Commodifying Disclosure? The Debate on Financial Incentives for Whistleblowers
Commodifying Disclosure? The Debate on Financial Incentives for Whistleblowers

Author(s): Stelios Andreadakis, Dimitrios Kafteranis
Subject(s): Criminal Law, Law and Transitional Justice, Comparative Law, Administrative Law
Published by: ADJURIS – International Academic Publisher
Keywords: financial rewards; incentives; speak up; whistleblower protection; whistleblowing;
Summary/Abstract: This paper examines the ongoing debate over whether whistleblowers should receive financial rewards, with a focus on the financial sector. It compares the U.S.model, where schemes, such as the Dodd-Frank Act, have created strong incentives yielding significant enforcement results, with the European Union’s preference for protection without remuneration, as reflected in the Whistleblowing Directive. The analysis highlights the effectiveness of rewards in generating high-quality disclosures while acknowledging concerns over motivation, compliance culture, and risks of opportunism. It argues that Europe’s cultural, legal, and institutional context precludes direct transplantation of the U.S. system but suggests that hybrid or pilot reward schemes could provide a pragmatic middle ground. The paper concludes that a balanced model, which combines protection, recognition, and, where appropriate, modest compensation, could offer the most viable path to strengthening accountability and integrity in whistleblower regimes.

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