Kratka istorija antiratnog otpora u Srbiji 1991 – 1992
Mala čitanka za feministički diskusioni kružok „Od materinske politike mira do feminističkog antimilitarizma“.
More...We kindly inform you that, as long as the subject affiliation of our 300.000+ articles is in progress, you might get unsufficient or no results on your third level or second level search. In this case, please broaden your search criteria.
Mala čitanka za feministički diskusioni kružok „Od materinske politike mira do feminističkog antimilitarizma“.
More...
On the road towards EU enlargement, potential member states need to comply with the EU acquis communautaire. Chapter 18 of the acquis foresees the conduct of a population census by enlargement countries. This has proven to be more challenging in the post-war environment of the former Yugoslavia than in other countries. After the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the attributes of ethnicity and territory increased in importance as they were used to set or consolidate new borders and distribute rights and power according to population numbers and concentration. The sensitive aspects of ethnicity, language and religion, and the simple definition of the census category of ‘place of usual residence’ complicate the collection of census data in the region. This complication is rooted in the potential for an increase or decrease of ‘ethnic’ population numbers that can lead to the loss of rights or political influence. The significance of these aspects has been underestimated by the EU, which approaches the collection of population data as a rather technical exercise. This policy note reviews the recent census experiences in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to identify similarities in problems, process and politics, and to offer lessons learned for the future.
More...
When a new Croatian government was formed at the end of 2011 under SDP leadership, Prime Minister Zoran Milanović and Minister for Foreign and European Affairs, Vesna Pusić, took office and shortly thereafter announced their intention to make good relations with neighboring Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) a top priority of their policy of strong regional engagement. This decision to re-engage in BiH came after years of inactivity due to official Zagreb’s all-consuming focus on its preparations for EU membership and at a time when the on-going structural political crisis in BiH had reached new heights. There were growing demands for action on the crisis from individual EU member states despite the EU itself being not willing to seriously re-engage and take action. The new government’s BiH policy was to be a “principled policy” – one that would follow the state policy defined by former President Stipe Mesić in 2000 and accepted by all subsequent governments which was based on respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina and making it clear to BiH Croats that their capital is Sarajevo, not Zagreb. There was real hope in Zagreb that this was a new beginning. New opposition HDZ leader Tomislav Karamarko had generated further hope in a stronger, constructive BiH policy, on account of his political biography. But it soon became evident that there was no developed thinking or cohesive plan behind the basic declarations. Three years on, and hopes for change have been dashed. Croatia’s policy toward BiH has had little or no positive impact on relations between the two countries. Prime Minister Milanović’s efforts got mired in the conflictual relations among the key political actors in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Like former President Ivo Josipović’s earlier BiH policy initiative, it demonstrates that Croatia’s leverage in Bosnia and Herzegovina, particularly over BiH Croat politics, has substantially diminished since the 1990s. Foreign and European Affairs Minister Pusić attempted to make an impact working within the framework of the EU after Croatia became its 28th member, but her BiH plan received little support among member states, despite the fact that its main elements were almost identical to those of the later German-British initiative – now the EU’s new and much-touted BiH policy. Pusić could do little more than insist that she thought of it first. The Pusić plan had presented a dramatic policy U-turn that left the BiH experts within her ministry largely marginalized. Now, toward the end of Pusić’s term in office, those in her ministry in charge of BiH and the wider region appear to be skeptical of the prospects for the EU’s new BiH initiative to succeed. The BiH policy of all the top political players in today’s Croatia – the Prime Minister, the Foreign and European Affairs Minister, the President, the opposition leader – seems to be schizophrenic. They seem to possess closely-held views that are both moderate and reality-based. They reject the idea of a third entity, repudiate the HDZ BiH’s cooperation with the government in the Republika Srpska, and see the BiH Croat political leadership, along with the country’s entire political elite, as corrupt and part of the problem - not a part of the solution. Yet these views hardly ever translate into public performance or policy. Instead, the government, president, and opposition repeatedly allow themselves to get drawn into paying public tribute to Croatia’s 1990s policy legacy on BiH, which views the country solely through the lens of ethno-politics. While this conduct is considerably less invasive than it was under Croatian BiH policy in the 1990s, it nevertheless prevents Croatia from completely breaking with the past and setting aside the war legacy – which could now be done at a very low political price due to the current general disinterest of Croatian citizens regarding BiH. As a consequence, Croatia’s already limited potential impact as an honest broker on Bosnia and Herzegovina both in its direct relations with BiH and within the EU framework is further reduced. In Brussels, for example, Croatia’s MEPs are more vocal, but they are less respected than those of other new member states. Another policy remnant of the recent past is the constitutional right granted to BiH Croats with dual citizenship to vote in Croatian elections. The practice of this right undermines the sovereignty and democratic development of both Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.
More...
Bosnia Daily: January 27, 2014 – Diplomacy and the Syrian Equation
More...
“Compared with today's events in Kyiv, the Orange Revolution seems a children's party” – a foreign media outlet wrote when violent clashes on Hrushevskoho Street in Kyiv erupted between protesters and police and when the first blood was shed. And it's hard to disagree ... While the Orange Revolution of 2004 was a kind of joyful “festival of democracy” with songs, dances, humor, and blossoming of folk art, the "Revolution of Dignity" of 2013-2014, as it is now called, included tragic events of the kind that had never happened in the independent Ukraine. These two impressive popular revolutions in Ukraine do have a number of elements in common. They both started on November 21 (nine years apart), on the day of the Archangel Michael, the official patron saint of Kyiv and the head of the “heavenly army.” People often spoke about the mystical underpinnings of the protests, asserting that heavenly forces led by the Archangel Michael inspired people to fight against the regime. It is not surprising that the more than one hundred activists killed on the Maidan were promptly dubbed the “Heavenly Hundred.”
More...
(English edition) The Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (SANU) came to the political forefront some 10 years ago. Criticized by the “old regime” for the manner in which it raised the Serb question and its project of national homogenization (1986), and then encouraged by the “new regime” to continue its efforts, the Academy as an institution consented in the most critical years which determined the future of the common Yugoslav state (1987-1991) to act as a “collective mind” in judging and positively evaluating the execution of the “project” by Slobodan Milošević. It was this moment in the Academy’s political activity that caused internal turmoil and led to the crystallization of several groupings within its politically active membership. If the primary rift in 1992 was marked by being for or against Milošević personally, with both sides on the whole approving his “national project,” the breach is now much deeper at all levels. Nowadays the opinions of the members of the Academy differ on virtually all issues: the evaluation of Milošević’s rule, the point at which it became “bad” or “less bad,” the role of the Academy in society, the Memorandum, the nature of the wars in Yugoslavia, what constitutes victory or defeat, the importance and responsibility of intellectuals, population problems, and even election of their own officers. The Academy no longer comes out with common political stands, its present and former presidents deny that it is a “collective mind” and often cite ignorance of the situation as the reason why they cannot make public statements. Members even react to addresses delivered by officers at the Academy’s assemblies and meetings. It is therefore impossible today to reply to questions regarding the political orientation of the Academy, whether or not it at present has a “national program,” how it envisages Serbia’s future, since one would inevitably have to ascribe the views of a particular group of politically active academicians to the institution as a whole. Just as there was no doubt that such a group existed up to 1991 and encountered little overt opposition within the Academy, it is now certain that there are no more undisputed (national-political) authorities in the institution; only individuals remain with their personal opinions which are binding on no one but themselves. After a long series of failures, erroneous prognoses and an impermissibly uncivilized public settling of accounts, their personal authority as the “minds of the nation” has at best been seriously shaken, if it exists at all. For the reasons cited above, this paper is an overview of the stands predominating among the leading members of the Academy, its former and current presidents, and the stands of the politically active academicians. These academicians were in what used to be the dominant current in the Academy and are now only individuals who have closed their political circle – from their former belief that the generation which was nearing its allotted span had been called upon to reveal to the nation the road it should take, to the realization that the responsibility for all the defeats that have occurred in the meantime lies either on one man or is “collective.” Of their once staunch support for Slobodan Milošević, all that remains are their confused replies to the question: “Why do I protest?”
More...
(Serbian edition) The Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (SANU) came to the political forefront some 10 years ago. Criticized by the “old regime” for the manner in which it raised the Serb question and its project of national homogenization (1986), and then encouraged by the “new regime” to continue its efforts, the Academy as an institution consented in the most critical years which determined the future of the common Yugoslav state (1987-1991) to act as a “collective mind” in judging and positively evaluating the execution of the “project” by Slobodan Milošević. It was this moment in the Academy’s political activity that caused internal turmoil and led to the crystallization of several groupings within its politically active membership. If the primary rift in 1992 was marked by being for or against Milošević personally, with both sides on the whole approving his “national project,” the breach is now much deeper at all levels. Nowadays the opinions of the members of the Academy differ on virtually all issues: the evaluation of Milošević’s rule, the point at which it became “bad” or “less bad,” the role of the Academy in society, the Memorandum, the nature of the wars in Yugoslavia, what constitutes victory or defeat, the importance and responsibility of intellectuals, population problems, and even election of their own officers. The Academy no longer comes out with common political stands, its present and former presidents deny that it is a “collective mind” and often cite ignorance of the situation as the reason why they cannot make public statements. Members even react to addresses delivered by officers at the Academy’s assemblies and meetings. It is therefore impossible today to reply to questions regarding the political orientation of the Academy, whether or not it at present has a “national program,” how it envisages Serbia’s future, since one would inevitably have to ascribe the views of a particular group of politically active academicians to the institution as a whole. Just as there was no doubt that such a group existed up to 1991 and encountered little overt opposition within the Academy, it is now certain that there are no more undisputed (national-political) authorities in the institution; only individuals remain with their personal opinions which are binding on no one but themselves. After a long series of failures, erroneous prognoses and an impermissibly uncivilized public settling of accounts, their personal authority as the “minds of the nation” has at best been seriously shaken, if it exists at all. For the reasons cited above, this paper is an overview of the stands predominating among the leading members of the Academy, its former and current presidents, and the stands of the politically active academicians. These academicians were in what used to be the dominant current in the Academy and are now only individuals who have closed their political circle – from their former belief that the generation which was nearing its allotted span had been called upon to reveal to the nation the road it should take, to the realization that the responsibility for all the defeats that have occurred in the meantime lies either on one man or is “collective.” Of their once staunch support for Slobodan Milošević, all that remains are their confused replies to the question: “Why do I protest?”
More...
Nakon više od dvadeset godina, ime Aleksandre Zec još uvijek je demarkaciona linija u hrvatskom društvu. S jedne strane su oni koji lamentiraju nad pravosudnom farsom koja je poznate ubojice, bez obzira na njihova priznanja i materijalne dokaze, ostavila na slobodi. S druge pak oni kojima Aleksandra Zec služi isključivo za uspostavljanje razlike između ‘naših’ i ‘njihovih’ žrtava. U takvoj viktimološkoj dihotomiji ‘naše žrtve’ dobivaju mjesta posebnog pijeteta i “mramor ih se sjeća”, dok ‘njihove’ ostavljamo medijskim strvinama, stalno novom prežvakavanju onoga što nacionalno lobotomirana svijest nikako ne može provariti.
More...
France has declared that it is prepared to veto the approval of Macedonia’s candidate status, recommended last month by the European Commission. Instead, it has proposed a new debate as to whether there should be any further EU enlargement at all. The United Kingdom has proposed a new budget for the EU that would preclude any serious pre-accession assistance for the Western Balkans for the next 7-year budgetary period. The UK proposal could shut the door on further enlargement just as forcefully as a French veto. … Between France and the UK, there is now a distinct possibility that the European Council meeting beginning on Thursday (15th December) will not just deny candidate status to Macedonia, but throw the entire European strategy in the Balkans into confusion. This would be a disastrous policy error. For this reason, ESI is calling on EU member states not to forget their commitments to the countries of the Balkans, and their vital interest in lasting stability in the region on the eve of Kosovo status negotiations.
More...
Bulgarians are famously unhappy. A few years ago their pessimism came to international attention. A Gallup Poll discovered in 2009 that the citizens of this small Balkan nation had lower expectations for how their life would be five years later than Iraqis and Afghans. Bulgarians were not surprised by this discovery. A leading Sofia-based think tank, the Centre for Liberal Strategies (CLS), had already published a paper in 2003 titled Optimistic Theory about the Pessimism of the Transition. The latest World Happiness Report confirmed this global reputation for morosity in 2013. Out of 156 nations it ranked Bulgarians 144th, behind Iraqis and Afghans, Congolese and Haitians. || This raises questions, from the philosophical: is there a correlation between happiness and freedom? – to the political: does transition lead to happiness? Clearly Bulgarians enjoy more freedom today than the citizens of most of the world’s unhappy countries. Compared to their Western Balkan neighbours, Bulgarian leaders have done most things right in the past two decades. They kept their country out of war, pursued reforms, attracted foreign direct investment and brought Bulgaria into the European Union. Wages rose, poverty declined and there are more jobs today than a decade ago. So what explains this Bulgarian paradox?
More...
One popular idea about Bosnia and Herzegovina among European observers is that Newton’s first law of motion applies to its politics: this law says that an object at rest will stay at rest unless acted upon by an outside force. For Bosnian politics, that outside force has to be the international community. One debate in EU capitals today is whether Bosnia is “ready for the next step.” Now that Bosnians have applied for accession, the EU has an obvious way to find out: to give Bosnia a questionnaire, the first step towards preparing an opinion, without delay. The conventional wisdom that Bosnians cannot coordinate when it comes to EU matters is wrong. The history of relations between Bosnia and the EU since 2000 shows that whenever Bosnian institutions were seriously challenged by the EU to co-ordinate, they were able to do so – to the surprise of their European counterparts, who sometimes acted as though Bosnia was expected to fail. This report explores this history and sets the record straight.
More...
In 2008 the former High Representative Paddy Ashdown warned that “there is a real threat of Bosnia breaking up again … even a brief spell of wrong-headedness can quickly become the prelude to enduring tragedy.” In 2011 Ashdown warned the EU that unless it acted decisively, “bloodshed will return to Bosnia.” In 2013 two US-based analysts warned that Bosnia remained “at war” and that “the dynamics of war-era polarization still rage, captive to venal leadership and a defunct constitutional order.” In May 2015 an article in Foreign Policy argued that Bosnia faces “deeper and nearly irreparable injury.” In November 2015 Ashdown warned about “things going to become worse”, with the “potential for a dangerous and even tragical situation. || Clichés are terrible guides to action. They distort how other countries deal with Bosnia. They led the EU to conclude for many years, against actual experience, that Bosnian leaders were incapable of coordinating their responses to EU conditionality. Clichés divert limited attention from real problems and how to form reform coalitions to address them. It is time to take a closer look.
More...
Suočavanje s prošlošću, izgradnja kulture sjećanja u istini i pravednosti, jedan je od urgentnih zadataka za zdravlje pojedinca, obiteljske, etničke i religijske zajednice, pogotovo u višeetničkim i višereligijskim postratnim društvima. Konflikti sjećanja nipošto nisu usputni ni beznačajni jer su kolektivna pamćenja odreditelji kako osobnih tako i kolektivnih identiteta, odakle onda proizlazi da konflikti sjećanja mogu imati i razorne posljedice u stvarnim konfliktima progona i ubijanja. Bliža povijest, ratovi '90-ih, potvrdili su da su naši ubilački identiteti takvi jer su osvetnički, jer nalaze svoje opravdanje u razornoj moći sjećanja, konkretno – u zlopamćenju. Osvajački ratovi, s elementima građanskoga rata, u kojima je „etničko čišćenje“ (potpuno uklanjanje drugih s nekoga teritorija) bilo njihov cilj, bili su prije, i ostaju nakon bojnog polja ratovi sjećanja na patnje i žrtve uzrokovane zločinima zlih susjeda.
More...
Otac je iz Nemačke doneo mehaničku ptičicu. Navije se ključem, klima glavom kao da kljuca i skakuće u krug. Moja sestra Vesna ima šest, ja pet godina. Ispred zgrade na Novom Beogradu u kojoj je živela naša četvoročlana porodica, navijamo ptičicu, ona skakuće. Iznenada prilaze dva starija dečaka, uzimaju pticu i beže. Otkrivam osećaj bespomoćnosti, nemoći, nepravde. I ne nevažnu činjenicu da su to uradili dečaci.
More...
Više od dve decenije u Srbiji su zanemarene i, u suštini, odbačene sve vrednosti antifašizma koje su proglašene za anacionalne komunističke podvale poturene zavedenom srpskom narodu, iako je sam pojam antifašizam, ispražnjen od sadžaja i neretko sasvim pervertovan, ipak zadržan, kao neupitni izvor legitimiteta. Ukratko, antifašizmom je proglašeno ono što antifašizam nije, uz odbacivanje svega ili gotovo svega što antifašizam jeste. Te vrednosti izvornog antifašizma su internacionalizam, tolerancija prema raznim oblicima različitosti (iako ni u samom antifašizmu nisu sve razlike koje se sada smatraju legitimnim takvima oduvek smatrane), emancipacija od esencijalizovanja tih različitosti, i naročito, marginalizovanje nacionalnih, verskih, rodnih, seksualnih, političkih i drugih različitosti kao politički bitnih karakteristika i faktora moralnog, ili ma kog drugog vrednovanja čoveka. Antifašizam je i sada, dakle, u tradiciji onoga što istorijski jeste, progresivna ideja i moralni stav, pre nego ideologija, i podrazumeva konstantno širenje baze slobode i tolerancije. Sasvim zakonomerno, kao što je diskriminacija ključna reč fašizma, tako je antidiskriminacija ključna reč antifašizma.
More...
Vane Ivanović je umro 4. aprila 1999. Nekoliko nedelja pred smrt nije bio pri svesti, pa nije ni znao da je 24. marta NATO započeo bombardovanje Srbije. To mi je rekao njegov mlađi sin Andrija kada mi je telefonirao da mi saopšti tužnu vest i zamoli da je prosledim njegovim jugoslovenskim prijateljima u Britaniji. Sećam se da je u tom trenutku J. bila pored mene i da me je bezuspešno tešila. Nisam mogao da zadržim suze. Kada sam se malo pribrao, telefonirao sam profesoru Stevanu Pavloviću, a zatim i ostalim zajedničkim prijateljima. Imao sam osećaj da je Vanetov odlazak značio mnogo više nego lični gubitak za porodicu i prijatelje, među kojima sam poslednjih godina njegovog života bio i ja. Baš u kontekstu strašnih događaja iz poslednje decenije prošlog veka – gubitak stotina hiljada života, miliona domova, stotine hiljada, ako ne i milioni fizički i mentalno osakaćenih ljudi, nestanak jedne zemlje, zajedničkog jezika, zajedničkih uspomena… – osećao sam da je Vanetov odlazak bio posebno težak gubitak. J., Amerikanka, nije mogla da razume kako može jedan čovek, koji pritom nije bio predsednik ili bar vođa političke partije, nego emigrant, doduše dobrostojeći, toliko da znači za jedan narod. Nisam uspeo, a možda ni umeo, da joj objasnim. Već smo se bili raspravljali oko NATO bombardovanja: ona, Amerikanka, stidela se politike svoje zemlje i bila je gotovo stoprocentno na srpskoj strani. Ja sam pokušavao da razumem sve tri (dve?) strane u sukobu, ali sam se najviše stideo i najviše osuđivao zločine koje je činila srpska strana. Stalno sam se pitao šta bi Vane rekao i kako bi se držao. Bio sam uveren da sam postupao kao što bi i on: on bi osudio zločine srpske strane, sigurno ne bi podržavao albanski nacionalizam i akcije UČK, bio bi protiv daljeg cepanja jugoslovenskog prostora, i ne bi podržao zapadnu vojnu intervenciju protiv njegovih Jugoslovena. Jednom rečju, bio bi u ‘mini manjini’ (kako bi on rekao) i bilo bi mu užasno teško. Kao što je bilo i meni, profesoru Pavloviću, Desimiru Tošiću, Jasni Dragović, Dejanu Joviću i ostalim prijateljima s kojima sam tada bio u stalnom kontaktu.
More...
Ratovi 90-ih na teritoriji bivše SFRJ prouzrokovani su separatističkim nastojanjima Slovenije, Hrvatske i BiH da se na protivustavan način otcepe od SFRJ, što je Predsedništvo SFRJ upotrebom vojne sile JNA pokušalo da spreči i time očuva ustavni poredak i teritorijalni integritet zemlje. Tako otprilike glasi osnovni stav Miloševićeve propagande kojima je sve vreme opravdavao svoje postupke. Taj stav je ujedno bio i osnova njegove odbrane pred Haškim tribunalom. Taj stav je konačno ona monumentalna neistina, busija, iza koje se i danas krije srpski nacionalizam: kada proglašava za heroje Karadžića i Mladića budući da su oni samo branili srpski narod koji su separatisti pokušavali da otmu od matice Srbije; i kada insistira na tvrdnji da Srbija nije bila u ratu i da je sukob imao prirodu spontano nastalog građanskog rata u kome je JNA samo nastojala da razdvoji sukobljene strane i zaštiti srpski narod.
More...
Retke su zemlje, poput naše, u kojima je “ustavna radnja” napeta kao neki kriminalistički roman, prepun raznovrsnih zavera, zločina i namerno zamršenih tragova. Ova radnja pleni pažnju široke čitalačke publike koja se, u zavisnosti od trenutne sekvence, uvek iznova opredeljuje, ne mareći previše za vlastito prethodno ubeđenje. Uloge ustavobranitelja i ustavorušitelja razmenjuju se kao pozorišne maske. Ako su se slovenački političari donedavno profilirali kao poslednji branioci ugroženog Ustava, sada ih ništa ne sprečava da isti taj Ustav, neznatno izmenjen, bez griže savesti pošalju na drugi svet. Obrnuto, srpski ustavorušitelji odjednom otkrivaju svoju strasnu ljubav za donedavni objekt svog pravednog gneva i spremni su da ga brane sve dok se ne pogase i poslednje pozorišne svetiljke.
More...