ГРАНИЦИ НА БЮДЖЕТНАТА НЕЗАВИСИМОСТ НА СЪДЕБНАТА ВЛАСТ В ПРАКТИКАТА НА КОНСТИТУЦИОННИЯ СЪД НА РЕПУБЛИКА БЪЛГАРИЯ
THE LIMITS OF THE BUDGETARY INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY IN THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF THE REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA

Summary/Abstract: The article examines the constitutional dimensions of judicial independence in Bulgaria, and more specifically, the autonomy of the judiciary’s budget. It analyses the case law of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Bulgaria concerning the principle of an autonomous judicial budget as a key safeguard of judicial independence. The study traces the evolution of the Court’s jurisprudence – from its early decisions in the 1990s, which established the doctrine of non-interference by the executive branch, to the decisions delivered in the first, second, and third decades of the twenty-first century. In these later cases, the principle of non-interference by the executive has been reaffirmed, while the balance between independence and accountability has been recognised as a competence of the National Assembly. The article explores the evolution of the Constitutional Court’s interpretation of the balance between budgetary autonomy, judicial accountability and the respective roles of the National Assembly and the Minister of Justice.

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