Bergson’s Concept of Free Will: The Problem of Moral Responsibility
Bergson’s Concept of Free Will: The Problem of Moral Responsibility

Summary/Abstract: The question of free will and determinism has remained a central debate across various disciplines, notably philosophy, theology, psychology, science, politics, epistemology and metaphysics. On the one hand, some scholars believe that there is no free will because we live in a causally determined world. On the other hand, others argue that human beings are moral and autonomous individuals who can choose freely and act otherwise. Consequently, a philosophical question arises: do humans possess free will, or are they determined by external forces and causation? Philosophers from the voluntarist tradition, particularly Henri Bergson, approach this issue in their own distinctive way. Bergson’s metaphysics of free will is grounded in his conceptions of duration. He explains free will through the process of possibility and qualitative experience of inner life. According to Bergson, freedom inherently generates within duration, which can be known through metaphysical intuition. In contrast, the traditional and libertarian view of free will is concerned with the sense of moral responsibility within the realms of social, moral and legal practices. In this paper I examine Bergson's metaphysical understanding of free will and morality. I conclude my argument that Bergson's metaphysical concept of free will is confronted with free will based on the supposition of moral responsibility in the contemporary world.

• Details
• Contents