Price Regulation in Oligopolistic Markets: Unintended Competitive Effects of Emergency Ordinance No. 19/2026 On the Romanian Fuel Market
Price Regulation in Oligopolistic Markets: Unintended Competitive Effects of Emergency Ordinance No. 19/2026 On the Romanian Fuel Market

Summary/Abstract: This paper analyzes the structural effects of Emergency Ordinance No. 19/2026 on competition in the Romanian diesel market through the lens of game theory. The analysis is based on daily fuel price data collected from the pretcarburant.ro platform for the period from 18 March to 22 May 2026. The findings show that fuel distribution in Romania operates as a Stackelberg-type oligopoly, with OMV Petrom acting as the price leader. The pass-through of Brent crude oil price fluctuations to retail fuel prices remains limited, ranging between 0.34 and 0.39, because a fixed fiscal component representing approximately 35% of the final price absorbs a substantial part of the shock. The study also identifies an anticipatory lag of approximately 35 days, as the peak pump price recorded on 31 March 2026 precedes the peak Brent quotation observed on 5 May 2026. The conclusion regarding Emergency Ordinance No. 19/2026 is counterintuitive. By standardizing commercial margins at the national level, the ordinance eliminated the very price variability that still allowed a minimal degree of competition among fuel retail networks, transforming a strategic parameter into a fixed administrative one. These findings have direct implications for the design of regulatory policies in sectors characterized by oligopolistic market structures.

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