FREGEOV ONTOLOŠKI NIHILIZAM I KRUG U ZASNIVANJU ONTOLOGIJE
FREGE’S ONTOLOGICAL NIHILISM AND THE CIRCLE IN THE GROUNDING OF ONTOLOGY

Summary/Abstract: We aim to elucidate Frege’s account of existence by approaching it through the concept of the ontological difference, that is, the distinction between the ontic and the ontological, specifically from the perspective of Heideggerian ontology. The ontological difference entails a separation between being and beings, both at the linguistic level (de dicto) and at the level of things themselves (de re). At the de dicto level, the ontological difference concerns the distinction between linguistic expressions that refer to beings and their properties, and those terms that refer to the being of beings— its modes and immanent structures. At the de re level, the ontological difference pertains to the referents of these terms: on one side, we have the beings themselves along with their characteristics, a domain we refer to as ontic; on the other side, we have the being of those beings, which further differentiates into various modes of being, each possessing its own inherent structure—this domain we refer to as ontological. We will demonstrate how and why Frege’s ontological position can be characterized as ontic and nihilistic, and how his semantic thesis may be interpreted as reductionist, or more precisely, monistic. Finally, we will turn to the circularity found in his project of grounding ontology in semantics, and examine whether this circularity can be understood as a case of the hermeneutic circle.

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