Interpretarea lui Themistius din Constantinopol referitoare la concepția lui Aristotel despre suflet (ψυχή) și intelect (νοῦς)
Themistius of Constantinople’s interpretation of Aristotle’s concept of soul (ψυχη) and intellect (νοῦς)

Summary/Abstract: The concept of the soul (ψυχή) and the intellect (νοῦς) form the foundation of Aristotle’s Metaphysics. The application of hermeneutics to these two concepts poses a significant challenge for scholars interested in Aristotle's work. In the various contexts of Aristotelian philosophy, the term “νοῦς” is the most challenging to translate. The conventional translation of this term by intellect is considered inaccurate and unsatisfactory. The interpretation of Themistius of Constantinople concerning these two Aristotelian concepts provides a clearer and more rigorous vision of how to define and categorize these two concepts: that of soul (ψυχή) and intellect (νοῦς), in the whole of the First Philosophy in general and of the “theory of substance” in particular. The intellect, or more precisely the “capacity of rational apperception” (νοῦς), is defined as the faculty of human reason by which the “essential characteristics of things” (εἶδοςs) are integrated, through contemplation (θεωρεῖν), in the process of actualization (ἐντελέχεια). The term “contemplation” (θεωρεῖν) is employed to denote the intellectual process of assimilating the aspects of reality that are necessary for the process of actualisation.

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