Decentralized Punishments in Fighting Corruption: Experimental Evidence from Czech Republic Cover Image

Decentralized Punishments in Fighting Corruption: Experimental Evidence from Czech Republic
Decentralized Punishments in Fighting Corruption: Experimental Evidence from Czech Republic

Author(s): Jiří Špalek, Zuzana Berná
Subject(s): Criminal Law, Political behavior, Criminology, Corruption - Transparency - Anti-Corruption
Published by: Masarykova univerzita
Keywords: Experiment; corruption; punishment;
Summary/Abstract: The paper presents possibilities and limits of introducing experimental methods in measuring propensity to engage in and punish corrupt behavior. We are inspired by results of the multicultural experiments run to date. Our experiment is inspired by Cameron et al (2009), which took place in Australia, Indonesia, India and Singapore. It takes a form of a simple sequential game in which three players are involved. The decision of each player has an impact on the behavior and profit of the other players. Results of the experiment are in line with results of replicated experiment. We found several differences between the behavior of the Czech and Slovak participants. Particularly, the Czechs seem to be less tolerant to corruption behavior they witness.