The Collage of the Kremlin’s Communication Strategy
The Collage of the Kremlin’s Communication Strategy

Author(s): Ofer Fridman, Laima Venclauskienė, Viktoras Daukšas
Contributor(s): Monika Hanley (Editor)
Subject(s): Politics, Media studies, Communication studies, Economic policy, Security and defense, Military policy, Geopolitics, Russian Aggression against Ukraine, Russian war against Ukraine, Hybrid Warfare
Published by: NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence
Keywords: Kremlin Communication Strategy; Strategic Narratives; Information Operations; Hybrid Media System; Russian Propaganda; Russia–Ukraine War;
Summary/Abstract: This research builds upon two reports published by NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence. A multi-dimensional analysis, published in 2023, sought to explore the connection between hostile information activities and physical actions during Russia’s war against Ukraine1 . The study analysed both written content (six domains of official Kremlin communications) and audio-visual media (TV coverage) from the pre-war period (October 2021–February 2022) and the initial stage of the war (February 2022–March 2022). The findings indicated no clear signs of hostile information activities that could have served as warnings for the invasion. The second part of the analysis, published in 2024, was expanded by adding Telegram channels as an additional source of data. The analysis examined six key events (Victory Day, referendums, mobilisation, Kerch Bridge explosion, Nord Stream explosion, and sanctions imposed on Russia) and their portrayal across three different communications platforms (official communications, Telegram and weekend TV programmes). It revealed that a significant part of Russia’s hybrid media system content deviates to a certain extent from the official Russian narratives, and that the Kremlin is not fully in control of that information. Depending on the type of events (initiated/ able to prepare for in advance or coming as a surprise), the manoeuvring space for Telegram channels spans from simply stylising and adapting official narratives, to generating their own narratives and stories. This flexible and adaptive approach has served the Kremlin well on many occasions during this war, also pointing towards a paradoxical relation between the Kremlin’s monopolisation of power over the official media and the demonopolisation of power among Telegram channels. Unlike previous reports, this report adopts a different methodology. Instead of a top-down qualitative methodology, it applies a bottom-up topic modelling technique to uncover latent narratives propagated by the Kremlin from 1 October 2021 to 31 December 2023. In other words, while the primary focus of this report is on new data from 2023, it also utilises the data collected in previous reports, trying to identify Russian information campaigns that were missed in previous reports due to the top-down approach.

• Details
• Contents