Samoodgovornost i odgovornost za Drugog u sklopu intersubjektivne društvene relacije Jean-Paul Sartre i Emmanuel Lévinas
Self-responsibility and Responsibility for the Other in the Context of Intersubjective Social Relation Jean-Paul Sartre and Emmanuel Lévinas

Summary/Abstract: By analyzing variations of the concept of responsibility as expressed in the forms of self-responsibility and responsibility for the Other, which we also encounter as underlying ideas in the philosophies of Jean-Paul Sartre and Emmanuel Lévinas, this article also attempts to determine their mutual relationship. This is potentially made easier by the fact that, in both cases and in different ways, the concept of responsibility is inextricably linked to the concept of freedom. Thus, the definition and understanding of this concept will also influence the understanding of responsibility: in one case, responsibility will follow directly from freedom; in the other, it will represent a fundamental departure from it. Thus, we finally come to the conclusion that “historical and ontological” self-responsibility, born out of the self-reflection of freedom, in its inverse closeness to the anarcho-ethical responsibility for the Other, at once represents its polar opposite and traces its origin back to the particular negation of freedom.

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