CEEOL - Search Result

№ 52 - Huliganstvo: sa političkog na sportski teren

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English,Serbian

Ex-Yugoslavia’s bloody disintegration advanced violence into a way of life. After October 5, Vojislav Kostunica, the Serb Orthodox Church and scores of various organizations were preoccupied with rounding-off an ethnic state and hence reshaped the Serb nationalism. Kostunica’s two premierships were marked by numerous assaults against minority communities (mostly in Vojvodina in 2004-05) – and that resulted in internationalization of the Vojvodina issue. Policy of impunity practically enthroned the model of violence on which new generations were brought up. The value system was distorted and social tensions became a constant. Serbia’s present phase of state-building along the lines of European values faces strong opposition mostly from the groupings that have been particularly active at the time of Kostunica’s premiership. These groupings at still acting along the same lines: legitimization of nationalistic goals.

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№ 53 - Srbija - Hrvatska: Neprevaziñena prošlost

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English,Serbian

Almost two decades after the end of the war and fourteen years after the establishment of diplomatic relations, Serbia and Croatia still move from one crisis to another – each reviving traditional and carefully cherished mutual animosities. Belgrade is responsible for such oscillations in the first place: not only when it comes to Croatia but also for the entire region. Official Belgrade recognizes regional realities with leaden step unwilling to acknowledge “new” borders.

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№ 54 - Antievropski blok u kontraofanzivi

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English,Serbian

The Serbian cabinet's decision to apply for EU candidacy in late 2009 was a breakthrough in Serbia's history as a European country. The decision provoked strong, though not necessarily overt, resentment of the anti-European bloc. Apart from populist parties (DSS, SNP, SRS, NS, etc.) the bloc assembles the greatest part of the country's scholarly elite - mostly the circles from the Academy of Arts and Sciences and the University – the Serb Orthodox Church, various right-wing groupings and non-governmental organizations, parts of the Army and most media. This is the same bloc that defined Serb national program in late 20th century, thus confronting the country with the entire world. Premier Zoran Djindjic’s assassination in March 2003 was the most dramatic outcome of the bloc’s anti-Europeanism. The murder of the Premier stalled off Serbia’s orientation towards Europe for almost a decade.

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№ 55 - Novi patrijarh SPC - bez suštinskih promena

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English,Serbian

A change at the throne of the Serb Orthodox Church /SPC/ will effectuate no major changes in the SPC structure, organization and functioning or, for that matter, in its secular ambitions. In this context, newly elected Patriarch Irinej (Gavrilovic), former bishop of Nis, guarantees continuity. In other words, SPC will be trying to safeguard the space it has occupied at Serbia’s public scene over the past ten years, strengthen its position and further expand its influence on governmental policies.

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№ 56 - Srpska napredna stranka - navodna transformacija

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English,Serbian

Serbia’s entire political establishment and some other elites – those in the judicial branch in particular – welcomed the transformation of a part of the Serb Radical Party /SRS/ into the Serb Progressive Party /SNS/. There is no doubt that Vojislav Seselj’s inappropriate behavior before the ICTY that compromised SRS was among the reasons why some Radicals decided to form a separate party. Another major reason was to have a two-party system in Serbia, some elites have been striving after. Hence, the new Serb Progressive Party attracted undivided support from the media: with such backing it relatively shortly won over the majority of “old” Radicals and managed to obtain relatively good results in some local elections (for instance, in Vozdovac, one of Belgrade’s municipalities). EU and all foreign observers in Belgrade also welcomed this change of attire.

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№ 57 - Konsolidacija kosovske države i reakcije Beograda

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English,Serbian

After independence declaration Kosovo entered the phase of state consolidation. While trying to prevent it at any cost, official Belgrade channeled all its diplomatic energy into lobbying against Kosovo’s international recognition. Its turning to the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion about the legality of Kosovo’s independence is meant for the same purpose. What Belgrade really wants to achieve is a fresh round of negotiations with Prishtina, which would hopefully result in Kosovo’s partition: the Northern Kosovo would go to Serbia. Therefore, Serbian media have been more and more playing on the thesis about the Greater Albania. They are invoking the findings of a Gallup poll showing that the great majority of Kosovo Albanians (70 percent) take that Kosovo and Albania should unite, whereas 47.3 percent of interviewees in Kosovo and 39.5 percent in Albania believe this would become true in foreseeable future. Historian Cedomir Antic holds it only logical when it comes to Albanians. In fact, by showing understanding for Albanians’ aspirations Belgrade wants to strengthen its argumentation for Serbs’ demands: partition of Kosovo (as well as for similar feelings when it comes to Republika Srpska).

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№ 58 - Rezolucija o Srebrenici: rasprava ipak otvorena

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English,Serbian

President Tadic’s initiative for a parliamentary resolution on Srebrenica triggered off a debate that laid bare the proportions of Serbia’s frustration manifested in its denial to face up the recent past, the Bosnian war in particular. The existence of Republika Srpska /RS/ - actually the very fact that it exists for fifteen years now – strengthened the Serb mainstream elite’s belief about full attainment of warring goals being just a matter of time and more favorable international constellation.

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№ 59 - Crna Gora: stalna kriminalizacija vlasti u Podgorici

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English,Serbian

Relations between Serbia and Montenegro aggravated after Montenegro’s recognition of Kosovo (October 2008) to which Belgrade responded by expelling the Montenegrin Ambassador. When Podgorica and Prishtina established diplomatic relations (November 2009) Belgrade withdrew its ambassador to Montenegro. Montenegrin President Filip Vujanovic paid an official Belgrade to Serbia in May 2009, but the visit itself did not contribute to full normalization of bilateral relations. Besides, Montenegro definitely opted for Euro-Atlantic integrations and applied for EU candidacy, NATO endorsed a plan of action for Montenegro’s membership (December 2009) and, most importantly, the Montenegrin parliament already adopted a declaration condemning the Srebrenica genocide.

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№ 60 - Srbija i svet 2009: Kritična tačka još nije pređena

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English,Serbian

Having applied for EU candidacy (in late 2009), the Serbian government made the first real breakthrough in its proclaimed EU-oriented policy that can not be revoked. Besides, the EU annual report was mostly affirmative for Serbia, the EU also unfroze the Transitional Trade Agreement with it, whereas Serbia met the preconditions for the white Schengen visa regime. Taking all this into consideration, it could be said that the year 2009 was more fruitful than the years before at least from the angle of EU integration processes.

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№ 61 - Makedonija: pod stalnim pritiskom suseda

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English,Serbian

Macedonia’s statehood, nation or church have been denied by its neighbors ever since its independence. Has it not been for EU, US and NATO it would have been thorn by internal conflicts and, probably, by foreign aggression. However, despite the multitude of domestic problems, Macedonia managed to survive and even obtain EU candidacy and membership of NATO. These are the guarantees of its sustainability and social consolidation. Despite some minor disputes over the borderline, Serbia recognized Macedonia in 1996 under the name of the Republic of Macedonia. But the Serb Orthodox Church /SPC/ still denies the autocephaly of the Macedonian Orthodox Church /MPC/ proclaimed back in 1967. The issue of MPC autocephaly is closely connected with the recognition of the Macedonian statehood

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№ 62 - Srbija u začaranom krugu: od Republike Srpske do Kosova

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English,Serbian

Serbia’s behavior – notably at international level – is dictated by its proclaimed strategic goals and priorities summed up in the slogan “Both Kosovo and EU.” These are mutually opposed goals and contrary to the criteria and preconditions for EU membership. Controversial behavior at both domestic and international scenes stems from inner tensions and the pressure from the actors who actually determine Serbia’s strategic goals. On the one hand, “realpolitik” (necessitated by the country’s almost catastrophic economic situation in the first place) calls for rationalization of these goals along European course. On the other hand, the once “warring lobby” (patriotic bloc) insists on the attainment of warring goals by legal and diplomatic means. After the fall of Milosevic’s regime this bloc was reinforced with intellectual “followers” of the nationalistic-conservative option.

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№ 63 - Srpska Napredna Stranka: Priprema za izbore

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English,Serbian

Serb Progressive Party (SNS) is vigorously preparing the terrain for elections – either early on which it insists or regular scheduled for 2012. Its major objectives at this stage are to attract as many as possible voters of Serb Radical Party (SRS) and to demonstrate its power at local elections called in certain towns in Serbia. It has been successful in both up to now. Its weaknesses, however, are in its poor human resources and actually no-existent party program. Up to now its rhetoric has boiled down to populism, social populism in the fi rst place.

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№ 64 - Turska: Regionalni Faktor Stabilnosti

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English,Serbian

Over the past year Turkey has emerged as a major factor in the Balkans. Turkish diplomacy mediated not only between some countries – between Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina in the fi rst place – but also in sensitive, internal disputes. Serbia has been in the focus of Turkey’s activities as a potential generator of regional instability. This primarily refers to Serbia’s attitude towards Republika Srpska, but also towards Bosnia-Herzegovina as a whole, and its bad relations with neighboring countries. Serbia has been obstructing the process of Kosovo’s international recognition, while the international community has been constantly concerned with its political and religious tensions in its Sandzak region.

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№ 65 - Zapadni Balkan i Evropska Unija nakon Sarajevskog stastanka

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English,Serbian

The EU – Western Balkans Ministerial Meeting of June 2, 2010 in Sarajevo was a failure in terms of the messages stemming from it. Aft er the Sarajevo meeting the ten-year endeavor to bring the Western Balkans closer to EU looks like a paradox: Europe has never before been farther from the Balkans. Even though the meeting did not close down the region’s perspective for joining the EU, it shift ed the accession accent to the requirements for all new members and their “intensifi ed eff orts to meet the criteria and agreed conditions on their road to the membership.”1 In other words, the EU has set more rigorous criteria for the SAA process.

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№ 66 - International Court of Justice Delivers Advisory Opinion on Kosovo Independence: A Turnabout in the Interpretation of the Yugoslav Crisis

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

On July 22, 2010 the International Court of Justice /ICJ/ delivered an advisory opinion on Kosovo independence – Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence, ruled the ICJ, did not violate the international law. For Serbia, this piece of news was a “heavy blow” /President Boris Tadic/ but not a defi nite defeat of and longstanding and counterproductive policy. The jurists who have worded the initiative for the ICJ and supported it wholeheartedly were disappointed most of all: they were surprised by “the opinion’s preciseness,” they said. It was obvious that everybody has looked forward for an opinion that each of the two sides could interpret as it suited it, an opinion that would make it possible for Belgrade to maintain the status quo or even coerce Kosovo’s partition. The hopes that Serbia would start “cohabitating” with the realities more constructively aft er delivery of the opinion have not come true.

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№ 67 - Media in Serbia: Lost and Lobbying for the Status Quo

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

Serbia’s media scene is merely a reflection of society’s loss of bearings and moral devasta¬tion. This is especially so because, like all oth¬er national institutions, the media gave full support to the national projects embodied by Slobodan Milošević at the end of the twenti¬eth century. Above all, the media’s weakness is seen in its attitude to the past, which is similar or identical to that of most political players, as well as in its attitude to the transformation of society in the wake of radical nationalism.

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№ 68 - FOREIGN POLICY U-TURN: THE FAILED MANIPULATION OF KOSOVO

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

The opinion of the International Court of Justice on Kosovo’s independence, Serbia’s agreement to a joint resolution on Kosovo with the EU in the UN General Assembly and the refusal of a London court to extradite Ejub Ganić at Serbia’s request all testify to the Serbian national program coming up against the resolve of the EU and the US not to allow the redrawing of Balkan borders President Boris Tadić’s Kosovo policy over the past year has been at the expense of his popularity in Western circles, and one might even talk about disappointment in Belgrade’s behaviour. The behaviour of Vuk Jeremić, the foreign aff airs minister, has been a particular irritation to the EU and the US. This dissatisfaction has also been apparent in the increasingly frequent meetings between Westerners and SNS head Toma Nikolić during the summer.

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№ 69 - NATIONAL BOSNIAK COUNCIL ELECTION: TEST FOR SERBIAN GOVERNMENT

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

For the past two decades, Sandžak has been a crisis point which could rapidly be activated and come to the forefront. Belgrade policies served to radicalize the Muslim population in Yugoslavia ahead of the wars of the nineties. One of the theses used to justify them is that radical Islam brought Yugoslavia down1. Nor did that policy change aft er October 2000, despite the fact that Sandžak Bosniacs contributed to the overthrow of Slobodan Milošević (2000) and, later, to the establishment of a pro- European government (2008).

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№ 70 - SHIFT IN BELGRADE’S KOSOVO POLICY AND ITS IMPACT

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

The political atmosphere in Serbia has changed signifi cantly thanks to a shift in the attitude of the political leadership to Kosovo. Following submission of the joint EU and Serbian resolution to the UN General Assembly, and the International Court of Justice’s advisory opinion on the independence of Kosovo, Serbia’s political life has undergone some meaningful changes. President Boris Tadić’s articulation of the “new policy”, was welcomed with strong support from the Serbian public. This implies, fi rstly, “that Serbia must not be a country of just one issue – Kosovo” and, secondly, “that we shall not be able to accede to the EU if we import new confl icts into it”

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№ 71 - SERBIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH ON THE BRINK OF SCHISM

Author(s): Author Not Specified / Language(s): English

The Serbian Orthodox Church (SPC) is a bastion of Serbian nationalism. Its ideology is drawn from the radical right and it is very close to groups at the rightist end of the political spectrum. With this ideology, the Church played a very important role in mobilisation and the prelude to war and, to this day, has made no attempt to distance itself from this role. Part of the Church continues to promote Serbian national interests in exactly the same way. The head of the Serbian Orthodox Church, Patriarch Irinej, does not yet see the River Drina as a border but rather a bridge which “brings together” the Serbian nation: “Although, in some way, we are together now, God willing we shall be truly one in the near future.

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Publisher: Helsinški odbor za ljudska prava u Srbiji