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This paper is an attempt to challenge some of the most persistent myths about the link between the institutional role of judges and their political convictions in constitutional adjudication. These myths form together a fable of separation, according to which judicial roles and political convictions should be kept rigorously apart. The ensuing analysis contradicts the fable of separation in important ways. Firstly, it demonstrates that political convictions do play a signifi cant role in adjudication. Secondly, it suggests that diminishing the infl uence of party-related political identities on judicial decision-making does not always have a positive impact on the institutionalization of a judicial body, but rather it may signal its institutional decline. Thirdly, the paper argues that the fable of separation is particularly inapplicable to constitutional courts, since these institutions have hybrid functions: on the one hand, they follow and apply rules (the standard judicial function), while on the other, they sometimes have to decide cases on their merits in the absence of defi native rules (a function of political bodies in constitutional democracy). Finally, the paper argues that the development of judicial policies is an unavoidable element of judicial work and constitutional review: often, the self-declared ambition of judges to refrain from judicial policy making is just a camoufl age for specifi c policies. This should not be read as an accusation of judicial hypocrisy: even bona fi de judges are forced to develop judicial policies, in the elaboration of which their moral and political convictions do play a role.
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The above research explores questions about the ways in which group identities are formed, and the functions that they serve. It simultaneously recognizes that it is not just the legal statutes, but also the every-day practices to which they are attached, that define identities of any community. It is this array of cultural and symbolic resources that I am interested in developing further in my article. I focus here on how and which generational (and class) distinctions are understood, negotiated and put to work by actors themselves. Through in-depth interviews with young Slovenian and Macedonian intellectuals from the last Yugoslav generation I explore the perception of Yugoslav identities and I argue for its understanding as a hybrid. I suggest that understanding it as a hybrid helps to unveil the complexities of social reality, its diverse and multiple dimensions, the overcoming of traditional/modern/postmodern models, and at the same time, it resists the boundaries and dichotomies (neither/nor).
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This paper attempts to challenge the gender universal discourse of the quality press as legitimized institution for producing representations in the period of post-socialist changes.
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Serbia’s entire political establishment and some other elites – those in the judicial branch in particular – welcomed the transformation of a part of the Serb Radical Party /SRS/ into the Serb Progressive Party /SNS/. There is no doubt that Vojislav Seselj’s inappropriate behavior before the ICTY that compromised SRS was among the reasons why some Radicals decided to form a separate party. Another major reason was to have a two-party system in Serbia, some elites have been striving after. Hence, the new Serb Progressive Party attracted undivided support from the media: with such backing it relatively shortly won over the majority of “old” Radicals and managed to obtain relatively good results in some local elections (for instance, in Vozdovac, one of Belgrade’s municipalities). EU and all foreign observers in Belgrade also welcomed this change of attire.
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President Tadic’s initiative for a parliamentary resolution on Srebrenica triggered off a debate that laid bare the proportions of Serbia’s frustration manifested in its denial to face up the recent past, the Bosnian war in particular. The existence of Republika Srpska /RS/ - actually the very fact that it exists for fifteen years now – strengthened the Serb mainstream elite’s belief about full attainment of warring goals being just a matter of time and more favorable international constellation.
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Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) is currently in a severe crisis that could yield total political paralysis,and perhaps eventual disintegration of the state. The international community in BiH has no discernable strategy. While rejecting Republika Srpska (RS) Premier Milorad Dodik’s desire for eventual RS independence and international acquiescence to it, there has been no effective response. The international community’s acquiescence leaves BiH in a “neither secession nor success,” limbo. Unable to align its desire for a reduced commitment to the ugly on-the-ground reality, the EU nevertheless has clung to its standard script of progress and “transition” brought about solely through EU inducements – a theoretical nirvana of carrots without need of sticks. This lack of strategic engagement has fostered political decay. BiH requires far more tailored reform than the off-the-peg acquis communautaire, which treats BiH as if it were Slovenia. Last December, the desire to proclaim “success” at any cost by initialing a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) led to an ignominious surrender on police reform – a surrender that has now proved futile, as reform is once more blocked. Even if the SAA is signed later this year, it will not transform BiH into a functional state. The stumbling block for BiH is its constitutional order. Robust international engagement through the Office of the High Representative (OHR), equipped with its executive “Bonn Powers” has allowed a project of state-building from above over the past decade. This has resulted in a number of institutions, laws, and reforms that have helped BiH recover from its 1992-1995 war. But the durability of these accomplishments in the face of hostility from established political elites is questionable – as the degeneration of the past two years has shown. The BiH political elite forms an oligarchy, and while the Dayton order suits no faction leader perfectly, it is the second-best option for all of them. Dayton’s Annex IV deters linkages among citizens who consistently profess similar priorities and concerns. With weak international engagement, Dayton BiH defaults toward de facto partition. Until there is a constitutional order capable of allowing BiH to advance toward the EU under its own steam, all the Dayton instruments, including the High Representative with Bonn Powers, must be maintained – and strengthened. The EU holds the carrots and the HR wields the sticks. Creative thinking regarding new sticks is urgently needed.
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among others: * PROCES JANUSZA PAŁUBICKIEGO * "Głos" - program bieżący
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among others: * Rozmowa z Wiktorem Fulerskim * Pozostali w więzieniach
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among others: * Akt oskarżenia KOR-u * "Bądźmy solidarni" - "Solidarność" Ursusa
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among others: * SAMORZĄD W ZAKŁADACH PRACY * SZKOŁA I WYCHOWANIE
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among others: * Oświadczenie w sprawie podwyżek cen, Stanowisko w sprawie wyborów do Rad Narodowych * Prawo i bezprawie
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among others: * WRONIE ZWIĄZKI. Czy bojkot przetrwa mimo przywilejów? * W ZAKŁADACH PRACY. Ludzie nie rwą się dospektakularnych akcji
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Montenegro is a small republic—with a population of 635,000—which, together with Serbia, makes up today’s Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. It is at a crucial moment: the present government leadership is considering how to re-define its fundamental relationship with Serbia. On December 3-4, 1999 the Project on Ethnic Relations (PER) organized a meeting in Budva, on Montenegro’s Adriatic coast, about the status of Montenegro in Yugoslavia. Some 40 leading officials and policymakers from Montenegro, Albania, Croatia, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Romania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Hungary, the United States, Italy, the OSCE and the United Nations, as well as from the Serbian democratic opposition, participated. They addressed Montenegro’s relationship with Serbia, its role in the western Balkans, and how Montenegro is managing interethnic relations, especially with its Albanian minority. The tenor was one of cautious candor, with an emphasis on positive accomplishments. Indeed, the uncertainty and lack of unanimity that characterized reactions to political developments in Montenegro reflected the open nature of the dialogue.
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Despite the difficulties that have beset Romania in its transition from communism to democracy, it boasts a most important success in interethnic relations. Few would have predicted, after the disastrous violence between Romanians and ethnic Hungarians in Tirgu Mures in 1990, that only six years later the ethnic Hungarian party would be a respected member of Romania’s governing coalition.The Project on Ethnic Relations was an active participant in bringing about this result, initiating the first discussions and negotiations between leaders of the preceding government and the Hungarian minority, and replacing confrontation with a pattern of dialogue that persists to this day. The achievement, however, is untested by time. With the year 2000 elections underway in Romania, ethnic issues are already being raised in the campaign.
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Nakon više od dvadeset godina, ime Aleksandre Zec još uvijek je demarkaciona linija u hrvatskom društvu. S jedne strane su oni koji lamentiraju nad pravosudnom farsom koja je poznate ubojice, bez obzira na njihova priznanja i materijalne dokaze, ostavila na slobodi. S druge pak oni kojima Aleksandra Zec služi isključivo za uspostavljanje razlike između ‘naših’ i ‘njihovih’ žrtava. U takvoj viktimološkoj dihotomiji ‘naše žrtve’ dobivaju mjesta posebnog pijeteta i “mramor ih se sjeća”, dok ‘njihove’ ostavljamo medijskim strvinama, stalno novom prežvakavanju onoga što nacionalno lobotomirana svijest nikako ne može provariti.
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Više od dve decenije u Srbiji su zanemarene i, u suštini, odbačene sve vrednosti antifašizma koje su proglašene za anacionalne komunističke podvale poturene zavedenom srpskom narodu, iako je sam pojam antifašizam, ispražnjen od sadžaja i neretko sasvim pervertovan, ipak zadržan, kao neupitni izvor legitimiteta. Ukratko, antifašizmom je proglašeno ono što antifašizam nije, uz odbacivanje svega ili gotovo svega što antifašizam jeste. Te vrednosti izvornog antifašizma su internacionalizam, tolerancija prema raznim oblicima različitosti (iako ni u samom antifašizmu nisu sve razlike koje se sada smatraju legitimnim takvima oduvek smatrane), emancipacija od esencijalizovanja tih različitosti, i naročito, marginalizovanje nacionalnih, verskih, rodnih, seksualnih, političkih i drugih različitosti kao politički bitnih karakteristika i faktora moralnog, ili ma kog drugog vrednovanja čoveka. Antifašizam je i sada, dakle, u tradiciji onoga što istorijski jeste, progresivna ideja i moralni stav, pre nego ideologija, i podrazumeva konstantno širenje baze slobode i tolerancije. Sasvim zakonomerno, kao što je diskriminacija ključna reč fašizma, tako je antidiskriminacija ključna reč antifašizma.
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It is difficult to overstate the scale of the electoral sweep of Prime Minister Zoran Zaev’s Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM) party in the October 15th municipal elections. Former Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski’s party, the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization – Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (VMRO-DPMNE), lost power at the local level across the country. Zaev’s victory, and that of his SDSM, following the June assembly of the coalition which included all ethnic Albanian parties, will reinforce the Zaev government’s control – and political responsibility. What Does This Mean? – The Chance for a. Democratic Reset
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The trial and sentencing of the former Ukrainian Prime Minister Yuliya Tymoshenko in 2011 is a double challenge to the European Union – testing both its credibility and the transformative capacity of its soft power. Kiev ignored clear warnings from Brussels and key member states, and then failed to deliver on promises of compromise. // The EU-Ukraine summit on Monday 19th December offers the chance to stop the rot in relations with Kyiv. // In a new policy memo published by ECFR, ‘Ukraine after the Tymoshenko verdict’, Andrew Wilson argues that instead of lecturing Ukraine on human rights the EU needs to show that it means business.
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