PREUGOVOR ALARM: REPORT ON PROGRESS OF SERBIA IN CHAPTERS 23 AND 24 (September 2019)

PREUGOVOR ALARM: REPORT ON PROGRESS OF SERBIA IN CHAPTERS 23 AND 24 (September 2019)

Author(s): Authors Various / Language(s): English

Keywords: PrEUgovor; prEUnup; European Union; Serbia; international relations; EU integration

This report contains the prEUgovor coalition’s assessment of the political criteria for the EU accession process and the fulfilment of criteria for selected policy areas from Chapters 23 and 24 for the period April 2019 – September 2019. Key findings indicate that the tendency of deterioration continues in most fields. The Government continues to consider only formal criteria, while in substance its primal concern is that the opposition does not boycott the elections, as that would send a bad message about the state of democracy in the country. Accordingly, the functioning of institutions, the Rule of Law, and the building of social consensus are not priorities that affect the Government’s understanding of European integration. The government is struggling not only to deliver what it had promised; formal commitments, benchmarks, as well as the adoption and extension of specific strategies and action plans are also inadequate and insufficient. The fight against corruption is characterised by the absence of a strategic framework and lack of political will and effective monitoring. Regulatory bodies responsible for control remain inactive and are not provided with sufficient support. Implementation of the law is a growing problem in all fields. The election process is also highly controversial. The ruling party continues to misuse state resources and offices for its propaganda and electoral needs, which involves various forms of pressure on public sector employees, including, for example, the obligation to attend the ruling party’s political rallies. Regulatory Body for Electronic Media, Anti-Corruption Agency and other control and regulatory bodies are not performing their functions; as a result, after unsuccessful negotiations most of the real political opposition announced a boycott of the next parliamentary elections. The number of laws passed under urgent procedure has been reduced, but the majorisation of the opposition continues, while key positions in agencies and independent regulatory bodies still remain to be filled. The ruling party MPs and the government-controlled media (in other words, the majority of the national media) continue to call the opposition, the non-governmental sector and some university professors traitors, thus marking them as legitimate targets of attack. Instead of opening a dialogue with them, government officials started promoting their own GONGOs (Government-Organised Non-Governmental Organisations) and their “opposition” political parties. Even judges who dare to openly criticise draft laws are in jeopardy of being dragged through the mud and discredited. The adoption of constitutional amendments concerning the judiciary is once again delayed. The amendments that were proposed by the Ministry of Justice do not introduce an adequate minimum standard of judicial independence. Developments in the security sector’s regulative area are disturbing. The new laws reduce the transparency of governance in this sector, and increase the discretionary powers of politicians with regard to procurement and employment. Control mechanisms of the sector’s public procurements and corruption are diminishing, while the number of large procurements is increasing, as well as the number of large contracts concluded outside of the established procedure. The new Law on Communal Militia is also alarming. It significantly expands the powers of this formation and gives local mayors greater discretionary powers over it, leaving much room for potential abuse.

PREUGOVOR ALARM: REPORT ON PROGRESS OF SERBIA IN CHAPTERS 23 AND 24 (May 2020)

PREUGOVOR ALARM: REPORT ON PROGRESS OF SERBIA IN CHAPTERS 23 AND 24 (May 2020)

Author(s): Authors Various / Language(s): English

Keywords: PrEUgovor; prEUnup; European Union; Serbia; international relations; EU integration

PrEUgovor’s monitoring of reforms in chapters 23 and 24 and certain political criteria of EU accession process indicates that, in most fields, the tendency of deterioration has continued during the period from October 2019 to April 2020. This was further exacerbated during the COVID-19 pandemic in the last two months, especially after the state of emergency was declared on March 15. In this prEUgovor Alarm report, special attention was given to the impact of the state of emergency – which President Vučić defined as “war against an invisible enemy” – on democracy, fundamental rights and freedoms, rule of law, and security and justice in Serbia. Controversy was raised by the very declaration of the emergency state by circumventing the Parliament, without offering proper reasoning as to why it could not convene. Preparations for the elections were suspended, but public officials continued their promotional campaign in favour of the ruling party. Public procurement rules were marginalised due to the pressuring need to “save citizens’ lives”. There was serious concern about the constitutionality of the imposed restrictive measures; however, the Constitutional Court remained silent on these issues. Free access to information of public importance and media freedoms were de facto suspended at one point, while personal data protection was put to the test. Restricted movement and slowed-down work of institutions affected especially vulnerable groups such as women and children, victims of domestic violence or human trafficking, migrants and others. Even political commitment to European integration suffered, from the very beginning of the public health crisis, due to statements of top officials criticising alleged lack of EU solidarity while praising and pleading help from “brotherly” China. The state of emergency ended on 6 May by the decision of the National Assembly.

PREUGOVOR ALARM: REPORT ON THE PROGRESS OF SERBIA IN CHAPTERS 23 AND 24 (November 2020)

PREUGOVOR ALARM: REPORT ON THE PROGRESS OF SERBIA IN CHAPTERS 23 AND 24 (November 2020)

Author(s): Authors Various / Language(s): English

Keywords: PrEUgovor; prEUnup; European Union; Serbia; international relations; EU integration

PrEUgovor’s monitoring of reforms in chapters 23 and 24 and certain political criteria of the EU accession process indicates that there has been no progress in most of the areas in the period May-October 2020. The reporting period began with the lifting of the state of emergency declared due to the COVID-19 pandemic, followed by general elections at the end of June, protests against the official management of the pandemic crisis in July, and the constitution of the National Assembly in early August, while the Government was formed only at the end of October. Although there was almost no normative activity due to the above circumstances, some important strategic documents were adopted, including the long-awaited revised Action Plans for Chapters 23 and 24.

PREUGOVOR ALARM: REPORT ON THE PROGRESS OF SERBIA IN CHAPTERS 23 AND 24 (May 2021)

PREUGOVOR ALARM: REPORT ON THE PROGRESS OF SERBIA IN CHAPTERS 23 AND 24 (May 2021)

Author(s): Authors Various / Language(s): English

Keywords: PrEUgovor; prEUnup; European Union; Serbia; international relations; EU integration

The period from November 2020 to April 2021 was marked by the accelerated activity of the newly formed Government and Parliament to compensate for a year that Serbia lost on its path to European integration. However, monitoring that was conducted by the prEUgovor coalition in the past six months infers that these renewed efforts are rather a continuation of the former checking-the-box approach, which so far has failed to achieve convincing results in monitored areas, namely political criteria and Chapters 23 and 24. Although the declarative commitment to Serbia’s EU path remains unchanged (albeit now and then interrupted by outbursts of anti-EU rhetoric), the coalition is still not convinced that there is in fact political will to bring about substantial reforms. Serbia has failed to open any new negotiating chapters since 2019, mostly due to the weak track record, but also due to stagnation and even deterioration in key areas such as freedom of media, independence of the judiciary and fight against corruption and organised crime, which cannot be regarded separately from (non)functioning democratic institutions. While lack of progress in critical reforms in the fundamental cluster remains the key cause of the effective blockade, a part of it lies in the expected implementation of the so-called ‘new enlargement methodology’ of 2020, which has been approved by both parties in the meantime. Serbia has adapted its Negotiating Team to the new negotiation structure based on clusters, but it has also abolished the position of the Chief of Negotiating Team after it had been vacated for 19 months. Although criticism of the lack of progress in key areas in Serbia has become more visible in the reports of EU institutions, as well as other international bodies and organisations in 2020,1 Serbian authorities tend to marginalise and/or discredit all negative remarks. Although opportunities for formal dialogue on certain issues have been provided, there is no impression that dissenting opinions and arguments are either heard or addressed, indicating form without substance. The coalition reiterates that speeding up reform efforts to meet the set deadlines should not, however, go to the detriment of the consultative processes preceding the adoption of normative and strategic acts.2 Better coordination of activities that overlap in the Action Plans for Chapters 23 and 24 is necessary, as well as effective, consistent and transparent formal monitoring. Since the functioning of democratic institutions and Chapters 23 and 24 are now part of the Fundamentals Cluster,3 along with economic criteria and public administration reform, the new methodology should be used to better interlink these areas. The European Union remains the largest donor, investor and trade partner of Western Balkan states. It has also provided assistance to the region in managing the COVID-19 pandemic. The new Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans is an opportunity to boost sustainable economic growth in the region. On the other hand, inability to reach a consensus on starting accession negotiations with Albania and North Macedonia represents another blow to the credibility of the EU enlargement policy. Western Balkan countries were not invited to the Conference on the Future of Europe. Further Rule of Law decline in certain EU Member States has a significant negative influence on the reform processes in aspirant countries. Coalition prEUgovor reminds the EU that the enlargement policy is its most effective foreign policy instrument and the foundation of its influence in the Western Balkans. It also reminds the Government of Serbia that the accession process cannot be a goal in and of itself, but is rather a means to achieve substantial progress in further democratisation and state organisation based on the rule of law.

PREUGOVOR ALARM: REPORT ON THE PROGRESS OF SERBIA IN CLUSTER 1 (November 2021)

PREUGOVOR ALARM: REPORT ON THE PROGRESS OF SERBIA IN CLUSTER 1 (November 2021)

Author(s): Authors Various / Language(s): English

Keywords: PrEUgovor; prEUnup; European Union; Serbia; international relations; EU integration

During the reporting period - from May to October 2021 - the implementation of formal activities in certain areas of Cluster 1 continued at an accelerated pace, especially in connection with the constitutional changes in the field of judiciary. These activities are mostly of a normative character, representing only the initial step towards the desired social change, and are still lacking tangible results. The activities are also mostly late and are compensating for the processes that should have been completed a few years back. As part of the civil society, Coalition prEUgovor is still not satisfied with the quality of the process of drafting laws, strategies and policies, or the resulting solutions. The way in which the activities are carried out, their dynamics and the official narrative that accompanies them confirm the earlier impression that this is actually a “ticking-of-boxes” approach that seeks to create a picture of progress that will be sufficient to open new clusters in Serbia’s accession negotiations with the European Union. Activities have intensified not only because of the delays and revised deadlines, but also because of the extraordinary parliamentary and regular presidential elections, which have been announced for the spring of 2022. Although a shortened term of the legislature was announced immediately after the elections in the summer of 2020 due to the under-representation of the opposition in the Parliament, the same monolithic parliamentary composition is expected to adopt the constitutional amendments and other (related) highly important regulations such as the Constitutional Law and the Law on Referendum and People’s Initiative. PrEUgovor fears that catching up at the last minute before the set deadlines will damage the democratic processes. At the same time, political and social polarisation is growing. Although the dialogue has been organised on certain issues, many proposals were rejected without proper justification. The authorities continue to (ab)use institutional and media channels to discredit political opponents, as well as critically inclined media, civil society organisations and individuals. Progress is not visible in critical areas monitored by the prEUgovor coalition, such as media freedom and the fight against corruption and organised crime. In addition to these, the European Commission regularly emphasises obstacles regarding the domestic handling of war crimes and public administration reform, which cannot be viewed in isolation from the (non)functioning democratic institutions. Poor performance in all above-mentioned areas has been reiterated, albeit in a milder tone, in the recently published annual report on Serbia,1 the first that was prepared based on the new enlargement methodology.2 Still, the European Commission recommended opening two new clusters3 in the accession negotiations with Serbia. PrEUgovor reminds that the last negotiation chapter was opened at the end of 2019. There has been some improvement in Serbian officials’ public communication about the European Union. Unlike the previous period, this time there were no conspicuous or direct attacks on the EU. Members of the government explained Serbia’s stagnation in the negotiation process by EU’s unwillingness to continue or accelerate the process. There was a visible lack of introspection and no mention of Serbia’s direct problems in complying with the accepted responsibilities.

Attitudes of Serbian Citizens Regarding Relations with Kosovo and Albania

Attitudes of Serbian Citizens Regarding Relations with Kosovo and Albania

Author(s): Maja Bjeloš / Language(s): English

Keywords: Serbia; Kosovo; Albania; public opinion

Relations between Serbia and Kosovo are currently reduced to the EU-facilitated talks in Brussels. The long-stalled talks went “back on track” after the appointment of EU Special Representative Miroslav Lajcak. The resumption of the dialogue was influenced by a different US approach to the Balkans following the presidential election and the appointment of Special Envoy Gabriel Escobar. Despite the international community’s strong desire for the leaders of Serbia and Kosovo to return to the negotiating table, it seemed that Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić and Kosovo’s Prime Minister Albin Kurti were unwilling to take a step forward. Their first meeting in June 2021 in Brussels was not encouraging, as it revealed personal animosities that threatened to bring the dialogue to another impasse. With an accession perspective that includes no date, i.e. without a tangible ‘carrot at the end of the stick’, leaders seem less motivated to make bold decisions. The actors were more engaged in the production and management of a crisis than in taking an effort to reach a final solution and progress towards EU membership. All in all, ten years after the dialogue began, there is little room for optimism as relations between Serbia and Kosovo are now at their lowest level. Many agreements have not been fully implemented, while the implementation of Brussels’ provisions concerning the association of Serb-majority municipalities is still pending.

PUBLIC PERCEPTION OF SERBIAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE MIDST OF THE WAR IN UKRAINE

PUBLIC PERCEPTION OF SERBIAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE MIDST OF THE WAR IN UKRAINE

Author(s): Vuk Vuksanović,Luka Šterić,Maja Bjeloš / Language(s): English

Keywords: Serbian foreign policy; War in Ukraine; international relations; public opinion

The war in Ukraine did not significantly affect the perception of the Serbian public regarding the major issues of Serbian foreign and security policy. In this context, this relates to how Serbian citizens think about the influence of great powers in their country and how the public perceives its relations with Russia and Western security institutions, the EU and NATO. The public opinion surveys also showed that the issue of Kosovo is still being perceived as a major foreign policy priority. There is a powerful cynicism in how the Serbian public views great power influences, as most respondents believe that external great powers bribe Serbian politicians and moguls to further their interests in the country. Russia and China are perceived as close foreign policy partners of Serbia, putting them in clear advantage over those who favour the EU on that front. The respondents also believed that Russia and China are sincere friends of Serbia and not players guided by their self-interest. As opposed to the study conducted by the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (BCSP) in 2020, which noted that Serbs perceived Chinese influence in the country as more positive than Russian influence, the latest survey shows that those who believe Russian influence in Serbia is positive have a slight edge over those who believe the same about Chinese influence. This is most likely the result of the fact that China has not been in the spotlight in recent months.

Balkan Csárdás: Hungarian Foreign Policy Dance

Balkan Csárdás: Hungarian Foreign Policy Dance

Author(s): Srđan Cvijić,Maja Bjeloš,Luka Šterić,Ivana Ranković,Marko Drajić / Language(s): English

Keywords: Hungary; Hungarian Foreign Policy; Western Balkans; international relations; regional relations

As part of the overall focus on the democratic backsliding in Hungary since Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz reassumed power in 2010, numerous international observers have expressed concern regarding increasing Hungarian influence in the Western Balkans.1 Specifically, many fear that through intensified meddling in Western Balkan affairs, Orbán’s Hungary would spread its illiberal influence throughout the region and subsequently undermine broader EU policy. In 2019, the process leading to the appointment of Olivér Várhelyi (a Hungarian diplomat close to Orbán) to the position of the European Commissioner for Neighbourhood and Enlargement garnered a salvo of criticism.2 While this incident briefly attracted the European media floodlights to the topic, the issue of Hungarian influence in the region of the Western Balkans quickly faded into a relative obscurity. Apart from few exceptions and a handful of journalistic accounts (which will be quoted extensively throughout the study), there are little to no attempts to analyse and explain Hungarian foreign and trade policy in the Western Balkans. This paper is one of few all-encompassing efforts to explain Hungarian policy and involvement in the Western Balkans, and it attempts to do so by asking the following questions: What interests and strategic considerations drive Hungarian foreign and trade policy in the region? What are Hungarian foreign policy priorities and what instruments does Hungarian foreign policy have at its disposal in the region? Is Orbán’s Western Balkan policy marked by a total discontinuity with regards to previous Hungarian foreign policy towards the region? Who formulates foreign policy priorities in Hungary and what is the interplay between formal and informal actors? What economic interests shape Hungarian foreign policy in the region? What is the role of ideology in Hungarian foreign policy in the Western Balkans? How much has Hungarian foreign policy in the region changed as a result of war in Ukraine? To answer these questions, this paper is divided into four main sections. The first focuses on Hungary’s foreign policy strategy in the region. The second, as a special case study, investigates the effects of Orbán’s minority politics in Serbia’s Autonomous Province of Vojvodina (Vajdaság in Hungarian). The third, researching Hungarian media empire in the region, and finally the fourth focusing on the economic drivers of Hungary’s approach in the region.

2015 ASSESSMENT OF POLICE INTEGRITY IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

2015 ASSESSMENT OF POLICE INTEGRITY IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Author(s): Alma Kovačević,Hamza Višća / Language(s): English

Keywords: police integrity; Bosnia and Herzegovina; police sector; corruption

A question of police integrity in BiH is quite difficult to consider due to the complexity of the police system. The police sector in BiH consists of 16 police agencies at all levels of government and 6 institutions which provide them support or carry out similar activities. This fact makes any research difficult because each police agency could be considered as an individual entity and particular research could be committed for each of them. Generally, findings of the report indicate that neither the legal framework, nor the practice is satisfying to ensure police integrity. In addition to that, the citizens assess police work as very weak and its efforts insufficient in fighting corruption. A very high influence of politicians on the police work still exists; police transparency is not satisfying when it comes to investigation of serious cases of corruption; human resources management and financing require serious reforms to be more functional in the fight against corruption; while both internal and external controls need serious changes to be more independent and functional. This report could help to consider police integrity from important points of view, including legal framework and citizens’ perspective. The report can help make a comprehensive study and a deeper analysis of each chapter.

THE ASSESSMENT OF POLICE INTEGRITY IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 2016

THE ASSESSMENT OF POLICE INTEGRITY IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 2016

Author(s): Mirela Hodović / Language(s): English

Keywords: police integrity; Bosnia and Herzegovina; police sector; corruption

Due to the complexity of the police system, the integrity of police in Bosnia and Herzegovina is difficult to review. All police institutions have, however, established external mechanisms of oversight and control. Still, the majority of these oversight bodies do not sufficiently use the existing communication resources, which negatively affects the transparency of their work, while independent bodies have no direct authority to conduct investigations against police officers. Internal control mechanisms in all law enforcement agencies provide a good framework for control of the legality of police work. Certain ambiguities however do exist in practice and are related to the independence and objectivity of the work of heads of departments for internal control; they are appointed by their immediate superiors and are directly accountable to said superiors for their work. Insufficient progress of internal control bodies has also been observed in terms of their contribution to determining criminal and misdemeanour liability of police officers and their transparency of work. Police institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina do not pay adequate attention to human resources management, where the greatest concerns revolve around integrity. There are no separate, comprehensive or integrated strategies or organisational units which would deal with all the aspects of human resource management in one place. Internal regulations allow managers to directly affect employees' career advancement. Internal control units are sometimes prevented by their superiors from performing their job effectively. All this ultimately de-stimulates the employees and reduces the efficiency of the police institution as a whole. The public procurement system is still underdeveloped. Public procurement frequently suffers from lack of adequate administrative capacity because law enforcement agencies do not have enough employees working on public procurement; under such conditions, planning and implementation of public procurement becomes a very difficult task. Findings of auditors show that public procurement procedures in police sector institutions are generally not carried out in the most efficient manner and/or in accordance with the Law on Public Procurement.

2017 THE CITIZENS’ OPINION OF THE POLICE - Comparative Analysis of the Results of Public Opinion Surveys Conducted in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Macedonia, Serbia and Kosovo

2017 THE CITIZENS’ OPINION OF THE POLICE - Comparative Analysis of the Results of Public Opinion Surveys Conducted in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Macedonia, Serbia and Kosovo

Author(s): Sofija Mandić / Language(s): English

Keywords: police force; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Albania; Montenegro; North Macedonia; Serbia; Kosovo; Western Balkans; police sector; public opinion

Citizens in the Western Balkans trust the education and health care system the most, while the police is also placed high on the list, trusted by more than half the population (59%). A slight increase in confidence in the police has been noted from one year to the next. The first things that come to citizens’ minds when a police officer is mentioned are cordiality, responsibility and professionalism. As regards policewomen, the dominant traits are cordiality and pleasant appearance. Male officers are perceived as more prone to corruption and aggressive behaviour, while this perception of women officers is almost non-existent. The population is divided on the topic of whether the police serve the interests of citizens. Almost half of them (45%) believe that the police serve the interests of citizens the most, while the same percentage (45%) considers this to be incorrect, believing that the police operate as their own service the least. The citizens perceive the judiciary (66%), the health care system (66%), customs (63) and the prosecution (63%) as the most corrupt institutions. Although more than half of them do trust the police, most see it as corrupt (58%). The perception of high levels of corruption in the police persists together with a relatively high level of trust in this institution. The percentages are almost identical. Such an situation suggests that citizens may have reconciled with the fact that corruption is omnipresent in the police, and that they have become accustomed to it as an inevitable segment of police work. Border, traffic and criminal police, as well as the close associates of the Minister of Interior, were recognised as the most corrupt parts of the police. Those percieved as least susceptible to corruption are the special police units, employees who perform administrative tasks, and those in charge of the protection of public peace and order. Citizens in the Western Balkans are convinced that employment in the police is gained through a public competition. However, along with this reply, they also mention corruption and political and family ties in connection with employment in the police force. More than half of the population (55%) believes that politicians influence the operational work of the police. The views on reporting corruption vary. Citizens who say that they would report corruption, would do so at their local police station. According to those surveyed, the most effective method for fighting corruption is the stricter punishment of perpetrators, especially police officials. The Government, the Minister of Interior and the internal police control are viewed as most responsible for preventing corruption. 8 Citizens of the Western Balkans believe that civil society is an important player in the fight against corruption, both as a direct actor and as the state’s collaborator on this task. Only then do they notice that, in the fight against corruption, civil society also contributes by doing research, gathering evidence and offering protection to victims. Based on systemic problems identified in the police forces of the Western Balkans, it is possible to formulate recommendations for improving the situation. First, it is obvious that the police forces can learn from one another, especially when it comes to the individual areas that have been identified by the research. For example, exemplary willingness of the citizens of Macedonia to report corruption in the police can help introduce good practices and solutions to other police organisations in the region. The Western Balkans police forces must communicate much more effectively with citizens in order to increase the level of trust and confidence in their work; they also need to adapt the methods and channels of communication to the target groups. This is especially important when it comes to younger generations who, as a rule, have much a more negative perception of the institutions than the older population. Finally, additional and coordinated efforts are needed to address some of the biggest problems in the police. The citizens have become aware of the fact that the key to solving the problems of corruption, lack of professionalism of police officers, and bias in the operational work of the police is in the hands of national political elites.

POLICE INTEGRITY IN SERBIA - Results of the public opinion survey in Serbia 2015

POLICE INTEGRITY IN SERBIA - Results of the public opinion survey in Serbia 2015

Author(s): Authors Various / Language(s): English

Keywords: police integrity; Serbia; police sector; corruption

Bad economic situation is the main problem of Serbian citizens. When they are not preoccupied by this difficult, they are concerned with corruption, which is, for the majority of the citizens, a normal occurrence in Serbian society. Citizens say that corruption is everywhere, also inside the police, the institution which issupposed to lead the fight against corruption together with the Prosecutor’s office. Only four percent of the citizens believe that there is no corruption within the police. For more than two thirds of citizens, corruption within the police is widespread. Based on previously conducted public opinion surveys, the police is always amongst top five most corrupted institutions. This is also the case now, and police is accompanied by Health, Customs, Judiciary and Commercial Inspection. Traffic police, border police and the part of the police fighting of economic crime, are considered to be the parts of police where corruption is mostly widespread. The most corrupted within the police are those employed on the high positions, as well as police officers which have daily contact with the citizens. Four percent of the citizens state they have participated in bribery with the police representatives. Even when the socially desirable answers and the fear of admitting such deeds are taken into account, the difference between the perception of corruption and the experience with corruption is great. Citizens believe that the corruption level in Serbia has remained the same in the past year. Besides that, the fight against corruption is personalized, and institutions’ contribution is very small. Every fifth citizen believes that the Serbian Prime Minister contributed the most to fight against corruption. Nevertheless, Serbian citizens do not have a clear idea about to whom they should report corruption, as well as which is the institution in charge for the fight against the corruption within police force. At the end, citizens believe that the civil society and the European Union have their own part in the fight against corruption. Civil society organizations are perceived as direct participants in the fight against corruption, independently or in cooperation with the state, and the European Union primarily through financial support.

Testing the integrity of police officers 2016

Testing the integrity of police officers 2016

Author(s): Sofija Mandić,Saša Đorđević / Language(s): English

Keywords: police integrity; Serbia; police sector; corruption

The integrity test is an operational police method of covert collection of information, conducted for the purpose of preventing and detecting corruption in the police force. It was introduced back in the ‘70s to combat corruption in the New York Police Department. Although in Serbia it had been continually announced for four years, it was only in 2016 that it was prescribed, albeit imprecisely, by the new Law on Police. Also, no one ever explained which form of the test will be applied in Serbia: the one targeting police officers under suspicion, or the random form, which would apply to all. However, this is not the only dilemma regarding the testing of the integrity of police officers in Serbia, which was publicly described as a “secret operational method that will discover various forms of abuse in the police” and be used to try to “tempt colleagues by offering them bribes.” The concept of integrity, that is, the main purpose for the introduction of such testing in general, is unclear. The test subjects are unknown, and so are the requirements concerning the notification of testing, the consequences of its results and the utilisation, recording and preserving of collected materials. The law does not specifically prohibit encouraging police officers to commit criminal offenses of corruption or other illegal acts in the course of testing. All this will be included in a secondary legislation, which should be enacted by the Minister of Interior Affairs within one year after the adoption of the law – which is, in itself, quite problematic. For example, the integrity test may limit the rights of inviolability of the place of residence, confidentiality of correspondence, the right to work, the right to equal protection, and the right to a fair trial. The Constitution requires that these rights be restricted by a law, not a by-law. The integrity test, as it was designed in the Ministry of Interior and to some extent defined by the Law on Police, in no way fits into the allowed framework which serves to limit the rights, and into the existing rules that apply to criminal proceedings. It is clear that the integrity test will continue to develop in the direction of the confidentiality of operations to be carried out by the Internal Affairs Sector within the Ministry of Interior, which is not a good solution. The Criminal Procedure Code stipulates that covert information gathering methods, i.e. special investigative actions can be undertaken only upon a court decision issued upon a reasoned request of the public prosecutor. The Law on Police does not at all recognise the prosecution and the judiciary as actors in the implementation of the test. As regards the use of evidence obtained by way of integrity testing – they should be treated as illegally obtained evidence.

HOW MUCH DOES PUBLIC SAFETY COST US? - Analysis of budget items of police services in Bosnia and Herzegovina

HOW MUCH DOES PUBLIC SAFETY COST US? - Analysis of budget items of police services in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Author(s): Denis Hadžović,Benjamin Plevljak / Language(s): English

Keywords: public safety; police system; police budget; Bosnia and Herzegovina

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, there are 16 police agencies organized on different levels of governance, and 5 more institutions closely connected to police activities. Such a complicated police system is a reflection of the constitutional and social-political order in BiH. The goal of the presented analysis is to show how much of the budget is being allocated to finance the police structures in BiH. The analysis contains ten cantonal and two entity ministries of interior, Police of Brčko District, Ministry of Security BiH and its seven administrative organizations.1 Concerning the time of the research, the budget costs in 2011 and 2015 were analyzed. The time gap of four calendar years provides basis to identify trends and consumption dynamics important for the functioning of the above mentioned institutions. Primary sources of data used in the research are audit reports for 2011 and budgets of different government levels for the year 2015.

URGENT POLICE DEPOLITICISATION IN THE WESTERN BALKANS

URGENT POLICE DEPOLITICISATION IN THE WESTERN BALKANS

Author(s): Sofija Mandić / Language(s): English

Keywords: politicisation; Western Balkans; operational independence

One of the biggest problems faced by the police in the Western Balkans is politicisation and lack of operational independence from political leaders and structures. This is confrmed by the legal framework on policing which introduces a wide scope of competencies of Ministers of Interior and other politically elected figures, and by the citizens’ perception that the police serve the political parties’ interests. The Bosnia and Herzegovina (BIH) Law on Internal Affairs of 2014 allows direct and indirect influence of political parties and officials on the autonomy of the police. Most important shortcomings are related to the Federal Minister of Interior who is allowed to make decisions regarding concrete police actions, influence human resources micro-management, and decide on the use of police finances and detention treatment and rules. The Law only declaratively stipulates that the police are subjected to civilian and democratic control. However, more than 80 percent of the citizens of BIH believe that the influence of politics on operative work of the police is quite high. In Kosovo, before the Prime Minister takes a decision on the appointment of Police Director General, the Minister of Internal Affairs interferes in the process by establishing and regulating the work of the Commission whose task is to nominate the candidates. The 2012 Law on Police in Kosovo allows direct influence of the Minister of Internal Affairs on the internal organisation of the police and the establishment of special police units. The Minister can compromise the operational independence of the police regardless of the fact that the Law on Police stipulates otherwise. More than 70 percent of the citizens perceive police as politicised and fully, or to some extent, under political control. The Montenegrin Law on Internal Affairs of 2012 allows the Minister of Interior to influence the Police Director’s appointment by proposing the candidate to the Government, and to influence the work of the Police Directorate by appointing Police Director’s deputies. The Minister is allowed to define the exceptions concerning the duties that are deemed incompatible with police work, but he also has discretionary powers to allow police officers to conduct some activities that are in contravention to the rules if he estimates that this will not harm the professional work of the Ministry. The Minister can decide in disciplinary proceedings and develop its rules. The public image of the police as an authority serving the citizens is better, to the extent that the legal framework is more progressive – one third of the citizens believe that the police is working in their interest. The Serbian Law on Police of 2016 does not create sufficient and necessary conditions for depoliticisation of the police. The text of the law mentions “respect for the operational independence of the police” but fails to specify what that actually means. The Minister of Interior is allowed to prescribe the mode of performance of internal affairs tasks, request reports, data and other documents relating to the work of the police and the Ministry, and provide the Internal Affairs Sector with binding instructions for work, as well as with orders to perform certain tasks and undertake certain measures. The Minister is given the power to assign and dismiss the highest ranking heads of the Police Directorate. More than 80% of the citizens see the police as an institution serving others’ interests instead of theirs. There are various legal shortcomings influencing the operational independence of the police in the Western Balkans. It is therefore necessary that the international community – the European Union (EU) in particular – advocate the development of legal instruments and institutional mechanisms which will prevent the political leaders and structures from crossing the forbidden line and becoming involved in the operational work of the police.

TODAY AND TOMORROW: SOCIAL MEDIA AND POLICE SERVICES IN THE WESTERN BALKANS

TODAY AND TOMORROW: SOCIAL MEDIA AND POLICE SERVICES IN THE WESTERN BALKANS

Author(s): Marko Živković / Language(s): English

Keywords: social media; police services; Western Balkans

Police services in the Western Balkans (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia) are not substantially active on social media platforms (Facebook, Twitter, Instagram and YouTube) and are not sufficiently exploiting the advantages of online communication such as: flexibility (accessible 24/7), relevance (provides a place for real-life policing examples and the exchange of experiences), and community building (the police can develop a supportive, stimulating community that is held by participants in high regard). There is a significant possibility for police services to use social media in the WB for strong community engagement and partnership with the aim of providing a crime-free and safe environment for citizens. Internet penetration in the region is 68.1% and there are 12.5 million internet users1 as well as more than 8.5 million Facebook2 account holders. The average Facebook consumer has more than 200 ‘friends’3 , which indicates a high potential for the community engagement and sharing of information. The research analysed the level of police presence in the social media platforms during the period from 1 January to 31 July 2017. It shows that five out of seven police services in the WB that are subject to this analysis use at least one social medium as a communication tool. Four out of seven are present on Facebook and YouTube, while three have Twitter and Instagram accounts. Only the Albanian police are present on all four social networks. The Kosovo Police makes use of three networks, while the rest use two out of four. Montenegrin police and the MoI of the Federation of BiH, however, are not present on any social networks. Police services in the region predominantly use social media to share basic information, and for promotion. Efforts to engage citizens are lacking. The nature of these social networks, as two-way communication tools, is not recognised by police forces of the region. The police in Albania are mostly active on Facebook, with more than 30,000 page-likes. Twitter and YouTube are used considerably less, Instagram not at all. Facebook is used primarily as a communication tool for sharing service information of the Albanian police, mostly through video posts. There is no interaction with the citizens. The language is formal and bureaucratic. The MoI of the Federation of BiH is not actively using social media, while the MoI of the Republic of Srpska has a YouTube account and an official Facebook page with 18,123 page-likes. It is not however present on Twitter. Facebook is primarily a communication tool used for sharing service information, mostly by way of posting photographs. Citizens’ engagement is low, but still better when compared to the practice in Albania and Kosovo. The Kosovo police have Facebook, Twitter and YouTube accounts, but no Instagram. Facebook is their main online communication tool, with 34,345 page-likes. However, the Kosovo police are not regularly active on Facebook and mostly share links that lead to service information. Interaction with citizens is very low. Original Twitter content is not produced and a low level of activity on YouTube has been noted. The MoI of Macedonia is active predominantly on YouTube, with more than 5,000 subscribers and almost 9.5 million views, which is the best result in the region. Its activity on Instagram is modest. The Facebook page was created in August 2017. There is no Twitter account. The Minister of Interior is not very active on Twitter, and tweets are not strictly related to policing. The MoI of Montenegro is not present on any of the social networks. The police in Serbia are active mainly on Instagram and YouTube.4 Tweeting ceased in February 2010. Instagram is used in accordance with the rules of this social network, with the primary goal to promote the activities of the police and the Minister. The YouTube account of the Serbian MoI had more than 9 million views and boasts 6,483 subscribers, which is the record in the region. Communication in the 21st century has been tremendously changed by new technologies. Social media now provide a completely new communication approach, with different potential and substance. Regardless of whether or not the police want to be present on social media, police issues are being discussed online. Due to this fact, if the police do not use social media many related information can be subjected to spinning and misuse, with no possibility of reacting through the same communication channel. Even though the facts regarding internet and social media users in the WB indicate that conditions for police use of social media do exist, law enforcement agencies of the region are not sufficiently active on social networks. There is significant room for improvement of social media usage by police in the WB to increase effectiveness by engaging citizens, and to build trust in the police by presenting the human side through community policing. Social networks are not just another traditional media channel; they allow greater connectivity and interaction between the web users and encourage contributions and feedback from anyone who is a member of any virtual community

SERBIAN POLICE CRIME STATISTICS (UN)AVAILABLE

SERBIAN POLICE CRIME STATISTICS (UN)AVAILABLE

Author(s): Gorana Radovanović / Language(s): English

Keywords: police sector; crime; transparency; crime rates; Minister of Internal Affairs; Serbia

Increasing the transparency and accountability of the police is not viable if the Serbian public are made aware of current crime rates and the effectiveness of the police only by the Minister of Internal Affairs.

THE ROLE OF PARLIAMENTARY OVERSIGHT IN BUILDING POLICE INTEGRITY IN SERBIA

THE ROLE OF PARLIAMENTARY OVERSIGHT IN BUILDING POLICE INTEGRITY IN SERBIA

Author(s): Katarina Đokić / Language(s): English

Keywords: police integrity; police sector; Serbia; Parliament

Parsimonious legal framework and parliamentarians’ reluctance to utilise their powers have impeded parliamentary oversight of police work. Hence, the parliament does not have a significant role in building police integrity in Serbia.

2016 ASSESSMENT OF POLICE INTEGRITY IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

2016 ASSESSMENT OF POLICE INTEGRITY IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Author(s): Mirela Hodović / Language(s): English

The Future of International Police Missions in the New Global Security Environment – Contribution of Western Balkans Police Forces to EU’s International Policing

The Future of International Police Missions in the New Global Security Environment – Contribution of Western Balkans Police Forces to EU’s International Policing

Author(s): Andreja Bogdanovski,Uroš Živković / Language(s): English

The existence of a police component in UN peace operationsis not a novelty. It goes back half a century ago andwas first introduced in the Congo in the 1960’s. Embeddingpolice components in UN missions became moreextensive at the end of the 90’s, when different types ofit (support of country security reforms, advice, monitoringetc.) were incorporated in all UN Security Council approvedmissions after 1999.