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The study examines the general emergence and conceptual background of papal delegated jurisdiction, and the operation of the delegated tribunal in Hungary from the origins to 1241. The first, general part is justified not only by the absence of any attempt at a systematic inquiry in Hungarian, but also by the fact that it greatly facilitates the understanding of the features which characterised the Hungarian practice. With regard to the conceptual background, one of the basic findings is that the foundation of the system of delegated papal jurisdiction was constituted by the appeal of litigants to the Holy See in order to secure papal authority for the judgement made in their case. After sporadic beginnings in the 11th century, the system greatly expanded during the pontifi cate of Alexander III, and assumed a fixed framework after the reforms of Innocent III (the establishment of various offices and a special literacy). The study also describes the characteristics which can be observed in the selection and activity of the judges, in the course of litigation, in the legal background and in the sources. After these general problems, the study examines the emergence of delegated papal jurisdiction in Hungary, and the development of its features, from its beginnings under the pontificate of Alexander III until the middle of the 13th century. At fi rst the characteristic causes of litigation are examined, whereupon those aspects are scrutinized in which the situation in Hungary diverged from what was generally common in the western church. These, together with further aspects of the analysis, such as the selection of judges to preside in the various cases and their repartition in terms of dignity, are treated according to the order of things dictated by the general practice. The author also describes some aspects connected to the practical development of the procedure, which exerted considerable influence upon the formation of different kinds of litigation, from the emergence of the procedure itself (eg. the role of the auditores and of audientia) to other characteristics of the litigation such as the various excuses and appeals.
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The Hungarian Review of Economic History was founded in 1894 as the second economic history journal in Europe. It survived for twelve years. Although a historiographical study has already been devoted to it, the Departments of Manuscripts in the Library of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and in the Hungarian National Library respectively contain several hitherto unexplored sources (diaries, correspondences), with the help of which the history of the Review can be recast in new light. In a period when economic history had still no university chair, the Review (and a book series which also remained in torso) offerred the only institutional forum for all those dealing with the profession. The editors-in-chief, Károly Tagányi and Ferenc Kováts, struggled throughout with two basic difficulties: those of establishing a sound fi nancial background (recruiting supporters and subscribers), and of raising a stock of devoted authors who would provide studies of the required quality. The main supporters were the Ministry of Agriculture from the governmental sphere, the National Agricultural Association, the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and the Society of Economics. The authors were recruited chiefly from archivists, teachers in secondary schools or in academies of law, and clerics (theological teachers, parish priests). Alongside the institutional framework of the Review’s activity (that is, the economic history of the Review), the study also examines in detail the informal network of personal relations which connected editors, sponsors and authors to each other. Friendships and antipathies, intrigues and personal offences were as integral parts of the Review’s life as royalties and printing bills, and are consequently of the same importance for historiography. The causes which led to the Review’s suppression in 1906, and the respective roles played in them by institutional factors and personal and group conflicts, are made the object of a separate part of this study.
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Kálmán Kánya was one of the chief actors of Hungarian foreign policy in the interwar period, and its official leader between 1933 and 1938. His person and activity are given a special flavour by the fact that he gave to both his post and the tasks it involved a new interpretation. The present study follows the successive stations on the way to the leadership of the foreign ministry, and the parallel development of his personality. It was as a student of bourgeois origins that Kánya entered the Eastern Academy at Vienna, which prepared for consular service. In the foreign apparatus of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy he at first worked in the consular branch, than was transferred to the ministry, where he led the press department. Although his work was partly administrative, partly political, this latter aspect gradually became more dominant than usually. He aimed to fulfil his ambitions through a more effective direction of the press. Between 1913 and 1918 he functioned as the Monarchy’s ambassador in Mexico. These years spent in isolation further affirmed the already elitist tendency of his intellectual stance. After his return he was given a post in the Hungarian ministry of foreign affairs. Alongside his undeniably outstanding personal abilities, an important role in his rise was played by the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian state and the consequent emergence of an independent Hungarian ministry of foreign affairs. As the chief secretary of the ministry, he was able to vindicate a key role for himself. At the same time, his activities and especially his personal style earned him a lot of enemies. As a sometime member of the Imperial foreign apparatus, he was even less inclined than most of his contemporaries to accept the serious loss of prestige that Hungary was forces to face after WW I. In the course of his activity in the forein service, it became increasingly clear that he was before all interested in the conceptional questions of foreign policy. This particular interest certainly played a role in his assuming the Hungarian embassy at Berlin from 1925. His chief aim was tightening the German-Hungarian relationship, but all he was able to achieve in the end was to improve somewhat the initially rather negative view of his own personality. Although he was expected to retire after his service in Berlin, eventually prime minister Gyula Gömbös offerred him the direction of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in order to enlist his help in the execution of his own ideas of foreign policy. Since Kánya was a man of will himself, however, he soon managed to shift the balance in the traditional relationship between the prime minister and the minister of foreign affairs in his own favour, which, in turn, made this relationship rather disharmonious.
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The instruction given by Ferdinand I (1526–1564) to András Bátori, voevode of Transylvania, in 1552, by which the king authorised the voevode to grant away freely the smaller estates (that is, within 20 tenant sessions) which devolved upon the Crown in Transylvania, has long been known and cited in the historiography. What is still unknown is since when the voevodes had enjoyed such an authority. According to the author, the first voevode to acquire the royal right to make landed donations was János Szapolyai (1510–1526), later king of Hungary as John I (1526–1540). He seems to have been given the right as a compensation after the spring of 1519, when, upon the death of Imre Perényi, István Bátori, ispán of Temes was elected as palatine instead of János Szapolyai himself. The limit of his donational authority was initially 400 tenant sessions, but it seems to have been curtailed shortly thereafter, for already in 1521 and 1523 the voevode only made donations which extended to much smaller estates (the study offers a detailed analysis of the not too many surviving sources). It has to be emphasised, however, that the donational authority of the voevode was not an organic outgrowth of Transylvanian constitutional development, but was tailored instead to the person of the richest Hungarian magnate, voevode János Szapolyai, and thus further contributed to the emerging princely „aura” which surrounded the voevode, anyway of royal blood on his mother’s side. Since so far no donation of land made by any of the voevodes in the period between 1526 and 1552 has come to light, it is open to doubt whether during the wording of the 1552 instruction the right once granted to Szapolyai was used as a precedent. It is thus possible that it is in fact the donational right enjoyed by the royal commissionaries – among them the captain-general András Bátori –, who were sent by king Ferdinand to Transylvania in 1551, and the experience gained from their activity there, which should account for the subsequent authority granted to Bátori himself. It is certain that not only he but also his successors, Ferenc Kendi and István Dobó, exerted the right of donation.
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In 1530 the occasion first presented itself, after three years of civil war, for the two rival kings of Hungary, Ferdinand of Habsburg and János Szapolyai, to settle the disputed issue of the rule over the kingdom through negotiation. The necessity of negotiating was raised by the Polish diplomacy, which had traditionally tried to mediate between the two parties, and gained for the action the support of George, duke of Saxony, who was the brother-in law of king Sigismund of Poland. After protracted diplomatic preparations and several prorogations, the parties finally came together in the Polish town of Poznań. Although the Polish-Saxon diplomacy aimed at a final peace treaty, or at least a one-yearlong truce during which the preparations for the final agreement would be made, nothing of the sort appeared on the horizon after several weeks. Thus the talks were cut short in November apparently without any result, while the troops of Ferdinand lay siege to the castle of Buda. Yet the real importance of the talks of Poznań resided in the fact that the negotiations which started after the failure of the siege of Buda, again with Polish mediation, could lead within a few days to the three-month-long truce, signed in January 1531 at Visegrád, precisely because the parties did not have to elaborate a new agreement but simply to ratify the articles settled previously at Poznań. Although the peace treaty between Szapolyai and Ferdinand was only signed eight years later at Várad, diplomatic relationship remained constant between the parties after Poznań. The present study examines the antecedents, course and consequences of these negotiations, neglected by both contemporary historical works and modern scholarly analyses, on the basis of the two major groups of sources: on the one hand, the documents preserved in theHungarica and Polonica Collections of the Austrian National Archives (ÖStA HHStA), and, on the other, the Polish diplomatic material contained in volume XII of the Acta Tomiciana.
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The study examines the means and methods with which the Holy See experimented between 1945 and 1964 in order to provide for the continuity of the hierarchy which was indispensable in Hungary for the government of the dioeceses and the administration of the sacraments. It also analyses the process whereby the Papacy had finally come to accept an utterly disadvantageous compromise and signed the partial agreement of 1964. A thorough examination of the sources has proved that during the pontificate of Pius XII the Papacy merely aimed at short- or at best medium-term solutions, and treated separately the cases of incapacitated bishops from those of vacant episcopal sees. Although John XXIII likewise wanted to exert freely the papal right of episcopal appointment, instead of short-term measures applied thus far he again made steps in the direction of gradually connecting episcopal ordo and ecclesiastical jurisdiction. However, as the unilateral measures taken by the Holy See all foundered on the stiff resistance of the Hungarian regime, the Papacy, profiting from the more pragmatic policies which the Hungarian government adopted from the 1960s, eventually decided to pursue negotiations. It was by this means that the pope hoped to secure the functioning of a hierarchy in Hungary which would be treated as legal by both the state and canon law. A possible alternative would have been the establishment of a secret hierarchy; this, however, was judged too risky on the basis of the available experience, and was consequently only applied in those countries where no acceptable compromise was available.
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Book review of "A magyar megszálló csapatok a Szovjetunióban. Levéltári dokumentumok 1941–1947." (Editors: Krausz Tamás–Varga Éva Mária.) Krausz Tamás. Szerk. Krausz Tamás–Varga Éva Mária
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Book review of Bél Mátyás „Notitia Hungariae novae…” by Gergely Tóth
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Mija pięć lat DSH — we wrześniu 2010, po powołaniu go przez Ośrodek KARTA (OK) i w marcu 2011, po nadaniu mu statusu miejskiej instytucji kultury przez władze Warszawy. Przedstawiamy najważniejsze wydarzenia, które złożyły się na powołanie i pierwsze pięciolecie Domu.
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W opracowaniach na temat Holokaustu cytowany jest często Raport Gersteina. Jest to z pewnością pierwsza, a w ogóle jedna z niewielu relacji z obozu śmierci w Bełżcu, zarazem jedyne świadectwo złożone przez esesmana, który był świadkiem z wyboru. Raport spisany został w mieście Rottweil w Badenii-Wirtembergii, gdzie obersturmführer SS Kurt Gerstein oddał się w ręce wojsk francuskich. Sporządził dwie jego wersje po niemiecku i jedną po francusku, opatrzone różnymi uzupełnieniami. Podany tu tekst obejmuje najważniejsze fragmenty wszystkich trzech dokumentów. Uzupełniony został wyimkiem listu autora do żony oraz wypowiedziami świadków tego czasu, którzy poznali Gersteina
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Rodzina Zbigniewa Pieńkowskiego, mieszkająca w Łomżyńskiem pod okupacją sowiecką, od roku 1940, kiedy aresztowany został ojciec Autora (więziony w Łomży i Moskwie, otrzymał wyrok 8 lat łagrów), żyła w strachu i przekonaniu, iż czeka ich deportacja. Ostatecznie znalazła się w czwartej fali zesłańczej w transporcie do Kazachstanu.
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W drugiej fali deportacji w głąb ZSRR — ze Lwowa, 13 kwietna 1940 — wywiezieni zostali do Kazachstanu: Janina z Nurkowskich Dzierżanowska, żona generała WP w stanie spoczynku Kazimierza Dzierżanowskiego, aresztowanego 3 października 1939 we Lwowie, oraz ich dzieci: Aniela, żona kapitana artylerii Stanisława Furmańskiego, Wanda, narzeczona porucznika artylerii Kazimierza Kasprzyckiego oraz 18-letni Stefan. Trafili do sowchozu Krasny Skotowod, na fermę Baskurmielte w obwodzie semipałatyńskim. Przez cały okres pobytu w Kazachstanie zesłani pisali listy do rodziny, głównie do siostry Janiny — Kamili i jej męża Stanisława Dobieckiego, ich córki — Maryli Bonkowicz-Sittauer oraz do Krystyny Dzierżanowskiej z domu Stoker (żony najstarszego syna Romana oficera WP). Przedstawiamy wybór listów z całości opracowanej przez Wandę Bonkowicz-Sittauer.
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Przedstawiamy wybór fotografii przedwojennego Białegostoku autorstwa Bolesława Augustisa. Odnaleziona przed kilkoma laty kolekcja — udostępniona nam przez Grzegorza Dąbrowskiego — pokazuje, wśród wielu obrazów miasta w drugiej połowie lat 30., narastający wtedy nerw ulicy. W zapisanych w kadrze scenach zbiorowych odczytywać można słabo obecny w innych świadectwach rytm życia społecznego — napięcia polityczne, ideologiczne, religijne... Na ulicę wychodzą różne społeczności Białegostoku. Co i jak chciano manifestować?
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Odnowiony w styczniu 1971 strajk w Stoczni Szczecińskiej im. Adolfa Warskiego jest nie tylko protestem przeciw propagandowej manipulacji, ale też — wyrazem stanu wrzenia, w jakim po grudniowym wstrząsie znajduje się cały kraj. Dlatego przez władze zostaje potraktowany z całą powagą. Bezprecedensowe, wielogodzinne, niewyreżyserowane spotkania I sekretarza z załogami Stoczni Szczecińskiej (24 stycznia) i Stoczni im. Lenina w Gdańsku (25 stycznia) przynoszą Gierkowi znaczny kredyt zaufania. Zwłaszcza spotkanie w Gdańsku, zakończone legendarnym pytaniem „Pomożecie?”, staje się symbolem poparcia „klasy robotniczej” dla zmian zapowiadanych przez nowego „Pierwszego”. Spotkanie w Szczecinie to jedyny przypadek w historii systemu komunistycznego, gdy wódz partyjny rozmawia ze strajkującymi robotnikami. Przedstawiamy wybór ze stenogramu spotkania szczecińskiego. Pochodzi on z książki Michała Paziewskiego Debata robotników z Gierkiem. Szczecin 1971 wydanej przez „Więź” i Stowarzyszenie „Archiwum Solidarności” (Warszawa 2010). W tekście dokonaliśmy licznych skrótów, zarówno w obrębie pojedynczych akapitów, jak i pomiędzy nimi. Wszystkie skróty zaznaczamy.
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W okresie międzywojennym zabawy taneczne organizowano w Sylwestra i w karnawale, ale nie traciły na popularności i przez resztę roku. Bawiono się na wytwornych balach mody i na nie mniej modnych balach „gałganiarzy” i „włóczęgów”, na maskaradach, redutach, dancingach, balach brydżowych, bałaganach, czarnych kawach, kukiełkach, pierożkach, śledziach… Zabawa w odzyskanej Polsce początkowo
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