Independența procurorilor și echilibrul constituțional al puterilor în stat – reflecții critice asupra tezei ingerinței executive
The independence of prosecutors and the constitutional balance of powers in the state – critical reflections on the thesis of executive interference

Summary/Abstract: The article critically examines the thesis according to which any institutional relationship between the prosecution service and the executive branch is inherently incompatible with the principle of judicial independence. Starting from the constitutional distinction between the status of judges and that of prosecutors, the analysis highlights that prosecutorial independence cannot be assessed using the same conceptual framework as judicial independence, given the fundamentally different roles they perform in criminal proceedings. By referring to comparative law, the article shows that public prosecution services across Europe are organized according to diverse institutional models, where different forms of interaction with the executive exist without necessarily being considered inconsistent with the rule of law. From this perspective, prosecutorial independence does not require the complete absence of institutional links with the executive, but rather the existence of effective safeguards against political interference in individual cases. The article argues that the debate on prosecutorial independence should be placed within the broader context of institutional accountability and public trust in the administration of justice. It concludes that the constitutional provision stating that prosecutors act under the authority of the Minister of Justice should not be interpreted as a violation of the separation of powers, but rather as an institutional arrangement aimed at maintaining a balance between functional autonomy and democratic accountability.

• Details
• Contents