OSTENSION AND DEMONSTRATIVE REFERENCE

Author(s): Gheorghe Ștefanov / Language(s): English Issue: 2/2014

The strong similarity between the use of ostension and that of a simple demonstrative to predicate something of an object seems to conflict with equally strong intuitions according to which, while “this” does usually refer to an object, the gesture of holding an object in your hand and showing it to an audience does not refer to the demonstrated object. This paper argues that the problem is authentic and provides a solution to it. In doing so, a more general thought is given support by the approach used. Namely, the thought that our abilities to directly refer to things require some basic referential abilities exhibited in ostension and the use of demonstratives which, in their turn, rest upon our abilities to cooperate in performing non-communicative actions on our environment. Several concepts introduced in order to solve the initial problem can be used to articulate this thought in more detail.

THE SCOPE OF THE TRUTHMAKER REQUIREMENT

Author(s): Adam Shmarya Lovett / Language(s): English Issue: 2/2014

Truths require truthmakers, many think. In this paper I will discuss the scope of this requirement. Truthmaker maximalism is the claim that, necessarily, all truths require truthmakers. I shall argue against this claim. I shall argue against it on the basis of its implications. I shall first consider its implications when applied to synthetic, contingent propositions. If the truthmaker requirement applies to these propositions, so I shall argue, it is not possible for there to be nothing, and it is not possible for any (possibly) accompanied entity to exist on its own. I shall then consider its implications when applied to modal propositions, specifically those concerning possible existence. I shall argue that if the truthmaker requirement applies to such propositions, then there can be no relation which is equivalent to metaphysical explanation, which – I shall suggest – amounts to a denial of the existence of grounding.

THE PROBLEM OF TRUTH IN THE CLASSICAL ANALYSIS OF KNOWLEDGE

Author(s): Filip V Rossi / Language(s): English Issue: 2/2014

In this article I propose a new problem for the classical analysis of knowledge (as justified true belief) and all analyses belonging to its legacy. The gist of my argument is that truth as a condition for a belief to be knowledge is problematic insofar there is no definition of truth. From this, and other remarks relating to the possibility of defining truth (or lack thereof) and about what truth theories fit our thoughts about knowledge, I conclude that as long as truth is unquestioningly taken as a condition of knowing, knowledge can never be defined in a way that could satisfy our intuitions about it.

REANALYZING CHISHOLM PARADOX. STRUCTURAL INSIGHTS

Author(s): Bianca Alexandra Savu / Language(s): English Issue: 2/2014

In this paper I focus on the conditions that have to be met for Chisholm’s Paradox (CP) to occur. My claim is that identity and structure are notions closely related to each other. I propose a discussion in which the minimal framework for CP is set, then analyze the paradox in terms of S5, and suggest that in order to capture the core of the paradox one should use a dynamic valuation function for the model. Identity appears, at this point, to be dependent upon a structuralist point of view.

Carnap’s Ideal of Explication and Naturalism, edited by Pierre Wagner

Author(s): Constantin C. Brîncuș / Language(s): English Issue: 2/2014

Referential Zero Point

Author(s): Miško Šuvaković,Matjaž Potrč / Language(s): English Issue: 09/2016

Perhaps the most important controversy in which ordinary language philoso¬phy was involved is that of definite descriptions, presenting referential act as a community-in¬volving communication-intention endeavor, thereby opposing the direct acquaintance-based and logical proper names inspired reference aimed at securing truth conditions of referential expression. The problem of reference is that of obtaining access to the matters in the world. This access may be forthcoming through the senses, or through descriptions. A review of how the problem of reference is handled shows though that one main practice is to indulge in relations of acquaintance supporting logical proper names, demonstratives, indexicals and causal or histor¬ical chains. This testifies that the problem of reference involves the zero point, and with it phe¬nomenology of intentionality. Communication-intention is but one dimension of rich phenome¬nology that constitutes an agent’s experiential space, his experiential world. Zero point is another constitutive aspect of phenomenology involved in the referential relation. Realizing that the problem of reference is phenomenology based opens a new perspective upon the contribution of analytical philosophy in this area, reconciling it with continental approach, and demonstrating variations of the impossibility related to the real. Chromatic illumination from the cognitive background empowers the referential act, in the best tradition of ordinary language philosophy.

Wittgenstein’s “Simple Object”, The Phenomenological Gaze and the Representation of Spatial ‘Things’ in Modernism/Postmodernism

Author(s): Slobodanka Vladiv-Glover / Language(s): English Issue: 09/2016

By examining a series of paintings by Magritte and etchings by Escher, with reference to several literary texts, this article traces the aesthetic function of the representation of space and silence in Modernist art at the beginning of the 20th century. In reading the Modernist work of art against the theory of language proposed by Ludwig Wittgenstein in his 1921 Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, this article also suggests that the representation of objects testifies to a paradigm shift in European aesthetics at the beginning of the 20th century which involves a repudiation of affectivity as a mode of experience and expression prevailing as far back as Classical Antiquity, and a move into the orbit of the phenomenological gaze which shifts the space of representation beyond the actually visible or representable. This shift makes experience into an experience of language or of the process of signification, which has the effect of symbolic ‘castration’ (Freud), bringing into existence the ‘split’ subject (Lacan). The alienating split of the subject by the signifier (‘the object’) is thematised as violence (cannibalism) in modernism and inhertited by postmodernism, as demonstrated by critical reference to Maurice Blanchot’s Thomas the Obscure (1932), Patrick Sűskin’d Perfume, and Milorad Pavić’s Dictionary of the Khazars.

Rethinking the Institutional Theory of George Dickie: The Art Circles

Author(s): Marko Đorđević / Language(s): English Issue: 09/2016

This paper initially revisits the institutional theory of George Dickie, which originated in relation to Arthur Danto’s “The Artworld” and the works of other analytic philosophers dealing with art theory at the time. This contextualization is followed by an attempt at finding possible relations and theoretical developments of Dickie’s work in theorists such as Howard S. Becker and Pierre Bourdieu. The aim is to find basic correlations and differences between Dickie’s theory, Becker’s symbolic interactionism and Bourdieu’s field theory. The final segment consists of linking the interpreted theoretical terms and summing up the possibilities that arise out of them for contemporary art theory.

“Outside the Box” – Another View on Modern and Contemporary Art.” Book Review: Nikola Dedić, Između dela i predmeta: Majkl Frid i Stenli Kavel između moderne i savremene umetnosti, Beograd: Fakultet za medije i komunikacije, 2017.

Author(s): Jelisaveta Mojsilović / Language(s): English Issue: 15/2018

A Quasi-fregean Solution to ‘The Concept Horse’

Author(s): MIHAIL-PETRIŞOR Ivan / Language(s): English Issue: 1/2015

In this paper I offer a conceptually tighter, quasi-Fregean solution to the concept horse paradox based on the idea that the unterfallen relation is asymmetrical. The solution is conceptually tighter in the sense that it retains the Fregean principle of separating sharply between concepts and objects, it retains Frege’s conclusion that the sentence ‘the concept horse is not a concept’ is true, but does not violate our intuitions on the matter. The solution is only ‘quasi’- Fregean in the sense that it rejects Frege’s claims about the ontological import of natural language and his analysis thereof.

Carnap Sentences and the Newman Problem

Author(s): LARISA-IOANA Gogianu / Language(s): English Issue: 1/2015

In this paper I discuss the Newman problem in the context ofcontemporary epistemic structural realism (ESR). I formulate Newman’s objectionin terms that apply to today’s ESR and then evaluate a defence of ESR based onCarnap’s use of Ramsey sentences and Hilbert’s ε-operator. I show that thisdefence improves the situation by allowing a formal stipulation of non-structuralconstraints. However, it fails short of achieving object individuation in the contextof satisfying the Ramsified form of a theory. Thus, while limiting the scope ofNewman’s argument, Carnap sentences do not fully solve the problem.

Rejecting Wittgenstein’s Criticism against Russell’s Theory of Knowledge

Author(s): AIDA ŞMALBELGHER / Language(s): English Issue: 1/2015

In this paper I reject Wittgenstein’s criticism of Russell’s theory ofknowledge. First, I present the historical context in which Russell formulated histheory and Wittgenstein his criticism. Then, I attempt to show that Russell’s viewshad the potential to develop into an important conceptual scheme relatingknowledge to mental phenomena. I argue that Wittgenstein’s criticism was adecisive factor in Russell’s decision not to pursue his line of enquiry. But thiscriticism was misdirected, as shown by the fact that Wittgenstein’s later work inthe Tractatus approached a range of problems different from those targeted byRussell’s theory.

The platonic receptacle: between pure mediality and determining cause

Author(s): Octavian Puric / Language(s): English Issue: 1/2017

In this paper I will try to answer two different questions that stem from Plato’s characterization of the Receptacle in the Timaeus. The first originates from the description of the Receptacle as a ‚characterless sort of thing‛ (50e5-6, 51a5) that‚ receives all things‛ (51b) without showing its own face‛ (50e4). This lets one assume that whatever character the Receptacle will receive from the Forms, the resulting image will have that exact character and will in turn be an accurate depiction of its Form. Yet, this conflicts with the fact that Plato describes Forms and particulars in strikingly contrasting manners. Thus, the first question will be: What accounts for the differences in character between Form and particular in light of the Receptacles’ pure receptivity? The second question asks as to the nature of the common character that binds the image to its Form: If the image and its model are differentiated by opposing characteristics, what is the common aspect in which an image resembles its model, making it of one particular model rather than of another? Before tackling these questions, I will first review three of the more influential interpretations of the nature of Forms and particulars in the following order: The Approximation View, the Unqualified Exemplar interpretation, and the Model-Image view. I will side with the latter, arguing that it provides the most satisfactory account of Plato’s thought. Placing my approach in the theoretical framework of the Model-Image view I will argue that the first question can be solved in the following way. First, I will maintain that the Receptacle need not be characterless in all respects, but only in those in which it is to receive the characters of the Forms. Secondly, I propose that the image has two inherent types of determining sources, a) the formal determination that comes from its model, and b) the medial determination that stems from the medium to which it belongs. I will argue that it is due to the medial determination of the Receptacle that the image has all the contrary properties that oppose it to the Form. Regarding the second question, I will maintain that as it stands at a moment, the Model-Image theory cannot provide a satisfactory account.

Resisting the paradox of increase

Author(s): CONSTANTIN PRICĂ / Language(s): English Issue: 1/2017

The fact that an object gains a new part, when before it didn’t have it, is paradoxical. I argue that a holistic approach that considers change, defined as both increase and decrease of parts, can resist this unwanted implication. The approach requires understanding objects within the context of a world, be it finite or infinite. In such a world, objects can remain themselves even after exchanging parts. The primitive notion of essence (following in the tradition of Kit Fine) is central to this outcome. I argue that the actual world is similar to worlds that permit change, despite some concerns regarding vagueness.

New indirect syllogistic moods

Author(s): Georgeta Cuculeanu / Language(s): English Issue: 1/2017

In this paper are presented the indirect syllogisms that are divided in two categories. These syllogisms are resulting from operation applied either to the premisses, being named primary indirect syllogisms, or to the conclusion of other syllogisms, being named secondary indirect syllogisms. For the first category three new primary indirect syllogisms have been established by us, by one in the second, third and fourth figures. For the second category thirteen indirect syllogisms are proposed. So, in the total, twenty-four indirect syllogisms are resulted, by six in every figure.

Frankfurt-style counterexamples to influence theory of causation

Author(s): MILAN Z. JOVANOVIĆ / Language(s): English Issue: 2/2017

Two prominent counterexamples to Lewis’s Influence theory of causation (Schaffer 2001, Hall 2004) happen to be structurally very similar to so-called Frankfurt cases. This should come as a surprise since Lewis explicitly addresses Frankfurt cases while formulating his theory, and claims that theory deals with cases like that successfully (Lewis 2000). Hence, a good question to ask is – whether these two counterexamples are indeed plausible and valid objections despite their structural similarity to the Frankfurt cases. In this paper, I offer an analysis of two mentioned counterexamples in order to answer this question. On the one hand, in agreeing with Noordhof (Noordhof 2001), I will try to show that Schaffer’s counterexample can indeed be accommodated and explained by the Influence theory. On the other hand, I will try to maintain that, even if we accept Lewis’s premises, the counterexample offered by Ned Hall is still plausible – due to a certain feature that differentiates it from both: Frankfurt cases and Schaffer’s counterexample. While the latter two are cases of early preemption, Hall’s Smart Rock scenario doesn’t exhibit that – from the perspective of Lewis’s theory – convenient causal pattern in which we can find stepwise influence (which is enough for the theory to get these cases right). This result, as I believe, shows why we should regard Hall’s counterexample as a better and more plausible argument (than Schaffer’s ounterexample) against the Influence theory.

Practical Modes of Presentation. Some Remarks on the Intellectualism vs. Anti-Intellectualism Debate

Author(s): Mihai Rusu / Language(s): English Issue: 2/2017

This paper is a critical examination of the notion of practical mode of presentation and of related notions that have been proposed in the literature as a way to explain the propositional character of practical knowledge. If all knowledge is propositional, as intellectualists maintain, then we need an elucidation of the situations where the subject knows some true propositions about an activity without knowing how to perform that activity. Intellectualists have appealed to practical modes of presentation in order to reply to this objection and account for the apparent difference between ordinary (propositional) knowledge and the knowledge that is manifested in practical cases. While this difference is undeniable, it is not substantial according to the intellectualists. The paper proceeds as a discussion of the debate between intellectualists and their critics regarding practical modes of presentation. The controversial character of practical modes of presentation is a key issue for understanding the entire intellectualism vs. anti-intellectualism debate and, more generally, the competing accounts allow a deeper and more nuanced construal of the connection(s) between knowledge and action. The main aim of the critical discussion in this paper is rather modest, but still significant at this point of the debate: as I will show, the debate is far from over and – for all the ingenuity and complexity of extant intellectualist accounts – supplementary work needs to be done to clarify the distinctions and develop a convincing and comprehensive account of practical modes of presentation.

On the origins of the idea of a conceptual scheme

Author(s): Bogdan Oprea / Language(s): English Issue: 2/2017

In 1974 Donald Davidson published On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme, an article in which he tried to draw attention to the unintelligibility of such an idea and to the dangerous consequences of its acceptance. However, despite the influence of his criticism at the time, Davidson was never clear enough about his target. The purpose of this article is to outline a possible response to what the American philosopher has in mind when criticising the idea of a conceptual scheme.

Mysticism and Early Analytic Philosophy

Author(s): Marek Dobrzeniecki / Language(s): English Issue: 1/2021

Early analytic philosophy is known for its logical rigor that seems to leave no place for non-rational sources of knowledge such as mystical experiences. The following paper shows on the example of Bertrand Russell and Ludwig Wittgenstein that despite of this early analytic philosophy was interested in mysticism and it also shows the roots of this interest. For Russell an application of logical methods to solving philosophical puzzled was an expression of a more fundamental striving – to know the world as it is, sub specie aeternitatis – which is mystical in nature. In turn early Wittgenstein’s philosophy sets the limits of meaningful propositions and provides the distinction between what can be said and what can only be shown and what manifests itself in the world. The latter belongs to the realm of the mystical.

Conditional Uniqueness

Author(s): Erhan Demircioğlu / Language(s): English Issue: 2/2022

In this paper, I aim to do three things. First, I introduce the distinction between the Uniqueness Thesis (U) and what I call the Conditional Uniqueness Thesis (U*). Second, I argue that despite their official advertisements, some prominent uniquers effectively defend U* rather than U. Third, some influential considerations that have been raised by the opponents of U misfire if they are interpreted as against U*. The moral is that an appreciation of the distinction between U and U* helps to clarify the contours of the uniqueness debate and to avoid a good deal of talking past each other.