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The Smolensk campaign of 1632–1634 began the reign of the new ruler of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Władysław IV Vasa. Taking advantage of the death of Sigismund III Vasa, Moscow began operations in the eastern theater in the fall of 1632, with the goal of regaining the Smolensk lost in 1611. The Polish-Lithuanian side was unprepared for the war, and disputes between Hetmans Lew Sapieha and Krzysztof Radziwiłł continued about the purposefulness of the hauls. Thanks to the latter, the crews of the border fortresses were strengthened and a camp was established near Krasny, which blocked the Moscow forces besieging Smolensk. In view of the Thirty Years’ War, the Republic of Poland had to carry out hauls based on its own recruit, with the help of foreign officers recruited from abroad. Preparations to deploy a relief army took a long time and required a lot of money. As a result, an army of several thousand was raised, which under the command of Władysław IV in September 1633 reached Smolensk, unblocking the besieged fortress by the Moscow forces of M. B. Sheina.
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The article discusses the economic and social consequences of the march of Polish, Prussian and Russian armies through the estates of Count Antoni Józef Lanckoroński: Kije, Kliszów, Motkowice and Wodzisław, located on the border of the former voivodeship of Kraków and Sandomierz. Before the battle of Szczekociny ( June 6, 1794) Polish and Russian armies were passing through this area, coming from the region of Połaniec and Opatów. After the battle, the combined Prussian and Russian armies, chasing Tadeusz Kościuszko’s army retreating to the north, found themselves again in the area. What is more, in the second half of June and at the beginning of July 1794, before a series of battles took place in southern Mazovia, culminating in a battle on the outskirts of Warsaw on July 7–10, 1794, the armies of the partitioning states were stationed in camp in the vicinity of the Kije, Kliszów and Motkowice estates. The marches of the armies caused quite a lot of material damage. This included the requisitioning of grain, livestock and foodstuffs, as well as thefts by soldiers and local peasants. Stealing draught animals also resulted in the degradation of peasant farms. In a social sense, the presence of the army revealed a very strong antagonism between the manor and the countryside, which manifested itself mainly through the active participation of peasants in robbing manors.
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Propaganda played an important role in the war of 1920 as a tool in mobilizing polish society to fight the enemy. It was dealt with by civil and military institutions. The milieu of writers and artists who were the creators of propaganda posters joined the propaganda activities. Art playedan important role, the artists provided many works of utility character, created for propaganda purposes. So they contributed to winning the war against the enemy army. Apart from the posters, brochures, leaflets, journalistic texts and literary works were created. However, the posters published in the press, placed on the walls of buildings, and carried during the demonstrations had the greatest impact. Posters with a strongly anti-Bolshevik message were dominant, showing the enemy as a monster, demonizing his image in order to arouse emotions and appeal to the patriotic duty of every Pole. A separate group were mass-printed recruitment posters encouraging to join the Volunteer Army. Józef Piłsudski also appeared on the posters. The authors of the posters used this figure as a symbol of independence struggles. Posters, like other forms, were a psychological weapon in the fight against Bolshevik propaganda. Each of the posters can be analyzed on an artistic level, but from the historical point of view, the most important thing is the propaganda message.
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Among the many problems related to the functioning of the state that the Republic of Poland was faced with after World War I, one of the most important was the need to rebuild and develop transport, an important element of which was the railway. The railway infrastructure inherited from the invaders and its level of development significantly differed from each other. In contrast to the Prussian and Austrian Partitions, the railways of the Russian Partition were less developed. The war damage was visible, both in the railway equipment, as well as railway lines, bridges, viaducts, depots and railway stations, which showed the enormity of the undertakings facing the reborn state. The importance of railway connections was important not only for the development of the economy, but also important for its security and defense due to the geopolitical location of Poland. From the beginning of military planning in the General Staff (Main), the General Inspectorate of the Armed Forces or the Ministry of Military Affairs, it was assumed that it was necessary to create the possibility of rapid movement of military transports to the necessary regions of the country. In the period preceding the outbreak of World War II, war plans were drawn up, also regarding military communications (emergency and general mobilization, war transports), taking into account the conflict with Germany or the USSR. A group of the Chief of Military Communications of the Commander-in-Chief, headed by the Minister of Communication Juliusz Urlich, worked on these plans. In this group, the chief of Eszelon I, Brig. Aleksander Szychowski. The subject of the analyzes in the presented article is its assessment of work on the preparation of transport plans (as part of the war plan „Z”) and the effectiveness of its implementation.
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Italian fascism was formally born after the end of World War I. In fact, it grew out of a sense of the hurt and injustice of the 1919 peace treaty at Versailles. Benito Mussolini, using previously revealed philosophical views, managed to take over the leadership of the Blackshirts. From that point onwards, Benito Mussolini consistently built the concept of Italy as a colonial empire, striving for hegemony in the Mediterranean Basin. He was preparing the state and society for a new war that would repair the wrongs at Versailles and give Italy a new, true and just peace. Italy’s road to war began with the end of the previous war, and it never left that path.
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The article describes the mobilization of the 25th Infantry Division in August 1939. This division was stationed in the District of Corps No. VII Poznan in three garrisons: Kalisz, Krotoszyn and Ostrów Wielkopolski. The process of mobilization an infantry division was difficult and complex, because it had to be completed in just three days. At that time, it was also necessary to form new troops that did not exist in peacetime. In addition to personnel mobilization, material mobilization was also important, including weapons provided for the time of the war and all the necessary equipment. All units of the 25th Infantry Division were mobilized covertly during the so-called emergency mobilization. The basis was the mobilization plan “W” and the mobilization tables of the aforementioned division. During the mobilization process, there were also many changes in the staffing of the division’s command and in its subordinate regiments (29th, 56th and 60th Infantry Regiment and the 25th Light Artillery Regiment). Despite many difficulties, the mobilization of the troops of the 25th Infantry Division took place efficiently and on time. After the mobilization, the division took up the defensive positions in the Kalisz region. After the outbreak of the war, it fought in the composition of the “Poznan” Army.
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In the first years of World War II thousands of Poles had been deported to the USSR, and they regained their freedom in the second half of 1941. Many of them joined the Polish Armed Forces in the USSR, commanded by General Władysław Anders, with whom they went the entire combat trail. Along with the process of creating and developing the army, archival service was created. It was meant to overlook creations of the military archives by issuing archival instructions and commissioning chronicle work in departments. One of the first documents regarding such work was the letter of the Chief of Staff of the Command of the Polish Armed Forces of 16th December 1941, regulating the principles of conducting chronicle work in units and the methods of conducting combat surveys regarding fights in September 1939. Two weeks later (on 30th December 1941) in 5th Infantry Division an executive order was issued, along with chronicler’s instructions for division, regiments, and battalions’ chroniclers. Another important document was the letter of General W. Anders of 20th February 1943 concerning the organization of the chronicle-historical and archival work of the Polish Armed Forces in the East, regulating the existence of the archival service and the work carried out by it. This instruction also introduced the obligation to complete war diaries by units taking part in hostilities. The principles of keeping war diaries, introduced in February 1943, were changed, due to their non-compliance, on 20th March 1945, when the Command of the 2nd Polish Corps issued the Instruction for keeping war diaries. To secure the documents and to regulate their transfer from the office to the archives, on 6th April 1945, the HQ of Polish Forces on the Middle East issued an order on the collection and storage of military records and memorabilia.
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During World War II, there were manifestations of anti-Semitism in the Polish Armed Forces in Great Britain. This phenomenon posed a very serious threat to the image of Poland in the international arena, in particular in Anglo-Saxon societies sensitive to ethnic, religious and racial discrimination. This phenomenon intensified in the spring of 1944 and was the reason for the desertion of Jewish soldiers from Polish troops, which had a negative effect on the atmosphere in the troops, their compactness and combat readiness, threatening with destruction on the eve of the impending invasion of allied troops in Normandy.
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In presenting article, an author has been made an analysis of the German’s command preparations to plans of defence of sc. “Stettin’s Bridgehead” and the “Festung Stettin” and preparations to fighting against the great Soviet offensive 1st (and as a perspective) 2nd Belarussian Fronts and the local battles between March–April 1945, between town Gryfino (germ. Greifenhagen), along the Upper Odra River and next Szczecin’s Right part. Capturing of this area by the Soviet troops had been given them a good positions to great attack in a near future in the Left part of Szczecin (as it’s main, historical and administrative part of this city). One of the important elements of the text is showing the fighting of Altdamm (act. Szczecin-Dąbie) and fighting to the Eastern Odra’s crossing points. About 20 April, Marshall Georgi Zhukov’s ordered most important strategic decision – great offensive towards Berlin as a general aim and a strategic point to defeating the Third Reich. The main burden of fighting for Szczecin next was a 2nd Belarussian Front commanded by Marshall Konstanty Rokossowski, changing Zhukov’s troops near Szczecin. Especially, this giant Soviet operations group, which had been come from Gdańsk and Gdynia in a long way marching, will play a most decisive role in a perspective of “Battle of Szczecin”. Since the second half of April, a great Soviet offensive towards crossing the Western Odra River has been started, and next to plans to destroy the German positions along this river. In a few days (the 20–25th of April), the forces of 2nd Belarussian’s Front, especially 65. Army commanded by gen. Pavel Batov, crashed during hard local battles the German’s troops on the line of Western Odra River, crossed on the second’s river shore, and finally made the real perspective of total strategic city encirclement. On the area of southern and western-southern outskirts of the Szczecin – villages Kurów (germ. Curow), Rosówek (germ. Neu Rossow), Moczyły (germ. Schillersdorf ) and the others, during a few days (the 20–23/24th of April) were a places of hard local battles of some troops of 2nd Front with the rests forces of a Waffen-SS foreign volunteers divisions. The 25–26th of April, were the most decisive moment of sc. “The battle of Szczecin”. Marshall Rokossowski had a new order and plan of an offensive towards Rostock and the keeping of Baltic shore. In that moment, Szczecin as a strategic point of offensive were finished and will be a not important strategic point, as earlier. For the German command of the city, and the main leadership and commanders of Pomeranian’s NSDAP party, the Marshall Rokossovski’s Front made a real perspective to closing and next completely destroying of Germans troops in “Festung Stettin”. It was a main reason to a great evacuation of detachment and many civil refugees without fighting from the city. The 26th April, the left side part of Szczecin (the main) was captured by the troops of the 65 Army and 2nd Strike Army. Military history of Szczecin was ended in that moment not as a result of a hard street fighting on the Left, main part of the city, but on it’s Right side (especially the great battle of Altdamm/Szczecin-Dąbie) and on the southern and western-southern outskirts. Finally, there were no hard battles and a new, decisive phase street fighting “Battle of Szczecin” on the Left shore of Odra River. This formula knowing as a “Battle of Szczecin” is really only a good – looking sentence, not a historical reality and true.
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The decision of the UN General Assembly, on 29th November 1947, to divide Palestine into two states met with the dissatisfaction of Arab countries. One of these countries was Egypt. There was a political and social debate in the country about participation in the war against Jews, planned by members of the Arab State League. It resulted from it that the country would not join the war. A few days before the invasion, Egyptian politicians made a political change and decided to participate in the campaign. This decision was a surprise to everyone. The war was not planned as the implementation of political and diplomatic intentions. The society and even the army were not prepared for such an eventuality.
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Poles in their history many times pinned their hopes on war – for instance after losing the independence at the end of 18th century. Similar public mood occurred after World War II. It was expressed by widespread rumors about approaching a new global armed conflict. It was intensified during great international crises. Especially the war in Korea from 1950 influenced people’s imagination. Similar reactions occurred during the Berlin crisis in 1961, Cuban crisis in 1962 and in the first phase of armed intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968. The absence of Poland’s sovereignty brought this kind of Polish society reactions. It conduced imagination about new armed conflict, which was considered as the beginning of deep political changes in Poland and in the world. Rumors about the upcoming war described Polish psychosocial status after 1945. At the same time the ineffectiveness of party-state propaganda in a sphere of creating the so-called moral and political social unity was proved. The world powers realized the necessity of conducting peace policy after the end of the 60s of 20th century. Consequently, rumors about the new war became uncommon in Poland.
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The article discusses Egyptian preparations for a war with Israel in 1973, including war planning, complete doctrine change, counterintelligence preparations, and exercises for crossing the Suez Canal. The Egyptian war plan worked perfectly well in the early stages of the war. This is one of the rare examples of exceptionally successful preparation for war.
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During the Cold War, NATO and the Warsaw Pact faced each other as two hostile political and military blocs with vast arsenals of conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction. Their mutual distrust has kept the world tense for more than four decades. It seems that the Cold War between them was only held by a kind of “balance of fear”. The aim of the article is to show the reader the intention to use the 5th East German Army in an offensive operation of the Warsaw Pact troops. The main research method used during the development of individual theses was the analysis of available publications related directly or indirectly to the topic presented. Due to the lack of access to the original archival sources, the article was prepared mainly on the basis of a review of the available popular science literature and memories of soldiers of the GDR army. The author’s intention is not to unequivocally assess the intention and effects of using this operational relationship and to clearly interpret the correctness (or not) of such an intention. The reason for this approach is the lack of sufficient and reliable data to draw any conclusions. The main reason for this approach is the inability to verify the information obtained in reliable sources.
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This paper aims to give a detailed account of one particular solidarity action for the Spanish Republic undertaken by the leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. It was an attempt at illegal naval embarkment of a large group of volunteers from two planned locations on the Adriatic coast. For this purpose, a French trading vessel named “La Corse” (Corsica) was hired, which was supposed to transport the volunteers to Spain, where they would enlist in the International Brigades. Since this operation failed due to a timely reaction by the Yugoslav police, the events unfolded into mass arrests, including several high-ranking activists, as well as an intelligence breakthrough into the workings of the Communist Party. This paper combines the findings of relevant literature, mostly partial in content, with memoir texts and archival records, bringing forward a detailed reconstruction of all relevant elements, including context, events, causal relations, and their consequences.
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The Tribal Cavalry Regiments, who were assigned to cover the Ottoman-Russian border and provide border security during World War I, joined battles as part of the Turkish Third Army. They provided important services during the war, such as gaining time for the Ottoman army by distracting the Russian forces, conducting reconnaissance and surveillance activities against enemy forces, and harassing the enemy by mounting sporadic raids and attacks. In addition to these important contributions of the Tribal Cavalry Regiments to the army, these regiments that lacked all kinds of military equipment, especially in term of weapons and ammunition could not mount great resistance against the enemy equipped with heavy weapons and disbanded in a short time. These soldiers disbanded behind the front took part in activities such as extortion, robbery and banditry in the rural areas that disturbed the public order. This situation created a serious internal security weakness in the region. This study discusses the activities of the Tribal Cavalry Regiments at and behind the fronts. Their duties at the fronts, their contributions to the army (and to what extent they were successful), and the reasons behind their successes and failures are examined. Activities of those regiments regarding the country’s internal security are also addressed.
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In the first part of the article, the author presents in a synthetic way the etymology of the concept of hybrid war, as well as its derivatives. It briefly describes the theory of hybrid war according to the views of American and Baltic theorists. In the following parts, he presents Russian views on waging a hybrid war, as well as selected aspects of its practical application with the use of a wide range of economic, social, military and political conditions. In conclusion, in a synthetic approach, it identifies the specificity of future wars in the confrontation with the war of 2022.
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In the account of the Third Samnite War (298–290 BC) Livy records a special commitment of the Samnite Linen Legion that faced the Romans at Aquilonia in 293 BC. The oath of this élite formation required discipline and sacrifice to a greater extent than the obligations of the other Samnite troops and the Roman military oath of these times. According to Livy, the Linen Legion’s soldiers swore not to flee the battlefield and to instantly kill anyone from among themselves who would try to run away. Threatening soldiers to kill them on the spot in case of desertion in the face of the enemy and issuing such an order during battle was a widespread practice in the Roman army as well as in other armies of different epochs. It appears that in the Samnite picked troops, it was the military oath itself that included the obligation to punish the fugientes immediately. Strengthening military discipline and soldiers ’sworn commitments was a systemic solution aimed at enhancing combat effectiveness of the army in situations of extreme danger. Analogies can be drawn between the Samnite case and examples of Greek and Roman military oaths reinforced in the face of an invader. The peculiar clause of the Linen Legion’s oath may be seen as one of such systemic measures. The article examines the reasons for its use by the Samnites and attempts to demonstrate the credibility of this detail given by Livy.
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The authors of the article, studying Romanian historical records, highlight aspects of the various forms of organization of the association of retired and reserve military personnel of the Romanian Army, from its establishment and evolution to the present.
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The article draws attention to the phenomenon of military adventurism. The analysis reveals certain fatal mistakes committed by the Italian political leadership, leading to military and political-diplomatic adventure. The most crucial of these included the simultaneous engagement of the limited Italian military forces on several battlefields (France, Albania, North Africa and Greece); the Italian arrogance towards Germany, its key ally; Italy’s overestimation of its forces’ capabilities and its underestimation of the enemy; and Italy’s disregard for the season (autumn and the coming winter), terrain (the mountainous area of Epirus), and weather (rain, snow, and extremely low temperatures) at the time of its attack against Greece.
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