"Uvjerenje i ustav": Napomene o jednome ne samo hegelovskom problemu

Author(s): Ludwig Siep / Language(s): Croatian / Issue: 04/1988

The central problem of Hegel’s philosophy of law is how to unite the convictions of different individuals into the common will permanently directed towards achieving the common good. Hegel finds the solution in relating convictions to social roles. This pluralism of roles is reconciled with the loyalty to the constitution through a free development of group behaviour and the institutional linkage of private, group and common interests on all the levels of social organization. It was difficult for Hegel to anticipate that the private views could be mediated through common will owing to political organizations.

(META)ETYKA A FILOZOFIA PRAWA

Author(s): Monika Zalewska / Language(s): Polish / Issue: 26/2014

In this paper I have focused on methodological problems of ethics and legal philosophy. My main goal was to determine relation between meta-ethics and legal philosophy. In the first part I tried to describe historical context, how jurisprudence become independent form ethics. Then in second part I examined relations between main disciplines of ethics and legal philosophy pointing out that although there are some similarities, there is even more differences. Finally in the third part I explored relation between meta-ethics and legal philosophy. My conclusion was that the problems of meta-ethics also exists in legal philosophy but the level of significance is lower. The reason for it lays in the specific character of legal norms which existence depends on the will of competent authority in contrast to moral norms which need other, meta-ethical justification.

[rec.] Stefan Jan Karolak, Sprawiedliwość. Sens prawa

Author(s): Dawid Dziurkowski / Language(s): Polish / Issue: 14/2017

Review of: Dawid DZIURKOWSKI - [rec.] Stefan Jan Karolak, Sprawiedliwość. Sens prawa, Wydawnictwo Petrus, Kraków 2015, ss. 350

1st International Workshop on Law and Ideology, Wrocław, 29-30.05.2014 r.

Author(s): Wojciech Zomerski,Wojciech Kauczor / Language(s): Polish / Issue: 1/2014

2nd International Workshop On Law And Ideology Memories Of Struggles, Struggles Of Memories, Sarajevo, 28-29 maja 2015

Author(s): Filip Rakoczy / Language(s): Polish / Issue: 2/2015

A Few Questions Concerning Photographs in Court Decisions

Author(s): Michał Dudek / Language(s): English / Issue: 2/2018

The aim of this article is to discuss the infrequent, but noticeable, practice of inserting photographs in court decisions. Against the background of the few existing studies on this practice, which seem to be overly case-specific, this article proposes a more general, even universal list of problems connected with it. It addresses a short list of questions about the inclusion of photographs in court decisions, such as, for instance: “Why do judges include in court decisions photographs concerning the case-relevant facts?”; “Who are the addressees of these photographs?”; “What is the source of the photographs used and are all sources allowable?”; and “How come that some segments of court decisions are accompanied by relevant photographs and others are not?”. A discussion of these and other questions enables the conceptualisation of many problems connected with inserting photographs in court decisions – most notably, that of the criteria of choice, which previously has not been explicitly addressed, but barely hinted at – and leads to the conclusion that the practice in question, surrounded by many controversies, should be discontinued.

A Few Remarks on Equitable Law (from the Perspective of the System of Statutory Law)

Author(s): Wojciech Dziedziak / Language(s): English / Issue: 1/2018

The article discusses equitable law with reference to the perspective of the system of statutory law. The author founds the substantive theory of equitable law on the following values: truth, good, justice and human dignity. The paper defines the understanding of these values. Then, it indicates that they should be respected in legislative activities (in lawmaking) as well as in the application of law so that the law (norms) and decisions should be equitable. It is also emphasised that equity is “an instance” that can protect the man and his dignity – the dignity of the human person.

A Jigsaw Puzzle for Rainy Days - How to Put Together the Pieces: Sources of Law, Forms of Law, Principles, Standards, Rules and Norms - to Get a Consistent Picture of Law?

Author(s): Alexander Bröstl / Language(s): English / Issue: 3/2020

This is a proposal – “a tentative smile on the face of law” - how to create a consistent picture of law and diminish the confusion in the usage of the most frequent key-legal concepts. Its outcome is that law is one entity: its structure so far contains terms of the same degree with respect to all of their variables (sources, forms or rules, norms), from general rules (principles, laws) to individual rules (judicial and administrative decisions).

A Kantian Critique of Grotius

Author(s): Macarena Marey / Language(s): English / Issue: 95/2019

During the last few years, it has become usual to turn to some seventeenth century readings of the traditional idea of an original common possession of the earth for philosophical aid to explain and support the rights of persons in situations of extreme need, including refugees. Hugo Grotius’s conception of this idea is one of the most cited ones. In this paper, I hold that a Grotian reading of the idea of an original common possession of the earth is not a fruitful principle if we want to elaborate a solid defence of the rights of the ones in need. I reconstruct and analyse the role this idea has in Grotius’s theory of private property and present objections to it from a Kantian perspective.

A Note on Legal Education, Its Specific Features and Related Myths

Author(s): Małgorzata Król / Language(s): English / Issue: 2/2016

The question of legal education is recognised as important along various dimensions and thus has been in the focus of attention of numerous distinguished legal scholars and practitioners all over the world. The problem of legal education includes not just methodological issues, but also the issues that are par excellence philosophical in nature. Legal education has a specificity that arises from the nature of law and its complexity, and is related to the personal dimension of this education. The process of education should be organised in such a way that students should be in contact with members of the legal community whose authority, moral and subject matter-related attributes play a vital, formative role in legal education. The author tries to confront the didactics-related reality with ideals and postulates present within this field. Yet, it is revealed that such a reality is hidden below a “thick layer” of myths, which have grown around legal education. These myths blur the real picture of lawyers’ education, creating a kind of legal education mythology. Two types of systemic legal myths are indicated. The first one is built on the paradigm of university legal education. The other type is based on the paradigm of university studies.

A TRANSDISCIPLINARY AND CROSSCULTURAL INTRODUCTION TO THE ISSUE OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN A “GLOCAL” WORLD. ABOUT THE REVERSAL OF THE RELATION BETWEEN THE LOCAL AND THE GLOBAL AND ITS CONSEQUENCES FOR THE FERTILITY AND QUALITY OF HUMAN RELATIONS

Author(s): Dominique Bouchet / Language(s): English / Issue: 71/2021

The purpose of my contribution is to provide a general overview of the issue at stake when today over the world people debate human rights. In order to do so I will rely on and both differentiate and associate philosophical, anthropological, ethnological, historical, sociological, political, and psychological approaches. Let me stress that this is not at all to contribute to a muddled understanding of the issue of human rights that necessarily has to be perceived differently depending on the field of research. On the contrary, it is in fact to articulate that the issue of human rights can only be understood from a transdisciplinary perspective; and that cross-cultural communication is required to approach the question of ‘values’ and ‘rights’ in our globalized world.

Abuso del diritto ed autonomia negoziale. Nuovi approcci giurisprudenziali e profili comparatistici.

Author(s): Marco Farina,Demetrio Maltese / Language(s): Italian / Issue: 3/2012

Afirmatywna amnezja i konserwatywni crits. Kilka uwag o kondycji krytycznej myśli prawniczej w Europie Środkowej i Wschodniej

Author(s): Adam Sulikowski / Language(s): Polish / Issue: 1/2014

The purpose of this article is to analyze the causes and effects of two phenomena, which can be considered as characteristic of the critical legal discourse in Central and Eastern Europe. The first phenomenon is sometimes termed as „affirmative amnesia”. It consists of the abandonment of critical methodology by legal scholars who have dealt with the Marxist critique of the neoliberal law for the major period of their careers. The author tries to diagnose the cause of this phenomenon. The second of these trends lies in the fact that the critical tools that are used on the West mostly by left-wing thinkers, in Central and Eastern Europe are applied by conservative rightists.

Ahlaksız Hukuk ve Dinsiz Ahlak Mümkün Müdür?: Felsefi Bir Yaklaşım

Author(s): Tuncay İMAMOĞLU / Language(s): Turkish / Issue: 55/2021

The purpose of this article is to discuss the problematic grounding of immoral law and irreligious morality and to examine them with a different approach. Are the rules of morality and the rules of law the same? Can law without morals satisfy the human conscience? Is morality an obstacle to freedom? What is the source of morality? What is the relationship of morality with nature and religion? Can an atheistic person be moral, and can a religious person be immoral? Is it possible to ground morality with secular references? Around these and similar questions, we will discuss the possibility of immoral law and irreligious morality. In our article, we will try to analyse that immoral law will be inadequate to satisfy human conscience, and that morality can be grounded without religion or God in its source, which creates great difficulties. All these analyses will be presented in the philosophical and theological perspective in our article.

Aitia – wina arystotelesowska. Zagadnienia definicyjne. Część I

Author(s): Waldemar Gontarski / Language(s): Polish / Issue: 2/2012

When engaging in polemics with Pythagoras, Aristotle observed that the retributive function of punishment, as distinguished from the preventative one, does not involve revenge understood as material retaliation (i.e. suffering for suffering, meaning retaliation proportional to the damage suffered). It does not encompass a simple reciprocity, such as suffering in turn (ἀντιπάσχω), but instead shall be considered as a just reciprocity, meaning doing in return (ἀντιποιέω), whereby the degree of mental contribution is taken into account. The classical theory of responsibility, at least under the meaning assigned to it by Aristotle, considers human responsibility by means of reference to the mental capabilities of the actor in respect to the particular harmful action. An action involving human guilt is consequently contrasted with an accidentally caused action. In the works of Stagirite the mental attitude of the actor towards his action distinguishes human causation from the accidental one and from the forced one. Pythagoras, on the other hand, discussed material retaliation, meaning objective responsibility. At the same time, the author of Nicomachean Ethics had already experienced the system of subjective responsibility based on the concept of knowingly caused damage as opposed to the system of objective responsibility involving the objective causal relationship between actor’s behavior and the resulting damage. Aristotle has extended the concept of subjective responsibility to cover both knowingly caused damage (intentional fault) and unintentional fault, whereby the damage is directly caused by the negligent conduct of the actor, meaning the failure of the latter to observe required objective and abstract standards. The mental component and related to it subjectivization involve the actor possessing required intellectual capabilities, but not using them in a way as to observe the aforementioned imposed standards. Nonetheless, the potential mental component is itself not sufficient to establish guilt. Otherwise, all the people (apart from those lacking capacity at all) shall be declared guilty regardless of the fact that the damage was caused by them accidentally.

Aitia – wina arystotelesowska. Zagadnienia definicyjne. Część II

Author(s): Waldemar Gontarski / Language(s): Polish / Issue: 1/2013

When engaging in polemics with Pythagoras, Aristotle observed that the retributive function of punishment, as distinguished from the preventative one, does not involve revenge understood as material retaliation (i.e. suffering for suffering, meaning retaliation proportional to the damage suffered). It does not encompass a simple reciprocity, such as suffering in turn (ἀντιπάσχω), but instead shall be considered as a just reciprocity, meaning doing in return (ἀντιποιέω), whereby the degree of mental contribution is taken into account. The classical theory of responsibility, at least under the meaning assigned to it by Aristotle, considers human responsibility by means of reference to mental capabilities of the actor in respect to a particular harmful action. An action involving human guilt is consequently contrasted with an accidentally caused action. In the works of Stagirite the mental attitude of the actor towards his action distinguishes human causation from the accidental one and from the forced one. Pythagoras, on the other hand, discussed material retaliation, meaning objective responsibility. At the same time, the author of Nicomachean Ethics had already experienced the system of subjective responsibility based on the concept of knowingly caused damage as opposed to the system of objective responsibility involving the objective causal relationship between the actor’s behavior and the resulting damage). Aristotle has extended the concept of subjective responsibility to cover both knowingly caused damage (intentional fault) and unintentional fault, whereby the damage is directly caused by the negligent conduct of the actor, meaning the failure of the latter to observe required objective and abstract standards. The mental component and the related subjectivization involve the actor possessing required intellectual capabilities, but not using them in a way as to observe the aforementioned imposed standards. Nonetheless, the potential mental component is itself not sufficient to establish guilt. Otherwise, all the people (apart from those lacking capacity at all) shall be declared guilty regardless of the fact that the damage was caused by them accidentally.

Ajhman u Hagu

Author(s): Obrad Savić / Language(s): Serbian / Publication Year: 0

Pitanje političke pravde, i s tim u vezi, lične, kolektivne, i međunarodne odgovornosti neposredno je pokrenuto nakon traumatskog iskustva sa različitim oblicima totalitarizma (»Moram da vas zamolim izraz lična odgovornost shvatite kao suprotnost političkoj odgovornosti koju svaka vlast preuzima za dela i nedela svojih prethodnika, a svaki narod za dela i nedela svoje prošlosti« – Hana Arent).

An Essay on Natural and Distributive Justice

Author(s): Wojciech Dziedziak / Language(s): English / Issue: 4/2020

The article addresses the issues of natural justice and distributive justice. The traditional formula “to render to everyone his or her own” (suum cuique tribuere) was taken as the point of departure. The discussion leads to the conclusion that natural justice concerns every person, and that everyone is entitled to inherent, innate rights, fundamental human rights. The exercise of natural justice ensures basic participation in the goods of the community, namely the state. This is so because this justice requires that every person be provided with an existence appropriate to the dignity of the human person. The relationship between natural justice and distributive justice exists at the level of elementary objective needs. Natural justice, when exercised, in a sense meets the formula “to render to everyone according to their legitimate needs”, meeting objective, basic needs, but this applies only to part of society. This justice is broader, it does not boil down to these elementary needs and, of course, it relates also to other things than needs. In a sense, it could be said that natural justice “intervenes” where justice applied according to the principles of proportionality is not enough. Man, with his or her guaranteed natural, equal rights enacted as positive law in line with natural justice, through his or her own action “uses justice” by using (positive) law and provides himself or herself with a decent life. However, natural justice does not omit anyone, its implementation actually replaces the formula of distribution justice “render to everyone according to legitimate needs”. In distributive justice, equality is about proportion to the contribution made, but also to the merit. Of these two principles, the guiding principle, because of its universality, is the formula “render to everyone according to their contribution”: those who contribute more to the good of the community, receive more.

AnthroHeinrich Beck, Dialogik – Analogie – Trinität: Ausgewählte Beiträge und Aufsätze des Autors zu seinem 80. Geburtstag

Author(s): Bogoljub Šijaković / Language(s): Serbian / Issue: 2/2014

A-podmiotowość władzy – mit i rzeczywistość, czyli Zakład Ubezpieczeń Społecznych jako władza „suwerenna”

Author(s): Arkadiusz Barut / Language(s): Polish / Issue: 2/2015

The subject of the article is the analysis of a specific feature of contemporary political and administrative power. As analytic categories the author uses Foucaultian concepts of power discourses: sovereignty: the type of individualized power which strives for self-conservation (pre-modern type of power) and governmentality – the type of non-individualized power the aims of which are control and management of the population (modern type of power). Contemporary power – the bureaucratic power described by M. Weber etc. – seems to be the type of governmentality. But in this field emerges a new type of sovereign power legitimized by the discourse of governmentality – management and protection of the population. Its examples are analysed by G. Agemben i J. Butler indefinite detention in Guantanamo. In this articles, the author focuses on symptoms of the new type of sovereignty in day-to day government action – the practice of the polish organ of compulsory social insurance – Social Insurance Institution (Zakład Ubezpieczeń Społecznych).