RULES-IN-FORM AND RULES-IN-USE AS A DUAL-PROCESS ACCOUNT OF INSTITUTIONAL ACTION IN BULGARIAN REGULATORY GOVERNANCE
RULES-IN-FORM AND RULES-IN-USE AS A DUAL-PROCESS ACCOUNT OF INSTITUTIONAL ACTION IN BULGARIAN REGULATORY GOVERNANCE

Summary/Abstract: This study examines why formally valid regulatory regimes often perform weakly in practice. It argues that the deeper problem lies in the gap between contemporary better regulation methodologies and the institutional environment in which public administration and regulated businesses actually operate. This analysis applies the distinction between rules-in-form and rules-in-use to Bulgarian regulatory governance, drawing on bounded rationality, dual-process reasoning, transaction costs, information asymmetry, and regulatory capture. Empirically, it uses three surveys conducted in 2026 among regulatory experts, public administration officials, and business respondents. The findings show systematic underestimation of administrative burden, limited use of alternatives to regulation, weak cost-benefit analysis, unintended incentives for circumvention, and an and an underdeveloped incentive environment for compliance. The study concludes that regulatory quality does not result from more detailed rules alone. It requires institutional capacity to translate written provisions into working rules-in-use through clearer rules, lower compliance costs, safeguards against capture, and institutional learning.

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