KREMLI KÕRGETE AMETNIKE SÕNAVÕTTUDES ESINEVATE VENEMAA PROPAGANDANARRATIIVIDE AJALOOLISED, FILOSOOFILISED JA IDEOLOOGILISED JUURED
THE HISTORICAL, PHILOSOPHICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL ROOTS OF RUSSIAN PROPAGANDA NARRATIVES IN SPEECHES OF HIGH-RANKING KREMLIN OFFICIALS
Author(s): Vladimir Sazonov, Sirje Kupp-SazonovSubject(s): Governance, Military history, Political history, Social history, Geopolitics, Peace and Conflict Studies
Published by: Kaitseväe Akadeemia (KVA)
Keywords: Kremlin; officials; Russia; propaganda; narratives; history; politics; ideology; Eurasianism; disinformation; influence operations; Third Rome;
Summary/Abstract: The Kremlin’s propaganda is a complex phenomenon. It is based on historical concepts and ideas such as the Russian world and Eurasianism, as well as extreme right-wing ideas. It also involves the manipulation of facts, disinformation and lies. For decades, the Kremlin has promoted the idea of Russia as a major Eurasian player and superpower, especially among the Russian-speaking diaspora in the West, through the politics of compatriots and influence operations that propagate concepts such as the Russian world. The Kremlin seeks not only to influence and damage the Western society but also manipulate its politics, economy, culture, security, the social environment, and so on. The ideological foundations of the authoritarian regime in modern Putin’s Russia and its revisionist, the neo-imperialist foreign policy, combine elements of the Tsarist era (‘Moscow is the third Rome’), Count Uvarov’s official theory of nationalism, Slavophilism, Eurasianism and the ultra-nationalist, far-right ideas of late 19th and 20th century Russian philosophers and ideologues. These topics and ideas are being used as weapons in hybrid war against the West. Statements by high-ranking Russian officials such as V. Putin, S. Lavrov, M. Zakharova, D. Medvedev and D. Peskov are primarily targeted at internal audience, i.e. the population of the Russian Federation, mainly because their interpretation of various events (for example, the Ukrainian war) as presented in their speeches makes no sense to the external audience. For example, when Sergey Lavrov claimed that NATO, Ukraine and the West started a war against Russia, nobody who is familiar with Russia’s full-scaled military invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 could consider this information truthful. Similarly, while Maria Zakharova in her speeches tried to create the impression that only Russian civilians are dying in this war, those who have seen the information about Bucha will know that this is disinformation. However, the Kremlin seems to assume that people outside of Russia are interested in these statements because these are carefully translated into English and posted on the websites of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Kremlin.ru. Finally, it should be noted that Russia’s influence activities, including the dissemination of strategic narratives, themes, ideas and messages, as well as their overall antiWestern discourse target potential audiences including populist movements, radical and non-radical political figures and forces, and various international audiences, as well as alternative, anti-government, anti-US, anti-NATO and anti-EU groups.
Journal: Sõjateadlane
- Issue Year: 2025
- Issue No: 26
- Page Range: 129-158
- Page Count: 30
- Language: Estonian
