EXPLANATION AND PARADOX IN THE CONTEXT OF THE HISTORY OF KNOWLEDGE
EXPLANATION AND PARADOX IN THE CONTEXT OF THE HISTORY OF KNOWLEDGE

Author(s): Iulian GRIGORIU
Subject(s): Philosophy, Epistemology, Logic, Special Branches of Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
Published by: CEEOLPRESS
Keywords: ontology; epistemology; explanation; last wagon paradox; Kuhn; Popper; scientific knowledge
Summary/Abstract: This study aims to investigate the ontological and cognitive status of the proposition Po: “Everything has an explanation.” I consider this approach innovative and necessary for the theory of knowledge because the generality of Po reflects and characterizes the attitude of the knowing subject toward any object within the realm of scientific knowledge. An original consequence of this approach is that it raises the issue of relating the universe to one of its properties, namely knowledge. The analysis of Po shows that it cannot be true in all cases and that it produces an incomplete system of explanatory propositions. This leads to a logical-linguistic paradox, which I have termed the “last wagon paradox.” If X is the phenomenon to be known, and E(X) its explanation, then in the first part of the study I demonstrate that the empirical explanatory sequence—X, E(X), E(E(X)), …—transitions from explanation to unexplanation after only a few steps. In the second part of the study, I show that the formal sequence generated by Po is inconsistent and that every explanation is also an unexplanation. The “last wagon” paradox reconciles the opposing positions in the theory of knowledge of Kuhn and Popper (paradigm and scientific revolution vs. falsifiability and gradual change) and approaches the philosophical and poetic views of Ion Barbu (pseudonym of the Romanian mathematician Dan Barbilian, with the concept of the secondary game) and Lucian Blaga (Romanian poet and philosopher, with the concept of Luciferian knowledge). I present several models of scientific knowledge, among which the linear model of the “explanatory train” stands out, noting that this represents only one link in a multidimensional gnoseological model. From the concrete example I provide, different empirical explanatory levels emerge, as well as abstract levels of a probabilistic, mental, and logical nature, which should constitute an objectively valid explanatory basis for any object of knowledge. However, I show that these supposedly objective explanatory levels also lead to an “explanatory train” and to paradox. Thus, any explanation transcends the object of knowledge. The fundamental contribution of the study lies in demonstrating that the limits of scientific knowledge exist a priori and that any explanation is inherently incomplete at the logical-linguistic level.

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