(Nie)obiektywna podmiotowość

Author(s): Piotr Piotrowski / Language(s): Polish / Issue: 36/2016

In this article, I analyze the issue of subjectivity in the form in which it appears in Charles Taylor’s and Richard Rorty’s writings. Positions of these philosophers are generally regarded as contradictory. I will, however, argued that the position on subjectivity represented by Rorty finds its complementation in Taylor’s concept. To do this, I will show firstly that both Rorty and Taylor use the category of contingency, presenting some common thesis about subjectivity. This way I will show that the location of the category of subjectivity and the scope of its use in each of them concept is closely related to the understanding of objectivity accepted by each of them. This will allow then to reconstruct the concept of subjectivity presented by Taylor and Rorty. Next, in the conclusion, I will present such a summary of those two standpoints, which will include justification of the thesis of their complementarity.

“Epistemological Reading”: Stanley Cavell’s Method of Reading Literature

Author(s): Magdalena Filipczuk / Language(s): English / Issue: 4/2016

Not many readers will recognize ‘Disowning Knowledge: Seven Plays of Shakespeare’ by Stanley Cavell as either a piece of philosophical writing or literary criticism, so it may be useful to ask what method Cavell uses to read literature, what are the main features of his approach, and whether he has a coherent view on what reading literature means. I examine Cavell’s interdisciplinary eclecticism, the feature which makes his work so original, and I describe his moving away from the British and American analytic tradition in which he was trained to other sources of inspiration, especially Thoreau. I also stress the important fact that Cavell does not avoid autobiographical motifs in his writings, the style of which derives to some extent from the Jewish tradition of storytelling. In his writings Cavell declares his adherence to an ahistorical approach, maintaining that in a sense philosophy is trans historical. In many of his books the central issue is the challenge that skepticism poses, and he endeavors to make a convincing case against it. Although Cavell’s work covers a broad range of interests, including tragedy and literature, as well as Romantic poetry, Shakespeare, Henry James and Samuel Beckett, I try to answer the question of why his analyses of skepticism in literature focus especially on the works of Shakespeare.

A PLEA FOR THE PLURALITY OF FUNCTION

Author(s): Tony Cheng / Language(s): English / Issue: 15/2016

In this paper I defend a pluralistic approach in understanding function, both in biological and other contexts. Talks about function are ubiquitous and crucial in biology, and it might be the key to bridge the “manifest image” and the “scientific image” identified by Sellars (1962). However, analysis of function has proven to be extremely difficult. The major puzzle is to make sense of “time-reversed causality”: how can property P be the cause of its realizer R? For example, “pumping blood” is a property of hearts, but a property of hearts cannot be the cause of the presence of hearts, since properties cannot predate their realizers and be causes of them. In section 2 I discuss Wright’s etiological analysis, Cummins’ causal-role analysis, and their critics. In section 3 I defend a version of the “consensus without unity” strategy proposed by Godfrey-Smith from Christopher Boorse’s recent critique (2002). In Section 4 I conclude by reflecting on the relation between functional discourses and physicalism.

ABOUT PRACTICAL PROBLEM SOLVING

Author(s): Arto Mutanen / Language(s): English / Issue: 89/2016

Knowledge is, by definition, reliable and, hence, it can be applied to a variety of different problems. Nevertheless, in practical problem solving, we do not rely on mere truthful knowledge, but also on information which frames the practical acceptability. We are not looking for truthful solution but an optimal solution. Optimal solution is found out by optimizing some given (practical) parameters. The optimization is both theory based and practice based process. That is, practical problem solving is a human deliberation that interconnects theoretical and practical knowledge. So, the philosophical foundation of practical problem solving interconnects theoretical and practical philosophy. Especially ethical deliberation plays – or should play – central role in practical problem solving. The complexity of the advanced scientific knowledge needed in solving present day practical problems separates the people who know, from the people who do (decide). The situation makes immediate that we need some deeper pedagogical conviction: we need ecological education.

Alice Returns From Wonderland

Ontological Frameworks for Explanation from Contemporary Quantum Theories

Author(s): Mladen Domazet,Mladen Domazet / Language(s): English / Publication Year: 2012

Alice returns from Wonderland discusses scientific explanation and its importance for scientific knowledge. The classical ideal of coherence and completeness of physics was shaken in the early 20th century with the appearance of quantum mechanics, and this opened the floodgates of skepticism about the explanatory potential of science. Through extensive examination of principle and constructive approaches to methodology and explanation in quantum theory, Domazet discusses realist and antirealist approaches to scientific enterprise as a whole. The need for modification of the everyday conceptual framework through modification of some foundational units of the realist material ontology arises. The book argues for the reintroduction of the metaphysical component of science; to base explanations of empirical phenomena on ontological commitments. Despite the unfamiliar phenomena like quantum teleportation, imaginary Alice finds a way to hold on to familiar macroscopic objects, as one of many instances of durable generalized objects subjected not only to spatio-temporal constrictions but also to ontologically primitive fundamental laws of temporal evolution.

An Examination of Superluminal Motion

Author(s): Argun Abrek Canbolat / Language(s): English / Issue: 2/2017

In this work, the debate between Yuri Balashov and Hud Hudson is reviewed in terms of the views put forward by Tim Maudlin. It seems that Maudlin’s view can shed light on the debate and may ensure new discussions and perspectives. Hudson, posing an interesting thought experiment, says that superluminal motion is possible whereas Balashov argues to the contrary. If we take into account what Tim Maudlin suggests in the first chapter of his book The Metaphysics within Physics, namely, that “laws of nature ought to be accepted as ontologically primitive,” we can interpret Balashov-Hudson debate from a new perspective. It can be said that Balashov would be taking a step forward if we were to take into account Maudlin perspective.

Analitička filozofija istorije

Author(s): Rade Kalik / Language(s): Serbian / Issue: 294-295/1983

Filozofija koja nema za cilj postavlianje novih filozofskih stavova, već za svoj osnovni zadatak smatra samoočišćenje od svake metafizike, svodi svoju aktivnost isključivo na filozofsku analizu pojmova. Stoga i filozofija istorije, unutar ove tradicije, postaje jedna u nizu ovih analitičkih aktivnosti, usmerena na značaj i istinitost istorijskih stavova, na njihovo objašnjenje, objektivnost, uzročnost i vrednovanje. Ako samo pogledamo sadržaj jedne od ovakvih filozofija istorije, nailazimo upravo na poglavlja pod ovim naslovima, pa i na sklonost da se i samo ime »filozofija istorije« zameni novim - »objašnjenje istorije«.

Antynomie teorii mnogości

Author(s): Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz / Language(s): Polish / Issue: 4 (92)/2015

The main aim of the study — written by Ajdukiewicz in 1913 in order to fulfil the requirements for a teaching certificate — is to provide a clear classification of set-theoretic paradoxes (Russell’s, Burali-Forti’s, Richard’s, König’s, and Berry’s) and to present a uniform way of framing them, which combines ideas put forward by Grelling, Nelson, and Russell. In the last part of the study, Ajdukiewicz surveys available solutions (Poincaré, Richard, Russell, Frege, Bernstein, Jourdain) and comments on their validity. The edition is based on a typescript.

Argumentativna semantika

Author(s): Oswald Ducrot / Language(s): Bosnian / Issue: 1/1998

Opći cilj ovog cjelokupnog rada govori o tome da se u semantičkom opisu maksimalno ograniči - i, ako je moguće, čak eliminira - pojam informativnosti. Zapravo, imam dojam da niti jedan dio iskazanog smisla, niti pak smisla jezika, ne sadrži opis stvarnosti, te mi se stoga ne čini da su pojmovi istine i neistine prikladni za opis lingvističkih činjenica. Govoreći ovo, čini mi se da se odvraćam od uobičajenog pojma značenja kakav se sprovodi u samom jezičkom rječniku, tj. pokušavam izgraditi drugačiji pojam značenja negoli je onaj što nam ga sam jezik pokušava nametnuti. Ako hoćete, pokušavam vidjeti jezik drugačije negoli on vidi sebe samog. To je moj opći cilj; sada treba pokušati da se precizira sredstvo kojim kanim postići taj cilj. Dvije teorije mi se čine posebno pogodnim za napredovanje k tom cilju: teorija polifonije i teorija argumentacije.

Argumenty na rzecz nieredukcyjnego ujęcia tożsamości osobowej

Author(s): Mariusz Grygianiec / Language(s): Polish / Issue: 34/2016

In the debate on personal identity many different criteria of identity are proposed and defended. Criteria of identity are usually taken to state necessary and sufficient conditions of identity and are viewed, in their metaphysical interpretation, as providing truth conditions of relevant identity statements. In my paper I argue that this view is misconceived and I present some arguments for the simple view of personal identity, according to which there are no noncircular and informative criteria of identity for persons. In particular, I argue that there are no other facts of the matter than identity itself which would serve as truth conditions of statements concerning numerical identity. I also try to justify the view that in most cases criteria of identity should be interpreted either epistemically as a means for finding out whether identity holds or not or metaphysically as criteria of genidentity, which provide appropriate persistence conditions for objects of a given kind.

Autorytet epistemiczny w sytuacji epistemicznej

Author(s): Filip Kobiela / Language(s): Polish / Issue: 1 (93)/2016

The first part of the article presents Józef M. Bocheński’s analysis of authority. Emphasis is placed on the formal definition of authority and the distinction between two kinds of authority — epistemic and deontic. The second part of the article presents the results of further analysis conducted in Bocheński’s style. It revolves around the function of epistemic authority in an “epistemic situation”, i.e. within the structure of human beliefs regarded in the context of their origin and their truth values. This makes it possible to highlight the importance of epistemic authority in modern society and the need to analyse false authority and other related notions. Suggested definitions of these notions are presented together with a brief analysis of particular cases.

Ayerova interpretacija Descartesovog stava Cogito, ergo sum

Author(s): Kenan Šljivo / Language(s): Bosnian / Issue: 08/2015

In this paper, I will explicate the basic aspects of Ayer’s criticism of Descartes’ statement“Cogito, ergo sum”. Namely, Ayer tried to show in his criticism that this statement is an expression of Descartes’ tendency to deduce all human knowledge from intuitively certain premises. What I want to show in this paper is that Ayer’s critique of this statement has in itself entirely integrated positivist matrices about the understanding of traditional metaphysics. This positivist criticism takes Descartes’ philosophy as the most representative example of the metaphysical way of thinking. In this article, I want to show that the evaluation of Ayer’s criticism of Descartes entirely depends on the acceptance of the positivist philosophical project, in other words, I want to show that this analytical endeavor of Ayer is acceptable only from the perspective of requirements which are set before philosophy by the positivist orientation on the conceptual value of various philosophical systems.

Aнализ на „неопределимите“ и логическите константи в Ръселовата философска логика

Author(s): Denitsa Zhelyazkova / Language(s): English,Bulgarian / Issue: 1/2017

The basic aim of this study is to reveal and demonstrate how the analysis of the topic of contradiction can outline directions for overcoming transcendentalism, i.e., outline ontological-dialectical approaches to logic through the prism of Kant and Hegel, and based on this, present the result of paraconsistent logic with regard to the formalization of dialectical logic.

Becker, Ramsey, and Hi-world Semantics. Toward a Unified Account of Conditionals

Author(s): Cheng-Chih Tsai / Language(s): English / Issue: 46/2016

In Lowe (1995), instead of endorsing a Stalnaker/Lewis-style account of counterfactuals, E. J. Lowe claims that a variation of C. I. Lewis’s strict implication alone captures the essence of everyday conditionals and avoids the paradoxes of strict implication. However, Lowe’s approach fails to account for the validity of simple and straightforward arguments such as ‘if 2=3 then 2+1=3+1’, and Heylen & Horsten (2006) even claims that no variation of strict implication can successfully describe the logical behavior of natural language conditionals. By incorporating the German logician O. Becker’s modal intuition with the insight of Ramsey’s Test, we show that there does exist a unified, strict-conditional based account of everyday conditionals, which withstands all attacks previously raised against truth-conditional accounts of conditionals. Furthermore, a subtle distinction between autistic and realistic readings of the indexical ‘I’ involved in a conditional helps us resolve a recent debate concerning the Thomason conditionals.

Bertranda Russella koncepcja monizmu neutralnego

Author(s): Jacek Jarocki / Language(s): Polish / Issue: 33/2016

The metaphysical view of Bertrand Russell, called neutral monism, is not widely known today, although its impact on the contemporary debate over mind-body problem is clearly visible. The aim of this paper is to answer the question: what was Russell’s neutral monism? Firstly, I present the views of Russell’s predecessors – Ernst Mach and William James. Then, I discuss Russell’s own thought which can be divided into three phases. The initial phase is the rejection of neutral monism (mainly because of Russell’s commitments to epistemology). The second phase – I call it the first neutral monism – appears in The Analysis of Mind, where he proposes a deflationary theory of the object and the subject. The last, third phase – called the second neutral monism, initiated in 1927 in The Analysis of Matter and An Outline of Philosophy – introduces the notions of intrinsic and extrinsic properties. Finally, I suggest that the agnostic metaphysics of Russell is too reductive for a dualist and too mysterious for a materialist. However, it might be also true that Russell’s view is more epistemological than metaphysical, and the frames of (misleading) Cartesian dictionary of mind/matter may be too narrow for neutral monism to be pertinently interpreted.

Białe kłamstwo w praktyce medycznej z perspektywy wybranych teorii etycznych

Author(s): Krzysztof Sobczak,Agata Janaszczyk / Language(s): Polish / Issue: 32/2015

Does a medical practitioner have a moral obligation to mislead a patient about hiscondition, if he has subjective certainty, that revealing the truth to the patient mayharm him even more? Or, perhaps the practioner is always bound to fully inform thepatient about true state of his health? Idea that pertains to those questions is, in itsnature, achronic. It has accompanied medicine since its birth and has also becomean issue pondered by philosophers. Over the course of centuries, various ethicalfundaments have been created by social and historical contexts. Their purpose wasto evaluate the so called ‘white lie’. The intention of this article is to classify and describemain ethical concepts, within which a solution to this issue has been sought for.

Bycie czy byt? O dwóch podstawowych terminach filozofii Heideggera i problemach z ich polskimi przekładami

Author(s): Daniel R. Sobota / Language(s): Polish / Issue: 31/2015

Martin Heidegger’s texts are among the most difficult in the philosophical literature throughout the world. Paradoxically, despite they are commonly considered as untranslatable, they belong to the most frequently translated twentieth-century philosophical texts. High availability of translations makes the thought of Heidegger still enjoy great interest and result in a number of comments. The constantly growing number of translations of his texts affects shapes of national philosophies and their issues. It is particularly clearly visible in Poland where for a long time the philosophy of Heidegger was available only to the narrow circle of the German-speaking philosophers. The situation has changed significantly since the early nineties, when there rapidly began to appear translations of his major works. However, a different problem occurred – namely the problem of translation. It is nowhere so much invisible as in the case of two basic words: bycie (Being) and byt (being). This text follows various ways of translating and interpreting of Heidegger’s terms, asking about their philosophical relevance and relationship to the established philosophical tradition. Not denying any previous choices, it tries to develop a relevant criterion for understanding the two concepts. In order to do this, it tries to reveal the most important idea of Heidegger’s philosophy.

CAUSAL DETERMINANTS, REASONS, AND SUBSTANTIVE AUTONOMY: A CRITICAL APPROACH TO AGENCY

Author(s): Murat Baç / Language(s): English / Issue: 71/2007

Although the notion of agency presents itself as an attractive solution to the puzzle of free will, it faces a problem vis-ŕ-vis the nature of reasons that are purported to lie behind actions. In this paper, I first point out the significance of a paradigm shift that emerges with the agency view. Then I argue that the agency theories nonetheless fail in general to give a satisfactory account of various sorts of reasons underlying our actions and choices. In trying to enlighten the multi-faceted nature of actions and agency, I define a novel concept, “substantive autonomy,” and claim that it is a basic fact valid for all animals, not only humans, that are capable of initiating action. Reasons may indeed be lying behind our actions in a non-deterministic and ubiquitous manner, but agency often works in the absence of sophisticated (discursive) reasons which are evidently characteristic of humans.

Comments on Inan’s Notions of Objectual and Propositional Curiosity

Author(s): Mirela Fuš / Language(s): English / Issue: 48/2016

In this paper I comment on Inan’s notions of propositional and objectual curiosity. Even though Inan offers an interesting and intuitive distinction between propositional and objectual curiosity, I want to question two aspects of his theory of curiosity. One aspect concerns his thesis that propositional curiosity is interdependent on epistemic attitudes such as belief, certainty and interest. Another aspect of his theory that I discuss is his thesis that objectual curiosity is not reducible to propositional curiosity. In more detail, in the first part, I start off by explaining what propositional curiosity is according to Inan and I bring up two worries that I call: (i) over-complexity as a result of subjectivity and (ii) overcomplexity as a result of dynamics for the above mentioned epistemic attitudes. Both worries stress the problem of over-complexity of Inan’s theory of propositional curiosity. In the second part, I argue that objectual curiosity is, contrary to Inan’s hypothesis, reducible to propositional curiosity. I further argue that the object of wh- questions that, according to Inan, express objectual curiosity can either be about the truth value of general or singular proposition. In addition, I suggest that only the reading where wh- questions express curiosity in a form of de re reading and have a singular proposition as their content is the one that is compatible with Inan’s notion of objectual curiosity.

Continuous creation in the probabilistic world of the theology of Chance

Author(s): Dariusz Lukasiewicz / Language(s): English / Issue: 31/2015

The aim of the paper is to present and analyze the doctrine of continuous creation typical for theism. Continuous creation is conceived of as divine causal action consisting in God’s bringing about the existence of any being at every moment of its existence. Such a definition of divine action, as N. Malebranche argued, leads to occasionalism – that is, to the view that God is the only cause in the world. In the first part of the paper, an attempt is made to demonstrate that Malebranche’s conclusion is valid and that two alternative views, weak and strong concurrentism, are not tenable. In the second part of the article, the idea of continuous creation is discussed, which can be formulated from the point of view of probabilistic theism.