Balancing the Win-Sets: Agricultural Lobby and Japan’s Accession to the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement
Balancing the Win-Sets: Agricultural Lobby and Japan’s Accession to the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement
Author(s): Karol ŻakowskiSubject(s): Politics / Political Sciences, Politics, Political Sciences
Published by: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek
Keywords: Trans-Pacific Partnership; Japan; agricultural lobby; liberalization of trade; two-level game theory
Summary/Abstract: Due to strong connections with the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), the agricultural lobby constituted a considerable obstacle in liberalization of trade by Japan. Nevertheless, in the last years, its influence on governmental policy has been waning. Referring to the theory of two-level games, the article analyzes the discourse on accession to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement to examine the weakening dependence of Japanese politicians on support from the Central Union of Agricultural Cooperatives. It is argued that the Japanese government managed to sign both the TPP Agreement in 2016 and its successor, the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership in 2018, thanks to the institutional strength and negotiation strategy of the Abe administration.
Journal: Athenaeum Polskie Studia Politologiczne
- Issue Year: 71/2021
- Issue No: 3
- Page Range: 198-216
- Page Count: 19
- Language: English
