The reactions to Vice-President Biden’s Balkan tour – before and after – indicate its far-reaching significance. First and foremost, because it testified that the region was still in the sphere of interest of US and EU. Further, it testified of US’ dedication to stabilize the Balkans and, last but not least, of its wish to have all the Western Balkan countries in Euro-Atlantic integrations as soon as possible.
More...
Keywords: South Serbia; Presevo; Bujanovac; Serbia and Kosovo;
South Serbia has been a neuralgic point ever since the opening of the Kosovo status issue. After NATO intervention /1999/ stability in three South municipalities -- Presevo, Bujanovac and Medvedja -- has been directly connected to the status issue. Both sides -- Serb and Albanian – hoped for partition, which would place the three municipalities in quite a different context. In early August 2009, American congressman Dan Rohrabacker concretized the “partition idea” – according to him, Serbia and Kosovo should switch territories with each other: Serbia would get North Kosovo with Mitrovica and Kosovo South Serbia with the three abovementioned municipalities. Given that the entire region is of strategic importance for the Serb strategists ensuring it the control over the Vardar Valley, the “offer” is unacceptable to Belgrade. For the same strategic reasons expulsion of Albanians from the three municipalities was Belgrade’s priority in the aftermath of the intervention. In this it succeeded only partially (in Medvedja). In response, local Albanians rebelled in 2001.
More...
Keywords: Serb Orthodox Church;
A change at the throne of the Serb Orthodox Church /SPC/ will effectuate no major changes in the SPC structure, organization and functioning or, for that matter, in its secular ambitions. In this context, newly elected Patriarch Irinej (Gavrilovic), former bishop of Nis, guarantees continuity. In other words, SPC will be trying to safeguard the space it has occupied at Serbia’s public scene over the past ten years, strengthen its position and further expand its influence on governmental policies.
More...
Keywords: Serbia;rights and freedoms; minorities; round-table; multicultural; cohabitation; autonomy;
In view of the key importance of inter-ethnic relations and status of national minorities in Serbia for development of democracy, Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia, Centre for Regionalism, the Vojvodina Club and Centre for Multiculturality have organised the round-table "National Minorities in Serbia" on 8 and 9 September 2000 in Novi Sad. Participants in this round-table were representatives of several dozen NGOs from Vojvodina and Serbia, representatives of political parties, prominent public personalities and experts for minority rights and ethnic relations. In a two-day debate participants in the round-table underscored that peace, tolerance and democratization of the society represent the basic prerequisite of the exercise of individual and collective rights and freedoms in the Republic of Serbia. Considering that a social community in the Republic of Serbia has a markedly heterogeneous cultural character and the fact that it is faced with pronounced ethnification of politics and intolerant nationalism, our discussion confirmed that the majority nation, that is, the ruling political establishment, were to be blamed for such a poor status of inter-ethnic relations. Hence the current political authorities cannot be relieved of responsibility from catastrophic consequences of internal conflicts and external and internal isolation. After analysing institutions and real social and political processes and actions of the most influential political protagonists, it was established that we all must insist on comprehensive implementation of ideas and legal-constitutional norms determining the Republic of Serbia as a state of equitable citizens, and the one guaranteeing corresponding standards in attainment and exercise of collective rights of national minorities in Serbia. Unfortunately during our discussion we identified through a host of examples a pronounced gulf between proclaimed norms and concrete reality in the sphere of protection of national minorities rights, notably in development and expression of their cultural identity. After the SFRY disintegration, the problem of "new minorities", notably Croats, Bosniaks, and Macedonians, emerged in Serbia. This problem entails official recognition of those minorities and concrete legal regulation of their status and rights. During preparations for the 2001 census scientific and cultural institutions and representative bodies should lay the groundwork for facilitating the free declaration of nationality by citizens. This particularly applies to Bosniaks, who have been deprived of that right to date. It is also expected that the democratic opposition of Serbia shall take a clear public stand on manner of resolution of minority problems, and incorporate pertinent proposals into their program of changes, offered as an alternative to the current regime. We brought into prominence the need to revive earlier initiatives for adoption of the Act on National Minorities in the Republic of Serbia, aimed at removing current shortcomings and imprecise points, and boosting harmonisation of domestic legal and political practice with the European standards on the Protection of Minorities. Our discussion indicated that the Republic Serbia in its relations with almost all neighbouring countries disregards the issue of minorities, and that this negligence is in turn reflected in the status of minorities and has a negative impact on relations between the majority and minorities. The role of ecological issues was discussed in the context of good-neighbourly relations, for they alike the minority issue clear the way for establishment of broad and efficient communications. Considering regional trends within the context of Europe those two issues can play an important role in the inclusion of Serbia in the project of European regions. Participants think that the Stability Pact is a conceptual framework for analysis of the most important problems and devising models of their resolution.
More...
Keywords: legal responsibility; authoritarianism; past; rule of law; Serbia; regime; personal data; protection; exceptions; state security service; legal system;
Societies in whose present time the authoritarian past is still a socially relevant thing may be placed in two opposing manners in front of this morally, politically and legally compromising past: there is a distinct difference between the policy of coping with the past and the policy of non coping with the past. In German, the only language with a specific expression for the complex phenomenon of the former, for ‘cope with’ the past (Vergangenheitsbewältigung), one can also use the synonym Vergangenheitsaufarbeitung. However, ‘to cope with’ is a bet-ter expression. The expression, as well as ‘to prevail over’ the past and ‘to get control over’ the past – indicates more clearly that at issue is a process by which the past is dealt with: to im- pose over, to get control over the past that imposed over us, and it would impose over us again, if we do not impose over it. The extreme patterns of the reactions to the authoritarian past by which it cannot be prevailed are on one side retaliation and pure vendetta and on the other side the 'as-if-nothing-has-happened' pattern: closing your eyes before the authoritarian past. By neither method, it must be emphasized, can the past be prevailed over. Retaliation is an authoritarian fight with the authoritarian past, but not the prevailing over it. Fire cannot be fought with fire here. The authoritarian fight with the past, even if it was authoritarian, is just a repetition, but with the opposite roles.
More...
Keywords: future status of Kosovo; conference; politics; Serbia; Albania; North Macedonia; Croatia; democratic society; regional stability; minority; international standards; decentralization; security;
The Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia organized a two-day conference “The Future Status of Kosovo” on June 13-14, 2005 in Prishtina. The conference not only stood for the third in the series of Serb-Albanian dialogues the Committee has staged over the past eight years, but also for the final and most important segment of the US Institute for Peace-supported project “Belgrade - Prishtina: Steps to Build Confidence and Understanding.” The idea behind the conference was to provide – on the eve of the announced startup of negotiations on Kosovo’s status – a realistic insight into the complexity of this major regional issue. The book’s contents – authentic discussions of the conference participants – practically figures for a public debate on a reality and real problems. Regardless of many a different stand, the conference participants, Serbs and Albanians alike, attempted to conceptualize a policy that moves towards a lasting solution and regional stability. A policy as such implies a sober assessment of Kosovo’s reality, as well as of possibilities, problems and constraints. The two-day conference, echoing more in Prishtina and somewhat less in Belgrade, assembled a number of outstanding political and public figures from Prishtina – Albanians, Serbs and people from Kosovo’s other ethnic communities, all of them concerned with their own future and ready to acknowledge major changes in the Kosovo society in the past six years. The same were the considerations of the participants from Belgrade, the people standing for Serbia’s alternative politics, and of Podgorica’s officials. Representatives of the international community and regional neighbors, Macedonia and Croatia, also partook in the conference and creatively contributed to the exchange of views. “Key international players were clear that that the startup of the talks about Kosovo’s future status is on the international agenda this year. And now it is on political leaders and institutions to demonstrate that they aim at building a stable, tolerant, multiethnic and democratic society in Kosovo, a society in which all communities will be living together in peace and in peace with their neighbors. It is time for all sides to let go short lived politics, join in a dialogue about real problems in good faith, with passion and constructiveness, and take all measures we know are necessary. This conference is a good start in the right direction. We need more such dialogues, said Soren Jessen Petersen, the UN Secretary General Special Representative, addressing the conference. The conference was organized in five panels: “Kosovo in the Context of Regional Stability,” “Minorities and International Standards in Kosovo,” “Decentralization and its Implications in Kosovo,” “Post-Conflict Rehabilitation” and “Status of Kosovo.” The first panel, “Kosovo in the Context of Regional Stability” chaired by Professor Enver Hasani, broached key security aspects, the role of Kosovo’s future army under civilian control, regional security challenges not only in the event of Kosovo’s independence, but also of Montenegro’s, the state of a ff airs in Kosovska Mitrovica as a major problem to be solved, etc. “Unconditional safety of minority communities is a key standard preconditioning stability and the pace of solving future status of Kosovo,” concluded, inter alia, the second panel “Minorities and International Standards in Kosovo,” chaired by lawyer Azem Vllasi. The discussion also highlighted that the return of all displaced persons and refugees was a priority task of all Kosovo institutions and factors. As for Kosovo Serbs, their integration into Kosovo society, as many put it, is their right, the same as their right to live safely in their homes is a fundamental human right without any alternative solution whatsoever. According to Vera Markovic, who chaired the third panel “Decentralization and its Implications in Kosovo,” the discussion that resembled a parliamentary debate indicated that political power was being gradually institutionalized. “It’s most encouraging that different positions on the decentralization plan do not divide the political sphere into Serbian and Albanian parts, but into groupings that include both Albanian and minority parties…I would say that the debate on decentralization testifies that Kosovo society obviously endeavors to let go the issues related to ‘outer freedom’ or freedom from domination and come to grips with the question of ‘inner freedom’ that cannot but benefit all minorities, ethnic and political alike,” said Vera Markovic. What marked the panel “Post-Con fl ict Rehabilitation,” but the entire conference as well, was the stance that position of minorities was a measure of any society’s democratic potential. In this context, as Dr. Olga Popovic-Obradovic put it, still rather high interethnic tensions make the situation in Kosovo extremely complex. Referring to preconditions of post-conflict rehabilitation, she singled out the issues brought forward by panelists, ranging from acknowledgment and condemnation of crimes and the policy that has given birth to it, lustration and individual accountability to culture as a lasting value linking people and nations. Summing up the “Status of Kosovo” panel, its chair, Sonja Biserko, said that the view that prevailed – at the panel and throughout the conference – was that some form of Kosovo’s independence was unquestionable. However, the panel itself, she added, was more focused on the sum and substance of Kosovo’s independence. It is impossible to ignore the past, the recent past in particular, as it brought about the situation under discussion. In other words, what should be recognized are not only developments in the recent past, but also the fact that the Greater Serbia project that generated ex-Yugoslavia’s disintegration persists as an illusion to come true once the international constellation changes. Therefore, Serbs should reconcile not only with Albanians, but also with all neighbors – Croats, Bosniaks and, in a manner of speaking, with some minorities in Serbia proper, according to Biserko. The conference ended by adopting a declaration welcoming the international community’s intention to tackle the future status of Kosovo as a priority issue of its agenda. Taking into account that the Contact Group has already defined the framework for negotiations that should ensure regional security and stability, and open the door to Western Balkans’ association with and ultimate membership of the European Union, “cognizant that such approach by the international community and favorable circumstance should not be allowed to pass by, and confident that this provides a unique momentum for all regional leaders to prove their political wisdom, constructiveness and genuine commitment to true interests of peoples and citizens,” participants in the conference, “call on Belgrade and Prishtina, as two directly involved parties, to engage in a substantial dialogue with maximum good will and to fully cooperate with representatives of the international community; request political actors on both sides to acknowledge Kosovo’s reality as the starting point for negotiations, while constantly bearing in mind legitimate interests of Serbs, Albanians and other communities in Kosovo, and to insist on the respect and full implementation of all international documents and standards dealing with human and minority rights,” quotes, inter alia, the unanimously adopted declaration.
More...
Keywords: Serbia; constitution; constitutionality; political society; politics; law; violation of constitution; legal act; constitutional Court; president of the Republic; human rights;
U knjizi SRBIJA IZME ĐU USTAVA I USTAVNOSTI iznela sam svoj pogled na ustavno pitanje u Srbiji. Srbija je jedina među zemljama koje su pošle putem evropske integracije, koja nije izmenila temeljni akt koji definiše osnovne vrednosti na kojima počiva politička zajednica, nije izmenila Ustav koji simbolizuje režim autoritarne vladavine. Šta je tome razlog i zašto Srbija toliko dugo traga za svojim ustavnim identitetom? Koje prepreke stoje na putu uspostavljanja ustavne države u Srbiji? Odgovor na ova pitanja već dugo vremena s pravom očekuju građani i građanke Srbije. Kao građanka Srbije i sama sam želela da saznam odgovor na ta pitanja. Profesija kojom se bavim i uža oblast mog naučnog interesovanja obavezivali su me da i sama pokušam da na neka od pitanja odgovorim. Ova knjiga ilustruje moja traganja za odgovorima. Da li sam u tome uspela i u kojoj meri, ostavljam čitaocima ove knjige da prosude sami. Kontinuirano sam pratila ustavni proces u Srbiji, posebno ustavne kontroverze koje prate ovaj proces. Sudelovala sam aktivno u tom procesu, prvenstveno na profesionalnom planu, na stručnim raspravama, ali i u široj javnosti.
More...
Keywords: Serbia; 19th and 20th century; status of women; children; influence of elite; village; kindergarten; upbringing of children; religious school;
"Helsinške sveske" pod naslovom Žene i deca proizišle su iz projekta Srbija u modernizacijskim procesima XIX i XX veka. Saradnici koji su ovaj projekat začeli devedesetih godina prošlog veka pronalazili su razne izdavače za zbornike radova u kojima su saopštavali rezultate svojih istraživanja. Tako su se prva dva zbornika pojavila u izdanju Instituta za noviju istoriju Srbije; treći u izdanju autora, koje je potpisala Dubravka Stojanović, dok se četvrti zbornik pojavljuje u okviru pomenute edicije Helsinškog odbora za ljudska prava u Srbiji. Hronološka granica istraživanja pomerena je već u drugom zborniku unazad: obuhvaćen je i XIX vek, što znači: srpska država i društvo u celom modernom dobu. U isto vreme, sužen je sadržaj istraživanja. Za razliku od prvog zbornika, koji ima multidisciplinarni karakter, jer su istraživana razna područja (ekonomija, politika, prosveta i obrazovanje, kultura), u narednim zbornicima preovlađuju istoričari koji se bave društvenom istorijom a u fokusu istraživanja je jedan problem: položaj žene, uticaj elita, žene i deca. U oba slučaja, istraživanja su podjednako delimična: ona ne predstavljaju celinu ni u hronološkom smislu ni u smislu obuhvaćenosti svih aspekata relevantnih za problem koji je istraživan. Na ovakav pristup modernizacijskim procesima u Srbiji XIX i XX veka uticalo je više činilaca: stanje istraženosti; teorijske osnove istraživanja; raščlanjenost istorijskog procesa, to jest njegova periodizacija, kako bi se uočila njegova dinamika i glavne karakteristike.
More...
Keywords: Vojvodina; identity; ethnic group; minority; human rights; multi-ethnicity; politics; protection of minorities; multi-culture;
(Serbian edition) Isticanje etničkog pluralizma Vojvodine predstavlja opšte mesto u retorici pokrajinskih političara, medija i predstavnika civilnog društva. Činjenica da na području Vojvodine žive pripadnici velikog broja nacionalnih manjina u toj se retorici uzdiže kao prednost i vojvođanska vrednost. Ovo naglašavanje višeetničnosti nije slučajno. Tokom raspada bivše Jugoslavije, multietnički karakter vojvođanskog društva često je bio na udaru. U sudaru sa heterogenom prirodom društva, novi politički ideal - nacionalna država - vrlo brzo je oslobodio svoje destruktivne potencijale. Nacionalistička histerija, nasilje, reduciranje prava i omalovažavanje vodile su marginalizaciji i izolaciji manjina, njihovom zatvaranju u uske granice vlastite etničke grupe, povlačenju iz sfere javnosti, iseljavanju u matične, odnosno treće države. Nakon 5. oktobra 2000. godine učinjeni su stanoviti pomaci u saniranju posledica Miloševićevog režima. Ti su pomaci, međutim, bili i ostali polovični. Donet je, recimo, zakon o Zaštiti prava i sloboda nacionalnih manjina, ali ne i zakon o načinu izbora i nadležnostima nacionalnih saveta. Na nivou republike i pokrajine formirani su, nakon zaoštravanja međuetničkih odnosa u Vojvodini, saveti za nacionalne manjine, ali oni, lišeni bilo kakvog realnog uticaja, vegetiraju pretvoreni u fasadne institucije. Spremnost države da se obračuna sa govorom mržnje i etnički motivisanim napadima je, najčešće, izostajala, što je kod manjina stvorilo utisak o selektivnoj primeni krivičnih paragrafa. Kampanja koju je, u cilju protežiranja tolerancije, svojevremeno vodilo Ministarstvo za ljudska i manjinska prava završila je neuspehom. Ni sadašnji projekat koji sprovodi Pokrajinski sekretarijat za upravu, propise i nacionalne manjine, neće uspeti ako njegovi napori na afirmisanju tolerancije i multikulturalizma ne budu snažno podržani od strane važnih društvenih podsistema.
More...
Keywords: Sandžak; European perspective; politics; marginalization; ethnic minority; Islam; Muslims; identity; integration; society; discrimination;
Sandžak, deo Srbije na tromeđi sa Bosnom i Crnom Gorom, gde živi najveći deo bošnjačke manjine u Srbiji, više od dve decenije je na udaru državne represivne politike u cilju marginalizacije te manjine. Odnos prema islamu i Muslimanima u Jugoslaviji počeo je da se zaoštrava i dobija neprijateljski prizvuk još osamdesetih godina prošlog veka, kada srpska elita pokreće kampanju protiv Muslimana i iznosi tezu o „islamskom fundamentalizmu koji preti da uništi Jugoslaviju“. To je bila priprema za genocid u Bosni, čije su posledice osetili i Bošnjaci u Sandžaku. Odnos prema muslimanima nije se suštinski promenio, ali se pod pritiskom evropskih organizacija kao što su Savet Evrope, OEBS i EU, država uzdržava od otvorene represije. Međutim, sada primenjuje druge metode poput kriminalizacije pojedinaca ili grupa (vehabije), ali pre svega, konstantnim podrivanjem Islamske zajednice (IZ) kao jedine institucije koju Bošnjaci imaju i koja je inače, od ključnog značaja za njihov identitet. Značaj Islamske zajednice za Bošnjake je izraz potrebe za religijom koja doprinosi jačanju vlastitiog identiteta i doprinosi integraciji društva. Potreba za jačanjem identiteta je i razumljiv odgovor na dugogodišnju diskriminaciju i „nevidljivost“, kao i policijski teror, otmice i likvidacije tokom rata u Bosni. Islamska zajednica je takođe, ključna identitetska matrica za bošnjačku zajednicu u odsustvu drugih institucija. Zbog toga je i bila na udaru Beograda i beogradskih „službi“, sa ciljem da se temeljno destabilizuje. To je dovelo do cepanja Islamske zajednice i podizanje tenzije unutar bošnjačke zajednice što može, ako bude potrebno, da se brzo pretvori u kriznu tačku.
More...
Keywords: Serbia; prison; Valjevo; Leskovac; Sremska Mitrovica; Požarevac; Novi Sad; quality of life; security; re-socialization; minor; woman; hospital;
Unapređivanje krivičnopravnog sistema, kao preduslov za izgradnju boljeg i bezbednijeg društva, jedan je od najvažnijih aspekata reforme pravosuđa koja se u Srbiji sprovodi poslednjih godina. Osim nesumnjivog značaja za zajednicu, posmatran u kontekstu ljudske bezbednosti ovaj segment reforme dodatno dobija na važnosti, jer je neminovno vezan za globalne procese i međunarodni pravni poredak. U isto vreme, i postupanje sa prestupnicima i zatvorenicima koji se nalaze na izdržavanju kazne, podleže brojnim zakonima i pravilima, konvencijama i drugim dokumentima koji se baziraju, kako na specifi čnoj unutrašnjoj i međunarodnoj legislativi, tako i na konceptu ljudskih prava. Imajući to u vidu, Helsinški odbor za ljudska prava je već 2002. godine počeo sa monitoringom zatvora u Srbiji, najpre kroz jednogodišnji projekat kojim je obuhvaćeno 13 zatvora, a potom kroz trogodišnji (2003-2006) regionalni projekat „Prevencija torture-podrška rehabilitaciji žrtava torture“, tokom koga je vršen kontinuirani monitoring svih zatvora u zemlji.
More...
Keywords: Serbia; prison; reform system; human rights; quality of life; security; re-socialization; legality of treatment; personnel; Kruševac; Valjevo; Požarevac; minor; woman;
Tokom godina Helsinški odbor za ljudska prava obilazio je zatvorske ustanove u Srbiji i izveštavao o stanju ljudskih prava osuđenih i pritvorenih lica – drugim rečima, od 2001. godine Odbor je posetio svih 28 ustanova za izvršenje krivičnih sankcija, mnoge od njih više puta. U velikom broju izveštaja1 Odbor je posebno analizirao raskorake između domaćeg zakonodavstva i međunarodnih standarda s jedne i prakse u sistemu izvršenja sankcija s druge strane, sugerišući moguća rešenja. Pred čitaocem su izveštaji iz zatvora koje je Helsinški odbor posetio u periodu 2011–2013. godina. Ove posete realizovane su u okviru dva kompatibilna projekta – “Reforma zatvorskog sistema u Srbiji” i “Jačanje Nacionalnog preventivnog mehanizma i zagovaranje prava institucionalizovanih osoba”, koje su finansijski podržali Civil Rights Defenders i Ambasade Kraljevine Holandije u Srbiji.
More...
Keywords: extremism; social evil; anti-fascism; Serbia; woman; politics; crime; hatred; law; minority; radicalization; hooliganism; social norms;
Pojava ekstremne desnice i desničarske ideologije u Srbiji posledica su strukturalnih promena nakon razgradnje socijalističke države. Ratovi devedestih vođenih sa idejom o prekomponovanju Balkana, odnosno s idejom o Velikoj Srbiji (Memorandumu Srpske akademije nauka i umetnosti, 1986), samo su jedan od ideoloških osnova na kojima još uvek opstaje desna misao. Njene osnovne karakteristike jesu: etnička homogenizacija, težnja za stapanjem državnih i etničkih granica, antikomunizam i negiranje antifašizma, jačanje tradicionalizma i autoritarnosti, pravoslavlje tretirano kao superiorna religija u odnosu na ostale etničke i religijske grupe (posebno Hrvate, Muslimane i Albance), otpor idejama multikulturalizma i kosmopolitizma i netrpeljivost prema “novim” (LGBT popuacija) i tradicionalnim manjinama (Romi). Zajedničko svim desničarskim pokretima koji se pozivaju na ekstremni srpski nacionalizam i fundamentalističke interpretacije pravoslavlja, odnosno svetosavlja, jeste i izrazita islamofobija i neprijateljski stav prema svemu što je islamsko.
More...
Keywords: mental health; human dignity; human rights; Serbia; psychiatry; mental illness; law; de-institutionalization; disability; NGO;
Publikacija “Briga o mentalnom zdravlju po meri ljudskog dostojanstva” predstavlja skup tekstova o nekim od najvažnijih problema koji usporavaju reformu sistema zaštite mentalnog zdravlja i odlažu početak deinstitucionalizacije u Srbiji. Predstavljene analize rezultat su kontinuiranog rada više organizacija civilnog društva koje se zalažu za promenu odnosa prema osobama sa mentalnim smetnjama, reformu psihijatrije i prelazak sa institucionalnog zbrinjavanja na sistem usluga podrške u zajednici. Time bi se, vremenom, stvorili uslovi za zatvaranje ustanova azilarnog tipa i omogućilo korisnicima psihijatrijskih usluga, deci sa smetnjama u razvoju i drugim osobama sa invaliditetom, da vode dostojanstven život sa jednakim pravima i mogućnostima. Nevladine organizacije okupljene u okviru radne grupe za deinstitucionalizaciju bavile su se, samostalno ili u međusobnom partnerstvu, brojnim temama od značaja za mentalno zdravlje, imajući sve vreme u fokusu povredu osnovnih ljudskih prava osoba sa mentalnim poteškoćama. Osim Helsinškog odbora za ljudska prava u Srbiji i IAN, kao nosilaca projekta „Kampanja civilnog društva za efikasnu zaštitu osoba sa mentalnim smetnjama”, u pripremi ove brošure su učestvovali i zaštitnik građana, Komitet pravnika za ljudska prava – yucom, mdri-s (Menthal Disability Rights Serbia), Beogradski centar za ljudska prava i Udruženje korisnika psihijatrijskih usluga “Duša”, a svoj doprinos su dali i dr Paolo Serra, psihijatar i konsultant Caritasa za mentalno zdravlje, aktivni učesnik u procesu deinstitucionalizacije u psihijatrijskoj bolnici u Goriciji i rukovodilac u službama u zajednici u Arecu i Firenci, kao i Dejan Milenković, profesor na Fakultetu političkih nauka u Beogradu. Projekat „Kampanja civilnog društva za efikasnu zaštitu osoba sa mentalnim smetnjama” ima za cilj da podstakne i pomogne uspostavljanje Centara za mentalno zdravlje širom Srbije, smanjivanje broja korisnika/pacijenata u socijalnim i zdravstvenim ustanovama i njihovo postepeno zatvaranje ili transformaciju, izmenu postojećih i usvajanje novih propisa u različitim oblastima, koji će obezbediti odgovarajući pravni okvir za sistemsku zaštitu ljudskih prava osoba sa mentalnim poteškoćama, okupljanje i zajedničko delovanje organizacija civilnog društva, kampanju za podršku javnosti itd. U tom smislu, nadamo se da će i ova publikacija doprineti boljem sagledavanju problematike i pronalaženju adekvatnijih rešenja koja će biti u skladu sa razvojem medicinske nauke, psihijatrije i sa međunarodnim standardima.
More...
Keywords: Serbia; high school students; value orientations; tradition; conservatism; homophobia; violence in school; human rights;
Analiza stavova i vrednosnih orijentacija srednjoškolaca je rezultat istraživanja na osnovu podataka prikupljenih u periodu april-jun 2011, u šest gradova u Srbiji. Da bismo se uopšte bavili vrednostima ove mlađe generacije u našem društvu, moramo se osvrnuti na neke strukturalne promene koje obeležavaju vreme njihovog odrastanja. Period u kome želimo da proučavamo stavove i vrednosne orijentacije srednjoškolaca u Srbiji, jeste period nakon decenije «demokratskih» promena u zemlji, period (još uvek) zakasnele transformacije. Došlo je do proglašenja nezavisnosti Crne Gore i Republike Kosovo a nestabilnost država regiona (Bosne i Hercegovine i još uvek nerešene granice sa Kosovom) su uzrok osećaja nesigurnosti u socijalnom ali i nacionalnom smislu, kod većine stanovništva Srbije. Govorimo i o periodu u kome se odvija revizija istorije i relativizacija, pa i promocija desnih ideologija (ravnogorski pokret i omladinske profašističke organizacije) i u kome su religija i crkva i dalje veoma važne za veliki deo naroda. Ne smemo da zanemarimo i povećan prodor globalizacijiskih faktora koji su relativno uticali na izgradnju demokratije u zemlji. Najupadljiviji faktor je zvanična odluka da se pristupi ulasku u EU. Kao rezultat postoji donekle približavanje državne politike interesima Evropske unije. Međutim, u zemlji problemi postoje: oligarhijski sistem, uticaj političkih stranaka i visoka korupcija – kako u privredi tako i u politici – kao i problemi zaštite prava marginalizovanih grupa koji sprečavaju izgradnju građanskog društva.
More...
Keywords: European identity; education; youth; EU accession; democracy; pluralism; extremism; pluralism; framed reality; interculturalism; ethnic nationalism; liberal ideology;
(English edition) Ongoing public debates frequently focus on European identity. What sparked off such debates were tremendous global changes after the Cold War, disappearance of two opposing blocs, ethnic conflicts, migrations, sociopolitical crises of liberal societies as well as the mass renouncement of value-based orientations Europe and the whole world had been built on after World War II and defeat of Nazism. People all over the world are now growingly concerned with the issues of statehood, ethnicity and the notion of “being a citizen.” Political manipulation of collective identities badly affects people’s lives and policies on which societies are being built. Many theoreticians are questioning – and with good reason – the very notion of collective identity, ethnic in the first place, as extremely exclusive. The Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia has launched a series of round tables under the title “Youth in a Post-Truth Era: European Identity and Education.” Participants were intellectuals of younger generations mostly, NGO activists and civil sector representatives, but secondary school and university students too. What we wanted achieve with these open debates – never devoid of controversial arguments – was to give shape to authentic views with impact on practical politics and (in)formal education of the youth. Our researches and experience in communication with young people show that they do care about collective identities, and that their ethnicities and religions are crucial in identity-building. Although they recognize the potential of Euro-integration for, say, better schooling or economic progress, a snail’s pace of the accession process and domestic propaganda make them turn to other international players. Young Serbs are turning to Russia and Putin, Bosniaks to Turkey and Erdogan, while young Hungarians to Serbia’s neighbor in the north and Orban. Revisionism also strongly influences the youth regardless of their ethnicities. They practically always oppose strongly any questioning of patriarchal values and react fiercely to it. Value-based orientations as such are mostly the effects of the spread of fake news and narratives predominant in the media, schools environments and families; the narratives that forced their way into the public sphere in the 1980s, bloomed in the 1990s and are thriving now against the global backdrop. Is the narrative about European identity and education a key to changes and inclusive enough? When I say European identity I am not advocating for Euro-centrism, especially not now when it implies social and economic exclusion of people heading for Europe from various continents and countries, or those outside the European Union. In Balkan countries aspiring to EU membership European identity is used as a political instrument supportive to integration processes. At the same time, it supports the transfer from a one-dimensional, nationalistic and wartime identity to a multi-dimensional, civic one. As it has turned out so far, the issues of class consciousness, socioeconomic justice and the right to education for all will be predominant in the debates to come. We do not intend to impose alternative narratives on the youth but to capacitate them for critical thought; to help them recognize and stand up against social repression and collective identities that have been imposed on them and exclude any “otherness.” Ever since the early 1990s the European Commission has also been focused on the researches of European identity (or identities). The European bureaucracy was interested in it for very practical reasons: the European Commission’s concern with the manner in which different processes of identification with the European Union shape integrative processes and strengthen the sense of solidarity among Europeans. On the eve of the Gothenburg Summit in November 2017 the European Commission issued guidelines for strengthening of the common European identity through education and culture, under the motto “unity in diversity.” The document was meant for the European Parliament, the Council of Europe, the European Socioeconomic Committee and the Committee of Regions. It was motivated by the rise of populism “at home” and beyond the EU, the spread of fake news and manipulation of information networks. Given that the EU administration interferes not into educational systems and culture of its member-states but leaves them to national, regional and local authorities, its role is limited to strengthening of cooperation and support to national projects in these spheres. It realized that education and culture make Europe attractive for learning and working, attractive as a space of freedom and shared values reflected in fundamental rights and an open society. And education as such builds foundations for active citizenship and helps to prevent populism, xenophobia and violent radicalism. Education, along with culture, plays a key role in cross-border meetings and learning about the true meaning of “being a European.” According to an analysis commissioned by the European Commission, joint, cross-border actions such as engagement in social movements or in organizations with shared goals (such as ecologic organizations) can promote the sense for European identity since collective actions are always taking into consideration the “other’s” points of view. How to involve candidates for the membership of the EU in the debate on Europe’s future and identity (identities) is among major issues. Isolated periphery and people’s frustration with accession that is being constantly postponed incite Euroskepticism and passivity of the youth who actually stand for European integration. The publication “European Identity and Education” resulted from a series of discussions and debates organized by the Helsinki Committee. Its introductory section presents one of the essays and political analyses of the international and local context in which Serbia’s youth are being raised: “Democracy, Pluralism and Extremism” by Vladimir Gligorov. The following section presents readers with draft practical politics for those dealing with institutional and informal education of the young. These draft policies, actually suggestions, are about teaching methods that may efficiently develop critical thinking among the youth and their awareness about alternatives. Inter alia, the suggested approaches are meant to motivate young people to get actively involved in building of a democratic society based on pluralism, inter-culturalism, solidarity and socioeconomic rights. Recommendations can be summed up as follows: 1. Strengthening of the idea of active citizenship; 2. Media literacy and development of critical thinking of the youth; and 3. Development and modernization of educational programs and present approaches to education of school children. Drafts of public policies were on the agenda of debates held in Belgrade and Novi Sad with participation of scholars and activists from younger generations mostly, concerned with the issues of identity and education. This publication also presents excerpts from those debates. How possibly could cosmopolitanism, inter-culturalism, anti-fascism and open society be promoted in today’s Serbia but also in Europe where extremism, fear of “otherness,” concerns for the safeguard of one’s own national identity that is allegedly threatened, be on the up and up? This is one of major dilemmas facing us today. Few students have access to informal education that rests on the principles guiding a democratic society. Speaking from experience many participants in debates pointed to the lack in professional staffs involved in educational process. Civic education is being marginalized in elementary and secondary schools. The participants also presented well-thought-out arguments against religious teaching in school curricula. The majority of participants take that strengthening of informal education that would lead towards incorporation of similar contents and methods into the educational system could be a solution to the above-mentioned dilemma. That would be a chance for attracting young people whose interests and ambitions are well beyond the rigid educational system, they argue. Positive experiences of Yugoslavia’s interculturalism and socialism, and the common history and culture can be used as resources for strengthening interculturalism throughout the region. Small steps forward within institutions that depend, above all, on individual activism and courage are another possible approach to resolution. This publication is meant as a contribution to local but also more extensive debate on European identity and new European policies that would cope with today’s challenges by far more efficiently.
More...
Keywords: European identity; education; youth; EU accession; democracy; pluralism; extremism; pluralism; framed reality; interculturalism; ethnic nationalism; liberal ideology; geopolitics;
(Serbian edition) Ongoing public debates frequently focus on European identity. What sparked off such debates were tremendous global changes after the Cold War, disappearance of two opposing blocs, ethnic conflicts, migrations, sociopolitical crises of liberal societies as well as the mass renouncement of value-based orientations Europe and the whole world had been built on after World War II and defeat of Nazism. People all over the world are now growingly concerned with the issues of statehood, ethnicity and the notion of “being a citizen.” Political manipulation of collective identities badly affects people’s lives and policies on which societies are being built. Many theoreticians are questioning – and with good reason – the very notion of collective identity, ethnic in the first place, as extremely exclusive. The Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia has launched a series of round tables under the title “Youth in a Post-Truth Era: European Identity and Education.” Participants were intellectuals of younger generations mostly, NGO activists and civil sector representatives, but secondary school and university students too. What we wanted achieve with these open debates – never devoid of controversial arguments – was to give shape to authentic views with impact on practical politics and (in)formal education of the youth. Our researches and experience in communication with young people show that they do care about collective identities, and that their ethnicities and religions are crucial in identity-building. Although they recognize the potential of Euro-integration for, say, better schooling or economic progress, a snail’s pace of the accession process and domestic propaganda make them turn to other international players. Young Serbs are turning to Russia and Putin, Bosniaks to Turkey and Erdogan, while young Hungarians to Serbia’s neighbor in the north and Orban. Revisionism also strongly influences the youth regardless of their ethnicities. They practically always oppose strongly any questioning of patriarchal values and react fiercely to it. Value-based orientations as such are mostly the effects of the spread of fake news and narratives predominant in the media, schools environments and families; the narratives that forced their way into the public sphere in the 1980s, bloomed in the 1990s and are thriving now against the global backdrop. Is the narrative about European identity and education a key to changes and inclusive enough? When I say European identity I am not advocating for Euro-centrism, especially not now when it implies social and economic exclusion of people heading for Europe from various continents and countries, or those outside the European Union. In Balkan countries aspiring to EU membership European identity is used as a political instrument supportive to integration processes. At the same time, it supports the transfer from a one-dimensional, nationalistic and wartime identity to a multi-dimensional, civic one. As it has turned out so far, the issues of class consciousness, socioeconomic justice and the right to education for all will be predominant in the debates to come. We do not intend to impose alternative narratives on the youth but to capacitate them for critical thought; to help them recognize and stand up against social repression and collective identities that have been imposed on them and exclude any “otherness.” Ever since the early 1990s the European Commission has also been focused on the researches of European identity (or identities). The European bureaucracy was interested in it for very practical reasons: the European Commission’s concern with the manner in which different processes of identification with the European Union shape integrative processes and strengthen the sense of solidarity among Europeans. On the eve of the Gothenburg Summit in November 2017 the European Commission issued guidelines for strengthening of the common European identity through education and culture, under the motto “unity in diversity.” The document was meant for the European Parliament, the Council of Europe, the European Socioeconomic Committee and the Committee of Regions. It was motivated by the rise of populism “at home” and beyond the EU, the spread of fake news and manipulation of information networks. Given that the EU administration interferes not into educational systems and culture of its member-states but leaves them to national, regional and local authorities, its role is limited to strengthening of cooperation and support to national projects in these spheres. It realized that education and culture make Europe attractive for learning and working, attractive as a space of freedom and shared values reflected in fundamental rights and an open society. And education as such builds foundations for active citizenship and helps to prevent populism, xenophobia and violent radicalism. Education, along with culture, plays a key role in cross-border meetings and learning about the true meaning of “being a European.” According to an analysis commissioned by the European Commission, joint, cross-border actions such as engagement in social movements or in organizations with shared goals (such as ecologic organizations) can promote the sense for European identity since collective actions are always taking into consideration the “other’s” points of view. How to involve candidates for the membership of the EU in the debate on Europe’s future and identity (identities) is among major issues. Isolated periphery and people’s frustration with accession that is being constantly postponed incite Euroskepticism and passivity of the youth who actually stand for European integration. The publication “European Identity and Education” resulted from a series of discussions and debates organized by the Helsinki Committee. Its introductory section presents one of the essays and political analyses of the international and local context in which Serbia’s youth are being raised: “Democracy, Pluralism and Extremism” by Vladimir Gligorov. The following section presents readers with draft practical politics for those dealing with institutional and informal education of the young. These draft policies, actually suggestions, are about teaching methods that may efficiently develop critical thinking among the youth and their awareness about alternatives. Inter alia, the suggested approaches are meant to motivate young people to get actively involved in building of a democratic society based on pluralism, inter-culturalism, solidarity and socioeconomic rights. Recommendations can be summed up as follows: 1. Strengthening of the idea of active citizenship; 2. Media literacy and development of critical thinking of the youth; and 3. Development and modernization of educational programs and present approaches to education of school children. Drafts of public policies were on the agenda of debates held in Belgrade and Novi Sad with participation of scholars and activists from younger generations mostly, concerned with the issues of identity and education. This publication also presents excerpts from those debates. How possibly could cosmopolitanism, inter-culturalism, anti-fascism and open society be promoted in today’s Serbia but also in Europe where extremism, fear of “otherness,” concerns for the safeguard of one’s own national identity that is allegedly threatened, be on the up and up? This is one of major dilemmas facing us today. Few students have access to informal education that rests on the principles guiding a democratic society. Speaking from experience many participants in debates pointed to the lack in professional staffs involved in educational process. Civic education is being marginalized in elementary and secondary schools. The participants also presented well-thought-out arguments against religious teaching in school curricula. The majority of participants take that strengthening of informal education that would lead towards incorporation of similar contents and methods into the educational system could be a solution to the above-mentioned dilemma. That would be a chance for attracting young people whose interests and ambitions are well beyond the rigid educational system, they argue. Positive experiences of Yugoslavia’s interculturalism and socialism, and the common history and culture can be used as resources for strengthening interculturalism throughout the region. Small steps forward within institutions that depend, above all, on individual activism and courage are another possible approach to resolution. This publication is meant as a contribution to local but also more extensive debate on European identity and new European policies that would cope with today’s challenges by far more efficiently.
More...
Keywords: education; high school; students; violence; extremism; alternative narrative; instruments; psychology; customs; abortion; Cyrillic script; Hijab; gender;
Socijlano okruženje i obrazovni sistem u kome odrastaju mladi u Srbiji karakteriše snažan uticaj etnonacionalizma, balast ratne prošlosti, nedovoljno pristupačni edukativni programi koji promovišu kritičko mišljenje i ljudska prava i neadekvatni udžbenici građanskog obrazovanja. U takvom socijalnom, porodičnom, obrazovnom i neprofesionalnom medijskom okruženju, mladi teško dolaze do argumenata koji identitet ne svode samo na verski i nacionalni. Nametanje etnonacionalističkog koncepta odozgo (elite) i klerikalizacija društva, što su procesi koji traju od devedesetih, ne odnose se samo na mlade u većinskoj srpskoj populaciji, već su odavno zahvatili i manjinske zajednice. Uvođenje verskog obrazovanja kao alternative građanskom 2001. godine, ostavilo je posledice na nekoliko generacija mladih, uključujući i one koji su sada predavači i roditelji. Učvršćivanje etnonacionalističkog koncepta podstaknuto je i globalnim promenama tokom poslednje dve decenije. U te globalne faktore spadaju pre svega, uspon konzervativnih političkih stranaka i organizacija, pretnja terorizmom, ratovi, nesigurnost u socijalno-ekonomskom i bezbednosnom smislu, kao i konfuzija i strepnje zbog eskalacije lažnih vesti i krize u medijima. Nasilni ekstremizam u Srbiji se obično prelama kroz prizmu stranih ratnika koji se pridružuju ISIL, ili Al-Nusri u Siriji i Iraku. Tako je, prema zvaničnim podacima, 49 državljana Srbije otišlo da se bori u Siriji i Iraku. Srbija je, međutim, i zemlja Zapadnog Balkana sa najvećim brojem ratnika u Istočnoj Ukrajini na proruskoj strani. Prema podacima MUP Srbije, iz Ukrajine se do kraja 2017, vratilo 48 boraca. U izveštaju koga je objavio Regionalni savet za saradnju sa sedištem u Sarajevu, navodi se da bi Srbija uspešno primenila nacionalnu strategiju za prevenciju i borbu protiv terorizma, neophodno je da standardizuje pristup ekstremizmima, zasnovan na različitim ideološkim osnovama. Alternativni narativ morao bi da se odnosi na sve elemente ekstremizma i različiti sektori bi morali da budu uključeni u njegovo stvaranje, navedeno je u pomenutom izveštaju. Osim za strane borce, nasilni ekstremizam u Srbiji vezuje se za zločine iz mržnje i huliganizam u najvećim nacionalnim i verskim zajednicama. Iako se te grupacije međusobno sukobljavaju, postoje bitne sličnosti među njima. Elemente ideološkog diskursa nasilnih ekstemističkih grupacija koji dolaze iz različitih etnokonfensionalnih zajednica u Srbiji su: ekstremni nacionalizam koji uključuje tendenciju za menjanje granica (širenje teritorije ili pripajanje drugoj državi), snažna vezanost za verske lidere, odbacivanje evropskih integracija i vezivanje za druge međunarodne faktore, istorijski revizionizam – pre svega Drugog svetskog rata i istorije Jugoslavije, proganjanje tradicionalnih neprijatelja nacionalnih, verskih i seksualnih manjina, napadi na organizacije za ljudska prava i degradacija žena. Neke od radikalno konzervativnih grupacija su posebno popularne među studentskom omladinom. Izgradnja alternativnog narativa u odnosu na propagandu ekstremističkih organizacija postao je jedan od najvećih izazova za međuvladine međunarodne organizacije, kao i za lokalne aktere u prevenciji i borbi protiv nasilnog ekstremizma i terorizma. Često svođenje alternativnog narativa na instant rešenja, “gotove” odgovore i “kontra činjenice” solidno vizuelno upakovane, pokazuju se kao neefikasno i sve više kontraproduktivne, pa teško mogu da privuku razočarane mlade ljude koji se osećaju izolovanim i bez perspektive. Zapravo, takav pristup, svodi alternativni narativ, na kontra-propagandu bez dubljeg efekta i željene promene.
More...
Keywords: Serbia; Montenegro; Sandžak; youth; Islamic extremism; Wahhabis; religious radicals; opinion poll;
The crucial question here is: Are the Muslim youth in Sandžak imbued with religious extremism or not? Hardly any interethnic and inter-religious incident has been registered in this part of the Republic of Serbia. On the other hand, fighters from Sandžak are being involved in the Iraqi and Syrian wars. Depending on the answer to the question above, the authorities could take appropriate actions aiming at young people in Sandžak. Both domestic and international stakeholders – and there are many of them, including the non-governmental sector – could develop plans and take a variety of concrete steps depending on the answer to this very question. Fahrudin Kladničanin wrote about the influence of Wahhabi Islamic extremism on the youth in Sandžak: “Wahhabis are usually focused on recruiting young people 19 – 27 years old with little education, who are poor and often come from dysfunctional families. The youth are being indoctrinated in private places of worship (masjids), which are either rented or owned by Wahhabis, and in certain religious objects (mosques) whose imams support Wahhabi teaching, and prayers in these mosques are always led by Wahhabis. (Kladničanin, 2013: 130) Marija Radoman analyzed the reasons driving young people in Serbia towards extremist ideologies. Two citations from an earlier research of the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia will thus be mentioned: „Regarding the period after 2000, surveys show that the family remains the mainstay of its young members, that young people’s life patterns lack individualization, and that they normatively accept the traditional sequence of events in a person’s life (i.e. completion of education, getting a job, entry into marriage and only then having children). What intrigues me is the sphere of influence between the respondents to this survey and their families. I tried all the time to keep a picture in my head of the families in which they grew up. I wanted to find out whether the respondents’ attitudes would reflect that background, which is hardly bright and optimistic, or whether the differences would be more than conspicuous.” (Radoman, 2011: 12). Family is the primary mechanism by which extremism is interiorized. However, it is not a cause, given that the changes stemming from structural circumstances also occurred within the family. Radoman wrote that “Today’s efforts to establish a stable democratic society in Serbia are being sabotaged, conditionally speaking, by the second generation of the nationalist current (i.e. by the circles close to the Serbian Orthodox Church, the remaining appointees of political parties who served the Milošević regime and members of Russophile conservative options, notably the Democratic Party of Serbia and New Serbia, but also the Serbian Progressive Party), as well as by the extreme right-wing reactionary Russophiles, i.e. the Serbian Radical Party. The efforts to establish a democracy are also hindered by the economic crisis.” (Ibid: 10) The analysis is based on the survey the Helsinki Committee conducted with the youth in Sandžak in May 2016. The focus was on their attitude towards religious extremism, whereas the goal to contextualize the findings: to see how to recognize and understand Islamic extremism and what could be done – preventively and concretely – considering the factors that have influenced the Sandžak youth. No doubt, interviewees’ attitudes towards extremism – or their everyday experience – differ from theoretical considerations of the phenomenon. The very notion of extremism is indisputable. In 2013 I wrote that mainstream social forces of individual societies were arbitrarily determining the notion of extremism. Official codification of political extremism and radicalism make it possible for governments and other political factors to place all those opposing the values such as equality, freedom, democracy, rule of law, etc. under control or control those advocating these values in the manner that contradicts a government’s interests. On the other hand, radicalism (or extremism) gauged by “political correctness” is being determined, as a rule, by the manner or scope in which a certain value is considered either unquestionable or unacceptable. And in all this, decision makers and the majority of population need not see eye to eye. For instance, according to many opinion polls, the majority of Serbia’s population discriminates sexual minorities, national minorities, some religious minorities and, especially fenced off communities such as Roma. By the standards of political correctness decision-makers term such stands – notwithstanding its predominance – extremist and “expel” them from media space. Extremism is deep-rooted in social structures. “The emergence of extreme right-wing and rightist ideology in Serbia derive from structural changes following on the disintegration of the socialist state. The 1990s wars, inspired by the idea of recomposition of the Balkans – or the Greater Serbia idea – are only one of many ideological bases on which the right-wing thought still lives; and its basic characteristics are: ethnic homogenization, wish to have ethnic and state borders ‘merged,’ anticommunism and denial of antifascism, the growingly stronger traditionalism and authoritarianism, the Eastern Orthodoxy seen as superior to other religions and ethnic groups (especially Croats, Muslims and Albanians), resistance to multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism, and intolerance of ‘new’ (LGBT population) and traditional minorities (Roma),” writes Sonja Biserko in 2014. To what extent is Islamic, religious extremism spread in Sandžak? In June 2015 in Novi Pazar Snežana Ilić quoted the ICG report “Serb Sandžak still Forgotten” saying that there were some 300 Wahhabis in Sandžak who were not exactly organized, that only some 50 of them were active, but the movement was spreading anyway. According to the said report, Wahhabism emerged in Sandžak in 1997, triggered off by an imam wanting his believers in a mosque to pray in a different way. The believers had opposed the imam and sent him away. However, over the past couple of years Wahhabis have better organized themselves in Sandžak, while getting more and more funds from abroad for their movement. Many of them were going to work in Vienna; apparently to be recruited in a way, since they dressed and behaved like true Wahhabis once back home. Snežana Ilić believes that the highest authorities of the Islamic Community in Serbia have been using Wahhabis in several ways. For instance, they have been presenting themselves internationally as someone capable of controlling Bosniaks’ religious radicalism by the principle of Islamic legitimacy. The message they have been putting across to Western diplomats and governments runs, “Give us a free hand, we must advocate Islamization of the society as that is the only way of keeping religious radicals under control.”
More...
Keywords: Serbia; Montenegro; Sandžak; youth; Islamic extremism; Wahhabis; religious radicals; opinion poll;
(Serbian edition) The crucial question here is: Are the Muslim youth in Sandžak imbued with religious extremism or not? Hardly any interethnic and inter-religious incident has been registered in this part of the Republic of Serbia. On the other hand, fighters from Sandžak are being involved in the Iraqi and Syrian wars. Depending on the answer to the question above, the authorities could take appropriate actions aiming at young people in Sandžak. Both domestic and international stakeholders – and there are many of them, including the non-governmental sector – could develop plans and take a variety of concrete steps depending on the answer to this very question. Fahrudin Kladničanin wrote about the influence of Wahhabi Islamic extremism on the youth in Sandžak: “Wahhabis are usually focused on recruiting young people 19 – 27 years old with little education, who are poor and often come from dysfunctional families. The youth are being indoctrinated in private places of worship (masjids), which are either rented or owned by Wahhabis, and in certain religious objects (mosques) whose imams support Wahhabi teaching, and prayers in these mosques are always led by Wahhabis. (Kladničanin, 2013: 130) Marija Radoman analyzed the reasons driving young people in Serbia towards extremist ideologies. Two citations from an earlier research of the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia will thus be mentioned: „Regarding the period after 2000, surveys show that the family remains the mainstay of its young members, that young people’s life patterns lack individualization, and that they normatively accept the traditional sequence of events in a person’s life (i.e. completion of education, getting a job, entry into marriage and only then having children). What intrigues me is the sphere of influence between the respondents to this survey and their families. I tried all the time to keep a picture in my head of the families in which they grew up. I wanted to find out whether the respondents’ attitudes would reflect that background, which is hardly bright and optimistic, or whether the differences would be more than conspicuous.” (Radoman, 2011: 12). Family is the primary mechanism by which extremism is interiorized. However, it is not a cause, given that the changes stemming from structural circumstances also occurred within the family. Radoman wrote that “Today’s efforts to establish a stable democratic society in Serbia are being sabotaged, conditionally speaking, by the second generation of the nationalist current (i.e. by the circles close to the Serbian Orthodox Church, the remaining appointees of political parties who served the Milošević regime and members of Russophile conservative options, notably the Democratic Party of Serbia and New Serbia, but also the Serbian Progressive Party), as well as by the extreme right-wing reactionary Russophiles, i.e. the Serbian Radical Party. The efforts to establish a democracy are also hindered by the economic crisis.” (Ibid: 10) The analysis is based on the survey the Helsinki Committee conducted with the youth in Sandžak in May 2016. The focus was on their attitude towards religious extremism, whereas the goal to contextualize the findings: to see how to recognize and understand Islamic extremism and what could be done – preventively and concretely – considering the factors that have influenced the Sandžak youth. No doubt, interviewees’ attitudes towards extremism – or their everyday experience – differ from theoretical considerations of the phenomenon. The very notion of extremism is indisputable. In 2013 I wrote that mainstream social forces of individual societies were arbitrarily determining the notion of extremism. Official codification of political extremism and radicalism make it possible for governments and other political factors to place all those opposing the values such as equality, freedom, democracy, rule of law, etc. under control or control those advocating these values in the manner that contradicts a government’s interests. On the other hand, radicalism (or extremism) gauged by “political correctness” is being determined, as a rule, by the manner or scope in which a certain value is considered either unquestionable or unacceptable. And in all this, decision makers and the majority of population need not see eye to eye. For instance, according to many opinion polls, the majority of Serbia’s population discriminates sexual minorities, national minorities, some religious minorities and, especially fenced off communities such as Roma. By the standards of political correctness decision-makers term such stands – notwithstanding its predominance – extremist and “expel” them from media space. Extremism is deep-rooted in social structures. “The emergence of extreme right-wing and rightist ideology in Serbia derive from structural changes following on the disintegration of the socialist state. The 1990s wars, inspired by the idea of recomposition of the Balkans – or the Greater Serbia idea – are only one of many ideological bases on which the right-wing thought still lives; and its basic characteristics are: ethnic homogenization, wish to have ethnic and state borders ‘merged,’ anticommunism and denial of antifascism, the growingly stronger traditionalism and authoritarianism, the Eastern Orthodoxy seen as superior to other religions and ethnic groups (especially Croats, Muslims and Albanians), resistance to multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism, and intolerance of ‘new’ (LGBT population) and traditional minorities (Roma),” writes Sonja Biserko in 2014. To what extent is Islamic, religious extremism spread in Sandžak? In June 2015 in Novi Pazar Snežana Ilić quoted the ICG report “Serb Sandžak still Forgotten” saying that there were some 300 Wahhabis in Sandžak who were not exactly organized, that only some 50 of them were active, but the movement was spreading anyway. According to the said report, Wahhabism emerged in Sandžak in 1997, triggered off by an imam wanting his believers in a mosque to pray in a different way. The believers had opposed the imam and sent him away. However, over the past couple of years Wahhabis have better organized themselves in Sandžak, while getting more and more funds from abroad for their movement. Many of them were going to work in Vienna; apparently to be recruited in a way, since they dressed and behaved like true Wahhabis once back home. Snežana Ilić believes that the highest authorities of the Islamic Community in Serbia have been using Wahhabis in several ways. For instance, they have been presenting themselves internationally as someone capable of controlling Bosniaks’ religious radicalism by the principle of Islamic legitimacy. The message they have been putting across to Western diplomats and governments runs, “Give us a free hand, we must advocate Islamization of the society as that is the only way of keeping religious radicals under control.”
More...