Corruption as a Problem of Parallel Redistribution System Cover Image

Corruption as a Problem of Parallel Redistribution System
Corruption as a Problem of Parallel Redistribution System

Author(s): Tomáš Otáhal , Petr Wawrosz
Subject(s): Criminology, Corruption - Transparency - Anti-Corruption
Published by: Masarykova univerzita
Keywords: Corruption; redistribution system; parallel redistribution game; game theory;
Summary/Abstract: We present a model of parallel redistribution system to explain the problem of corruption. Within this model we synthesize both agency theory and rent-seeking. More precisely, we argue that the principal-agent theory has problems accounting for the environment in which the agents offering and accepting corruption operate as well as explaining the importance of the agents for the survival of their environment. The rent-seeking theory, on the other hand, finds it difficult to establish socially effective legislation and ways to determine the barriers to entry that motivate agents to behave corruptly. Both problems, however, are central to solving the problem of corruption.