Preparation of the League of Nations during the War
Préparation de la Société des Nations pendant la Guerre
Keywords: Richard Cobden; John Bright; Frédéric Bastiat; Frédéric Passy; l'Oeuvre de la Haye; Léon Bourgeois; Alfred H. Fried;
More...Keywords: Richard Cobden; John Bright; Frédéric Bastiat; Frédéric Passy; l'Oeuvre de la Haye; Léon Bourgeois; Alfred H. Fried;
More...Keywords: Crillon Commission; President WIlson; Max von Baden; Lord Robert Cecil; General Smuts; Lord Robert Cecil; Lord Phillimore;
We should not imagine that the «Hôtel Crillon Commission» approached the problem ex abrupto, that it found itself in front of a blank slate and in a position to construct from scratch the international constitution of the League of Nations. The Crillon Commission mainly had an implementation role. The fundamental design of the new institution, the essential elements of its organization were definitively decided before it set to work. However, his role was not without importance. It had to resolve serious difficulties with regard to the drafting of the texts, and the discussion of certain implementing provisions threatened on several occasions to overthrow the entire edifice.
More...Keywords: Pacifism; Arms Control;
More...Keywords: Aggression; Bosnia and Herzegovina; International community; United Nations; European Union; NATO;
International community has, on its own will, taken the responsibility to resolve the situation in the then Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, following its dissolution. This has particularly applied to the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was threatened by an open aggression, even disappearance. To that end, ample peace plans were designed, and to a large extent based on ethnic divisions, which suggested intentions of the international community in relation to Bosnia and Herzegovina. Lack of a good will and unity aimed at prevention of aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina, including the prevention of mass crimes against its citizens, including the crime of genocide, as well as failure to prevent the destruction of state owned infrastructure, silent approval of the several years long siege of the capital, clearly speaks about the attitude on the part of international actors towards the aggressors and innocent victims, particularly the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Lack of condemnation of the aggression, and permanent attempts to equalize the victims and aggressors serve as a direct confirmation that the initial attitude towards Bosnia and Herzegovina did not significantly change, although the circumstances to a large extent did. Current development of the situation on a global plan affects the changes in the perception of threat, including the relevance of the Western Balkans, and more specifically Bosnia and Herzegovina, which now suggests the new discourse of the West (EU and NATO Member States) in relation to Bosnia and Herzegovina. The paper is structured in five chapters: Dissolution of SFRY and international recognition of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina; Quest for a peace solution in Bosnia and Herzegovina; Intensification of the international community engagement; Final NATO operation and peace establishment; Post-war reaction of the international community in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Final considerations. The study is based on the qualitative analysis of documents and critical analysis of activities and actions of the international community in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the period 1991-2022.
More...Keywords: Progress; Church; culture; humanitarian aid;
The aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina, by its nature, remains forever written in the history of Bosnia and Herzegovina and remembered by the people who suffered it. Painful and negative things are remembered more, especially the dead, wounded, and disabled people, as well as fear, hunger, and thirst. All those who lived through it and suffered it recount and will recount the events of that era for the rest of their lives. No matter how personal the memories are, they are still important, because they bear the mark of a concrete experience, and they have a context. Future scholars will try to objectify it, but they will always lack a context that is impossible to construct even close, let alone completely, later on. Who will imagine that people in Sarajevo first lived in a besieged and blocked city? It was a big prison, and we all know, even without personal experience, what a prison means. Who will be able to comprehend the situation in which numerous citizens for months received 200 grams of rice per week, that they did not eat anything serious for months, that they did not have water, electricity, transportation, telephone, cigarettes? Some said that they could not live with it, nor could they die. Some envied the dead. The Catholic Church and its Caritas and St. Anthony’s Bread tried as much as they could to alleviate the needs of hungry people, including by providing clothes and everything else necessary for life. At the beginning of the war in April 1992, HKD Napredak also registered as a humanitarian society and developed a significant humanitarian activity in addition to cultural and social activities, even though it had just been rebuilt (September 29, 1990). It suffices to say that Napredak organised 80 concerts, 37 exhibitions, several book promotions and various events in Sarajevo alone during the three and a half years of war. “The first musical event was organised by HKD Napredak, which, during the war-time years, took the lead in organising all cultural events in the city.” Moreover, Napredak distributed together with Vrhbosna seminary 403,000 meals, under which auspices it operated and protected. Napredak itself distributed 436 tons of food and medicine worth about two million DEM (= BAM, today 1 million euros). What is important for this context is that it provided a lot of humanitarian aid to members of other nations, at the time when exclusivity was dominant. Many living witnesses can testify to this.
More...Keywords: Yugoslav People’s Army (YPA); Territorial defence (TD) of Bosnia and Herzegovina; Bosnia and Herzegovina; northeast Bosnia; Tuzla; aggression;
The paper points out at the role of the YPA in the preparation and implementation of the aggression against the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, with special reference to northeast Bosnia. The YPA took the side of the great-state Serbian ideologists, blindly implementing the policy created in Belgrade, which implied open aggression and pretensions towards Bosnia and Herzegovina. In this respect, the YPA has been carrying out numerous activities since the late 1980s, working on the Serbisation of the YPA, installing exclusively Serbian-Montenegrin command staff in key positions. This made it possible for the YPA to be fully involved in the preparation of the aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina, and it played a key role in all of this. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the YPA implemented a plan to disarm and disable the TD of Bosnia and Herzegovina, taking over most of its weapons. It openly armed the Serb national component in Bosnia and Herzegovina, worked in cooperation with the SDS to undermine the constitutional and legal order of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and to implement war plans, such as the “RAM”, “TEPIH” and “DRINA” plans, which implied open aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the aforementioned plans, the area of northeast Bosnia had a special significance for the aggression planners. Therefore, the YPA carried out numerous activities in this area. Preparations for the aggression were entrusted to the YPA 17th Corps, based in Tuzla. According to a clearly developed plan, the YPA armed the Serb population, for which the high-ranking YPA officers were strictly in charge of. Through the YPA, a significant number of YPA units, which arrived from Slovenia, Croatia, and Serbia and Montenegro, were deployed in northeast Bosnia. Propaganda was constantly spread in this area for the purpose of collapsing the security situation and creating insecurity among the population. In preparation for the aggression, YPA units occupied important military-strategic points in this area. All the aforementioned activities were carried out by the YPA under the complete control of the military and political leadership from Belgrade, and in cooperation with the SDS of Bosnia and Herzegovina. By April 1992, the YPA had made all the necessary preparations for the aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina. The aggression began in early April 1992, precisely in the area of northeast Bosnia, with the attack on Bijeljina and other places in the Bosnian Podrinje. The consequences of the brutal aggression would have been much greater if the goals of the great-state ideologists and planners had not been recognised on time in this area, so that the preparations were made accordingly, responsibly, and decisively to start providing resistance to the aggression.
More...Keywords: Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina; aggression; state; defense; armed units; female members of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina; defense-liberation fight;
Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina emerged from the need of the Bosnian people to defend itself. The aggressors’ desires, planned and projected goals were confronted with a strong will of patriots to defend themselves and their homes, families, state. The defenders of Bosnia were barehanded young men and girls, decisive and courageous in their intention to defend their homeland, namely the heroes who recognized the conclusive historic moment for Bosnian and Herzegovina to confirm its independence and sovereignty, and to stop being the object of hegemonistic and great-state tendencies of its neighbors. This strong will produced the organization of the Army, which was the only official armed force of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, with its objective to protect the territorial integrity of the state, citizens, economic, cultural, and other goods. In the ranks of the Army were also 5,360 members of “soft” gender, who have presented sufficient bravery to join those forces in the most difficult times of the final defense of independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of the state. Among them, the particular piety belongs to those who were awarded Golden Fleur-de-lis (Zlatni ljiljan) – 13 of them. The option of choice – a victim or a defender ‒ made their decision easier when expressing their readiness to choose the adequate response. A special honor and respect be-long to a particular group of women ‒ who joined the Army voluntarily, when there were many of those who were hiding or were trying to escape the frontline or even the country, wishing to be a part of and to contribute in the fight for survival, either as combatants on frontlines, members of the sabotage units, reconnaissance teams, unit commanders, nurses, or those who worked in logistical units, commands or headquarters. Some of them did not live long enough to see the freedom. And where are those brave female combatants today? The answer to this question is the topic of empiric study, presented in the same-name paper which contains the results of all the processes related to building the culture of memory, including positioning of voluntary female combatants in legal norms. These are two crucial foundations, which position voluntary female combatants in a sociological reality of the present day.
More...Keywords: crimes; genocide; Sarajevo; Srebrenica; denial; revisionism;
The matter of denial of the genocide committed against Bosniacs, including also a revisionism of history has become in course of last several years a current topic in the Bosnian and Herzegovinian society. With the amendments to the Criminal Code off Bosnia and Herzegovina, which prohibits genocide denial and glorification of the adjudicated war criminals, exercising such practices has not stopped. The focus of recent studies related to the genocide committed against Bosniacs is reduced to the contemporary phenomena. Authors of this paper are trying to offer a historic review of the denial of crimes and genocide committed against Bosniacs, which has been in progress ever since the early days of the aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The denial of camps, massacre at the Tuzla square, Sarajevo Markale market place, ample other crimes, including also the denial of genocide in Srebrenica, clearly suggests the form of institutional denial of crimes, which has been in progress, to a lesser or larger intensity, in the last thirty years.
More...Keywords: Aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina; siege of Sarajevo for 1425 days; War Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina; 1st Corps of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina;
Sarajevo as the capital of the State of Bosnia and Herzegovina, has been subjected to the longest military siege in a more recent history. The siege continued for 1425 days. The objective of the siege as to prevent legitimate authorities of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to organize resistance and defense from the aggression executed by the Milošević’s regime against the sovereign and independent Bosnia and Herzegovina. The defense of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was organized and managed by the War Presidency on the basis of Platform for the operation of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in time of war. The principal role in the defense of Sarajevo was with the self-organized citizens and the 1st Corps of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
More...Keywords: aggression; crimes; judiciary; Prosecutor’s Office of BiH; Dobrovoljačka street; trust; reconciliation; Dayton Agreement; Serbia; Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; Bosnia and Herzegovina;
The political goal of the total demographic extermination of the Bosniac Muslim people in Bosnia and Herzegovina is evidenced by the criminal practice on the part of the aggressor, which tried to systematically persecute said people from the territory in which they always lived. Such a goal could not be achieved in another way, but by criminal methods of waging warfare. In order to cover up the aggressive nature of the military force use against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, presenting it as a civil war within an internationally recognized country, the Belgrade regime established a so-called Republika Srpska para-state and constituted an army of the said para-state, which made an integral part of the Army of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). The unjust and criminal political and military goals determined and directed the war of aggression primarily against the non-Serb civilian population, and only than against the other armed forces, given that most of the killed victims were civilians. The unjust policy based on the great-Serbian ideology against Bosnia and Herzegovina continued even after the signing of the General Frame-work Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereinafter the Dayton Agreement), and continued up to the present day. This is just another proof that Serbia has not yet sincerely and in good faith recognized territorial integrity and the sovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina, indicating that all anomalies and blockades in the implementation of the Dayton Agreement are a signal that Serbia, as of this day, does not consider its internationally recognized borders as being final. Such policy of the Belgrade regime is most concretely and indeed most destructively manifested in their attempts to cover up war crimes and glorify war criminals, aspiring to shifting the blame for starting the war and its consequences onto victims, and in that regard to equalize responsibility of the aggressor and Bosnia and Herzegovina defenders, ultimately to change the character of war. It is precisely the reason why the judiciary in the states that acted as aggressors against Bosnia and Herzegovina in the period 1991-1995 was burdened with anomalies resulting in blockades, even the setbacks in the commitments from the Dayton Agreement. This is the reason why trust cannot be built and reconciliation cannot be achieved on such foundations between the peoples and states of the Western Balkans. In that context, various concrete cases of unjust and illegal protection of war criminals should be analyzed, as well as numerous indictments fabricated by the Serbian regime and the Bosnia and Herzegovina entity of Republika Srpska should be considered. Obvious example of such practice is the indictment, including its confirmation, related to the events in Sarajevo’s Dobrovoljačka Street on May 3, 1992.
More...Keywords: Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina; 1st Corps; logistics; definition of logistics; structure of logistics; securing; Group TNT2; Container; Transporter; Operation Group TNT-rabbits; LoB;
Purpose of this paper is to provide a brief review how system of logistical security of the units within 1st Corps of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina emerged, its organisation and functioning, given that the 1st Corps as a military formation served within the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Officially, 1st Corps was established on 1 September 1992 under the conditions of aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the complete blockade and siege of the city of Sarajevo. Observed from the aspect of spatial, temporal and functional features, and given the lack of documentation ‒ as this topic was not elaborated in course of last 30 years ‒ achieving the expected result is a complex task. If we add to this that the logistical system as such is complex, big, open, and integral, complexity of this task is progressively increased. The author is aware that this task cannot be accomplished in this paper. By its specifics and manner of logistical securing of the units within the city under the siege, the time of war beginning in April 1992 until November 1995 is divided into four periods of logistical securing, which will be separately discussed further in the paper. First two periods precede the establishment of the 1st Corps. They are reflected in the fact that the logistics was not organised, that there were no permanent sources to supply the units with material and technical means, that there were no reserve sources, and also that there was no competent staff to carry out these tasks, so that the second period is in fact the beginning of establishment of logistics in the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
More...Keywords: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sarajevo; 1st Corps of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina; Igman; Tunnel D‒B (Tunnel of salvation); aggressor; Republika Srpska Army; Sarajevo-Romanija Corps;
Sarajevo, as the capital of Bosnia and Herzegovina is the biggest urban, demographic, economic, and political centre, and the city which during the siege and defence had around 350,000 residents. The 1st Corps of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was growing from the ashes, and its predecessors were Patriotic league and Territorial defence which with the state insignia became legal and legitimate force of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina Government. In the period March-April 1992, the aggressors managed to achieve a deep operational military blockade and placed the city under the siege. The city was militarily and hermetically closed. With this closure of the city, the aggressor manged to create all preconditions to begin with an open military operation aimed at terrorising and disappearance of Sarajevo. It also believed that only several weeks were required to completely take over Sarajevo. The city was destined to die. The 1st Corps of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was established on 1 September 1992 in Sarajevo and it encompassed all the military units, established up to that moment. The aggressor intended to remove from office the state, political and military leadership in Sarajevo, establish a new marionette presidency, occupy Sarajevo, declare capitulation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and thus and retain it within the ramp Yugoslavia, namely “Great Serbia”. The 1st Corps played a key strategic role in the defence of Sarajevo, during the longest siege observed in the history, and served as a principal holder the armed resistance and fight for the defence of Sarajevo. Valter was the 1st Corps, which based its fight for the defence of Sarajevo on his paradigm. This was the fight between David and Goliath, and despite the UN arms embargo, David won. It began with the groups, detachments, brigades, followed by Tactical groups, Operational groups and finally divisions with the total manpower of over 80,000 members. During the defence of the city, the 1st Corps manged to defend Sarajevo with the bodies of its soldiers. International community has left the 1st Corps and the Army to the mercy of the aggressor. At the end of the 20th century, the 1st Corps, in such an unfair fight from the aspect of the relationship of power in the technical factor, though fair from the aspect of justice and fairness, had to dig a tunnel under the airport, before the eyes of the entire world, which is the tunnel of the international shame and the tunnel of our pride, that had a strategic relevance for the defence of Sarajevo, including Bosnia and Herzegovina. International community has stopped the war with the architecture of the Dayton Peace Agreement, although the fight to make Bosnia and Herzegovina disappear by those same retrograde political forces, which started the war, continued, becoming even stronger in their ideology. That is the reason why the international community bears a huge responsibility for the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is obliged, responsible, and it would have to do everything possible to rectify those failures made in relation to Sarajevo and Bosnia and Herzegovina by way of ensuring its permanent prosperous future and building its political systema based on principles of civil democracy, as well as multi-ethnic and secular state.
More...Keywords: Bosnia and Herzegovina; Sarajevo; defence; 1st Corps of the ARBiH; political and military aspects;
The defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina, including the defence of Sarajevo, was based on political and patriotic awareness of its citizens, who were genuinely committed to preservation of Bosnia and Herzegovina specific political and statehood being, as a community of equal citizens and peoples. Based on assessment of a big relevance of Sarajevo for the survival of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the aggressor has thoroughly planned, prepared, and utilised large military forces to conquer the city and establish there its occupational authority. They wanted Sarajevo to be only a Serb capital of the so-called “Republic of Serb Bosnia and Herzegovina”. The combat activities carried out by the 1st Corps of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina were organised in a very complex strategic, operational, and tactical conditions, under the conditions of besieged free territories in which the units and the commands of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina operated, including the conditions of specific military siege of a major part of the 1st Corps in the city of Sarajevo. Strategic and operational-tactical positions of the aggressor’s forces were rather favourable for them, given that they controlled main roads that were connecting Bosnia and Herzegovina battlefield with the sources of mobilization into the aggressor’s army with soldiers and material means in the so called Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), and the countries that supported aggressor. The extent of human losses, during and after every war, turned into a big political, historic, and moral and ethical issue. Pursuant to the character of response of the warring parties and their allies to the question of the extent of human losses, it is possible to identify the character of policy that served as a basis for war engagement and support to any of the warring parties. In general, the factors on the side of the warring party that waged the righteous war strive to present truthfully the number of victims, whereas the factors on the side of the warring party that waged unfair war strive to fake the number of victims and adapt it to the character of its unfair political views related to the causes and consequences of the war. Given the fact that the international community with its embargo harmed the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina defence forces, which operated on the grounds of fair policy and righteous war, we arrive at a conclusion that the embargo was unfair, in favour of unfair aggressor’s policy, criminal and genocidal war practice.
More...Keywords: aggression; defense; Bosnia and Herzegovina; armed forces; war;
Faced with an open threat from Radovan Karadzic in the Republic of BiH Assembly on October 14, 1991 that the Muslim people would disappear, President Alija Izetbegovic visionary won the state, first through a referendum and then recognition from the European Community and the United Nations. With this, he repealed the SFRY laws. He formulated the general strategic concept of the defense of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is about small community waging a war, in a small territory, against incomparably militarily and economically stronger opponents. And precisely because of that, it was necessary to apply such a strategic concept that provides the opportunity to wage war in all domains, to engage all human and material potentials, activate all energy, to apply all forms of combat, all types and forms of combat operations. This means organizing the whole society into a solid monolithic community, which is completely identified with the total military force. Part of the RBiH leadership and its patriots, using the prior experiences from the war in Slovenia and Croatia, estimated that without the armed forces there cannot be any defense of an independent, complete, sovereign and multiethnic BiH. For the sake of easier and more purposeful leadership and command, all patriotic forces were united in the Army of RBiH. On April 6, 1992, the European Community recognized the independence of BiH, and one day earlier, on April 5, as this decision became public, the JNA, in fact Serbia and Montenegro, began with the aggression against BiH. This marked the beginning of the most terrible and bloodiest war in the history of BiH and the Balkans. Poorly armed units of the Territorial Defense, Ministry of the Interior, Patriotic League, Green Berets and spontaneously formed small armed groups provided heroic resistance to superior attackers who quickly took control over the large territory of the state. Our resistance was especially manifested in bigger cities, such as Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zenica... In a kind of the counterattack, armed units of the legitimate authorities liberated these places and the government was consolidated in them. On May 22, 1992, Bosnia and Herzegovina became a full member of the OUN.
More...Keywords: International scientific conference; Srebrenica; Genocide; Potočari; War in Bosnia; 1992-1995; demographic changes in Srebrenica;
Introductory remarks by: - Prof. Ph.D. Rifat Škrijelj, rector of the University of Sarajevo - Prof. Ph.D. Dženeta Omerdić, Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Office of Dr. Denis Bećirević) - Prof. Ph.D. Denis Zvizdić, Deputy Speaker of the House of Representatives of the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina - Ph.D. Pavle Krstić, Minister (Ministry of Higher Education, Science and Youth of Sarajevo Canton) - Ph.D. Husein-ef. Kavazovića, reisul-ulema (Islamic community in Bosnia and Herzegovina) - Academician, prof. Ph.D. Mirko Pejanović (President of the Scientific Committee of the Conference of the Academy of Sciences and Arts of Bosnia and Herzegovina) - Ćamil Duraković (Vice President of the RS entity) - Prof. Ph.D. Rasim Muratović, Director of the Institute for Research of Crimes Against Humanity and International Law, University of Sarajevo - Ph.D. Sc. Sedad Bešlija, director of the Institute of History
More...Keywords: Srebrenica; post-war economic recovery; Demographic discharge; Socio-economic research of Srebrenica; Encouraging the development of business networks;
Ni nakon više od dvije decenije u Srebrenici, ali manje-više i u svim povratničkim mjestima, ne samo da nije izrađen i primijenjen održivi model ekonomskog oporavka i razvoja već je ostao nerazjašnjen sam koncept postratni/genocidni ekonomskog oporavka. I pored zvanično promoviranog i izdašno donacijski podržanog procesa ekonomske obnove, na sceni su krajnje nepovoljna demografska, socijalna i ekonomska kretanja u ukupnom postratnom periodu. Naravno da se zbog toga otvaraju brojna pitanja ovakvog neuspjeha – od ponovnog preispitivanja samog pojma ekonomske obnove do niza „nenaučenih lekcija” iz dvadesetogodišnjeg procesa ekonomske obnove u ovoj općini.
More...Keywords: Srebrenica; demographic changes; War in Bosnia and Herzegovina; Genocide; demographic issues of the population;1991-2022; Economic structure of the population; Educational structure of the population;
Općina Srebrenica nalazi se u istočnom dijelu Bosne i Hercegovine. Graniči s općinama: Bratunac na sjeveru i sjeveroistoku, Višegrad i Rogatica na jugozapadu, općinom Milići (dio bivše općine Vlasenica) na zapadu, a na jugu granica ide rijekom Drinom u dužini od 40 km koja je i međunarodna granica između Bosne i Hercegovine i Republike Srbije. Površina teritorije općine Srebrenica je 529,83 km2. Prema popisu stanovništva 1991. godine na prostoru općine Srebrenice živjelo je ukupno 36.666 stanovnika ili 0,84% od ukupnog stanovništva Bosne i Hercegovine. Bošnjaka je bilo 27.572 ili 75,20%, Srba 8.315 ili 22,70% i ostalih 779 ili 2,12%1. Gustina naseljenosti u općini iznosila je 69,6 st/km2 (u Bosni i Hercegovini 85,6 st/km2). U političko-administrativnom pogledu 1991. godine Srebrenica je imala 19 mjesnih zajednica u kojima se nalazilo 80 naselja od kojih je jedno pripadalo gradskom, a 79 seoskom tipu naselja. Prema prirodnom priraštaju koji je iznosio 13,2‰ 1991. godine, općina Srebrenica bila je na petom mjestu u Bosni i Hercegovini i to poslije općina Žepče, Velika Kladuša, Živinice i Kalesija. U periodu 1992‒1995. godine na području općine Srebrenica, kao i na prostoru cijele Bosne i Hercegovine, dogodile su se krupne demografske promjene. Masovni zločini koje su nad nedužnim bošnjačkim stanovništ-vom vršile tzv. Vojska RS i policija RS, pod vojnom komandom ratnog zločinca Ratka Mladića i političke direktive ratnog zločinca Radova-na Karadžića, dostigle su vrhunac u općini Srebrenica kada su srpske oružane formacije okupirale “sigurnu zonu UN-a” Srebrenicu, jula 1995. godine, i počinile genocid nad nedužnim bošnjačkim stanovništvom.
More...Keywords: Inter-ethnic relations; Srebrenica; Bosniaks; Genocide; Bosnian Serbs; minorities; reconciliation;
Valjan razgovor o međunacionalnim odnosima, a kada je u pitanju međunacionalno povjerenje na putu pomirenja, danas je moguć tek u kontekstu analize ukupne socijalne situacije: ekonomske, kulturne i duhovne, te naravno političke stvarnosti Bosne i Hercegovine i uzroka koji ih omogućavaju i/ili onemogućavaju. U mogućnosti da se ovom prilikom barem pokuša izvršiti ta analiza, razmatranja u ovom radu podrazumijevat će mnoge poznate aspekte sadašnje situacije, koja je, s razlogom, već godinama označena kao krizom, i to u jednom produbljenijem smislu kao kidanje osnovnih, elementarnih poluga na kojima počiva karakter društvenih odnosa. U tim i iza takvih pukotina nastaje lavina procesa i proturječnosti koji su zahvatili bosanskohercegovačko tkivo u cjelini i koji se najčešće završavaju sukobima na socijalnoj, ideološkoj i političkoj osnovi. U središtu tih sukoba, a u sociološkom smislu sukoba koji su više nego očigledni u cjelokupnom društvenom odnosu, mogu se prepoznati najmanje dvije tendencije koje okružuju primarni društveni odnosi i koji su već odavno poprimili oblike pojava, ali i više od toga: formu i sadržinu dva polarizirana pogleda.
More...Keywords: Second International Scientific Conference; Genocide; Srebrenica; Bosniaks; Genocide education in BIH; Culture of remmembrance;
Moralno-pravna i politička obaveza svijeta i Evropske unije i Bosne i Hercegovine jeste ne samo spriječiti buduće, civilizacijski katastrofične zločine poput genocida nad Bošnjacima u Srebrenici i oko nje nego, i prije svega, spriječiti njegovo planski aktivno i politički, medijski, kvazinaučno, sistematsko poricanje i negiranje. Tome svjedočimo danas i svih poratnih godina u Bosni i Hercegovini i njenom susjedstvu. Umjesto odgovornosti za nesprečavanje genocida, u Srbiji se i dalje veličaju ratni zločinci koji su doveli do izvršenja genocida. Upornim i neskrivenim javnim veličanjem zločina i međunarodno presuđenih ratnih zločinaca, praveći od njih nacionalne heroje s jedne, i stigmatiziranjem kritičkoga govora i priznavanja genocida od strane grupacija ili pojedinaca u njihovom javnom angažmanu na tu temu, s druge strane, ohrabruju se politike i zagovornici opetovanja genocidnog zla i njegovo javno, nekažnjeno, stadionsko i medijsko veličanje, poput transparenata tokom utakmica na kojima se zanavlja napis: Nož, žica, Srebrenica.
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