not to have functioned as a principle uniformly accepted by the Anṣār from the outset; rather, in the sources, it can be read as a postfracture coordination mechanism that framed alignment with Quraysh as a way to prevent civil strife. This study aims to make three contributions to the historiography of early Islam. First, it proposes a framework that invites a reconsideration of early Islamic history through concepts such as chosen trauma, time collapse and collective memory. Second, it moves beyond single-cause explanations -Quraysh prestige, Saʿd’s illness or Muhājir pressure- by proposing a multi-factorial framework. Third, it demonstrates a methodological sensitivity aimed at reducing the risk of anachronism by consciously separating transmitted data from psychological interpretation. Accordingly, the Anṣār’s loss of standing at Saqīfa may be more adequately read within a multi-factorial model that takes into account the Anṣār’s own internal fragilities, rather than an alleged “natural” or “inevitable” superiority of Quraysh.

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