Токови капитала у Jугославији : 1918-1991. : студије случаја
Capital flows in Yugoslavia: 1918-1991. : case studies
Contributor(s): Vesna Aleksić (Editor), Jelena Rafailović (Editor)
Subject(s): Economy, National Economy, Recent History (1900 till today), Economic development, Socio-Economic Research
Published by: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije
Keywords: capital flows; Yugoslavia; 1918-1991
Summary/Abstract: According to the generally accepted definition within the economic sciences, capital flows refer to the movement of money for the purpose of investment, trade, or business operations and occur at almost all levels, from individuals, through businesses, to national governments. Within banks and businesses, these flows involve the flow of money in the form of investment capital, capital expenditures on business operations, as well as economic and scientific research and social development. Thus, individual investors direct their savings and investment capital into securities, such as stocks, bonds, and mutual funds, while national governments largely direct capital flows from tax sources and through the issuance of bonds into various public projects and programs, as well as into trade with other nations and currencies. Not all capital flows are the same and their impact varies depending on the type of investment, which is why economic historians and contemporary analysts have roughly grouped them into three categories: foreign direct investment, portfolio investment, and banking and other investment.
- Print-ISBN-13: 978-86-7005-187-4
- Page Count: 276
- Publication Year: 2023
- Language: Serbian
БРИТАНСКИ КАПИТАЛ И ЗАКОНСКА СТАБИЛИЗАЦИЈА ДИНАРА У КРАЉЕВИНИ ЈУГОСЛАВИЈИ – НЕУСПЕО ПОКУШАЈ СКЛАПАЊА СПОРАЗУМА СА БАНКАРСКОМ КУЋОМ РОТШИЛД ИЗ ЛОНДОНА
БРИТАНСКИ КАПИТАЛ И ЗАКОНСКА СТАБИЛИЗАЦИЈА ДИНАРА У КРАЉЕВИНИ ЈУГОСЛАВИЈИ – НЕУСПЕО ПОКУШАЈ СКЛАПАЊА СПОРАЗУМА СА БАНКАРСКОМ КУЋОМ РОТШИЛД ИЗ ЛОНДОНА
(BRITISH CAPITAL AND THE LEGAL STABILIZATION OF THE DINAR IN THE KINGDOM OF YUGOSLAVIA: AN UNSUCCESSFUL ENDEAVOR TO CONCLUDE AN AGREEMENT WITH THE ROTHSCHILD BANKING HOUSE IN LONDON)
- Author(s):Sonja Jerković
- Language:Serbian
- Subject(s):Economy, National Economy, Economic development, Interwar Period (1920 - 1939), Financial Markets, Public Finances, Socio-Economic Research
- Page Range:11-50
- No. of Pages:40
- Keywords:National Bank; stabilization; loan; Rothschild Bank; Ministry of Finance; Kingdom of Yugoslavia
- Summary/Abstract:The overarching theme of this article encompasses the stabilization of the dinar and endeavors surrounding the pursuit of a loan within the United Kingdom. Thanks to extensive archival resources, we are now able, for the first time, to comprehensively trace all stages of negotiations and activities pertaining to the prospective loan agreement within the United Kingdom. Two distinct streams of activity are discernible, one affiliated with the National Bank and the other associated with the Ministry of Finance. The documents unequivocally demonstrate the state leadership’s efforts to seek foreign funding for substantial investment initiatives, concurrently falling short in fulfilling the obligations associated with convertibility. Moreover, political stakeholders exhibited reluctance to relinquish control over the National Bank’s capital and its customary utilization to cover budgetary shortfalls. Recent findings indicate that political and national disputes directly influence economic and financial dynamics. Confronted with delays, Yugoslavia initiated the legal stabilization of the dinar amidst the escalation of Europe’s economic crisis, resulting in significant detriment to both society and the economy.
CREDITANSTALT-WIENER BANKVEREIN КАО ПРИМЕР УПЛИВА МЕЂУНАРОДНОГ ФИНАНСИЈСКОГ КАПИТАЛА У ПРИВРЕДУ КРАЉЕВИНЕ ЈУГОСЛАВИЈЕ
CREDITANSTALT-WIENER BANKVEREIN КАО ПРИМЕР УПЛИВА МЕЂУНАРОДНОГ ФИНАНСИЈСКОГ КАПИТАЛА У ПРИВРЕДУ КРАЉЕВИНЕ ЈУГОСЛАВИЈЕ
(CREDITANSTALT-WIENER BANKVEREIN AS AN EXAMPLE OF THE PENETRATION OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CAPITAL INTO THE ECONOMY OF THE KINGDOM OF YUGOSLAVIA)
- Author(s):Vesna Aleksić
- Language:Serbian
- Subject(s):Economy, National Economy, Supranational / Global Economy, Economic development, Interwar Period (1920 - 1939), Socio-Economic Research
- Page Range:51-97
- No. of Pages:47
- Keywords:International capital; National economy; Intermediation ; Balkans; Creditanstalt-Wiener Bankverein
- Summary/Abstract:Until the First World War, the banks Creditanstalt and Wiener Bankverein were woven into the network of Austro-Hungarian and German banks in the Balkans, and when their interests demanded it, they knew they should be part of a consortium of other European banks. With the concentration of large capital, strong banks then became increasingly involved with industry, mining, transport, trade, and agriculture. This “new type” banking, in which the Viennese bank sought to play a significant role, was the link between financial affairs and politics. The businesses and interests of such banks were partly the interests of the national economy. With the creation of two opposing alliances of major European states in the last third of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, there was a real race to achieve absolute economic and political monopolies, which made the operation of Creditanstalt and Wiener Bankverein in the Balkans increasingly political. However, it seemed that after World War I they would be eliminated from this merciless economic and political game, but economic and political ties, vast knowledge, and experience, as well as many their economic affiliations on the territory of the newly founded Kingdom of SHS, have made these two Viennese banks gain the role of an important financial intermediary. Namely, for large European capital, especially that which came from Swiss, Belgian, English, and Dutch banks, and which was not directly engaged in the Balkans even before 1918, intermediation, especially of Viennese banks, was of great importance. At the same time, for the Viennese banks themselves, this was a unique opportunity to return to the Balkan economic scene with the help of international financial capital. Earlier, they built their positions, using the influence and prestige of their country, harmonizing business interests with the interests of the national economy. Thus, in the case of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, the old Viennese banks skillfully took advantage of the fact that the state, due to complex internal political circumstances, was unable to organize a strong enough national banking apparatus that could successfully cover the growing financial needs, especially in industry, regardless of foreign financial influence. Taking advantage of this situation, as well as relying more on foreign than their own capital, the Viennese banks gradually regained their old positions and enabled the penetration of international capital into the Yugoslav financial market. However, the great crisis of European banking in the 1930s will show the unsustainable conception of “mixed type” banks, which will also represent the end of the domination of the Austrian-German banking organization in the Balkans embodied through the newly formed bank Creditanstalt-Wiener Bankverein. Each further placement of large international capital will be based exclusively on its own estimates, while business policy will be characterized by much greater prudence in work.
ЕНГЛЕСКА ТРГОВИНСКА БАНКА У БЕОГРАДУ 1920–1926.
ЕНГЛЕСКА ТРГОВИНСКА БАНКА У БЕОГРАДУ 1920–1926.
(BRITISH TRADE CORPORATION IN BELGRADE, 1920–1926)
- Author(s):Ranka Gašić
- Language:Serbian
- Subject(s):National Economy, Interwar Period (1920 - 1939), Financial Markets, Socio-Economic Research
- Page Range:99-129
- No. of Pages:31
- Keywords:British Trade Corporation; British-Yugoslav trade; State loan
- Summary/Abstract:The British Trade Corporation was created in 1917 and opened a branch in Belgrade on March 8, 1920. Up until 1926, this branch served as a representative office for several prominent London-based banks, including Lloyd’s Bank, Martin’s Bank, Barclay’s Bank, and London & Westminster Bank. Its primary objectives encompassed facilitating relations with British firms within the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (KSCS), overseeing transactions between Britain and the KSCS, and providing financial assistance to domes- tic firms in their interactions with Great Britain. In 1926, the institution underwent a transformative merger with the Anglo-Austrian Bank, subsequently rebranding itself as the Anglo-International Bank. By the conclusion of that same year, the entity had executed the liquidation of its Belgrade branch. The bank played a pivotal role in managing the one million pound sterling state loan within the United Kingdom in 1925. Milan Stojadinović served as the sole Serbian representative on the Board, while the predominant composition of the personnel comprised Russian emigrants, complemented by a limited number of Belgrade economists, many of whom had received their education in the United Kingdom during and after World War I. The bank ostensibly played a facilitative role in the establishment of contracts involving Serbian/Yugoslav joint stock enterprises, namely “SARTID” Ltd. (collaborating with Vickers Armstrong Ltd. in 1922) and “Rudar” (engaging with Johnson, Mattey, and Co. in 1925 and Selection Trust & Co. in 1926). A limited number of Belgrade manufacturers availed themselves of loans from this bank. Primarily, they engaged in the trade of English textiles and cultivated business affiliations with British enterprises before World War I, notably amid the “Tariff War” with Austria-Hungary spanning from 1906 to 1911.
УПРАВЉАЊЕ ДРЖАВНИМ МОНОПОЛОМ: ПРИЗАД 1930–1941.
УПРАВЉАЊЕ ДРЖАВНИМ МОНОПОЛОМ: ПРИЗАД 1930–1941.
(STATE MONOPOLY MANAGEMENT: PRIZAD, 1930–1941)
- Author(s):Vladan Z. Jovanović
- Language:Serbian
- Subject(s):National Economy, Business Economy / Management, Interwar Period (1920 - 1939)
- Page Range:131-172
- No. of Pages:42
- Keywords:PRIZAD; monopoly; preferential purchase; export; grain; opium; Kingdom of Yugoslavia
- Summary/Abstract:Amidst the Great Economic Crisis, the creation of a specialized state monopoly institution, known as the Privileged State Monopoly for the Purchase and Export of Agricultural Products (PRIZAD), aligned with the prevalent pattern of trade centralization observed in the majority of European agrarian nations during that period. The implementation of the state monopoly in 1930 aimed to supplant preceding purchase-export methodologies, elevate the prices of agricultural products, and eradicate the involvement of foreign intermediaries. Moreover, this monopoly organization was given the authority to provide loans, standardize agricultural production, oversee transportation, and manage the storage of goods. On the contrary, the competitive environment within the American-Soviet grain market, marked by an unregulated procurement system directly involving cultivators, deficient personnel management, and restricted grain, fruit, and raw opium storage capacities, collectively fostered an atmosphere conducive to corruption and the proliferation of private speculation. During the tenure of PRIZAD’s inaugural general director, Leo Gottlieb, the distinction between the private and public domains was notably obscured. Conversely, under the leadership of his successor, Milan Najdanović, a culmination of irregularities and bureaucratic inconsistencies gave rise to several prominent corruption scandals. These scandals involved activities such as the illicit exportation of domestic grains and the unau- thorized resale of Romanian wheat. Throughout the period of PRIZAD’s business consolidation (1934–1939), Director Edo Marković became a focal point of examination by the Belgrade press. This scrutiny revolved around attributing the role of primary controllers of grain and opium acquisition and export operations to the perceived entity termed “Judeo-Masonry“. He was additionally criticized for extravagance, incompetence in formulating grain policy, exhibiting bias in favor of “non-Serb” employees, and encroaching upon the autonomy of the opium department. According to accessible sources, Edo Marković was purportedly assassinated by the Belgrade police in December 1939, ostensibly due to his grain and opium policies. Specifically, his steadfast advocacy for PRIZAD’s geopolitical reorientation away from the Third Reich and towards Western-allied countries was notably highlighted as a contributing factor. Despite its conception as an ambitious and financially viable joint-stock corporation wielding a robust monopoly, PRIZAD found itself inexorably intertwined with the political fortunes of its predominant stakeholder, the state.
OДЛИКЕ КАПИТАЛА ТЕКСТИЛНЕ ИНДУСТРИЈЕ У КРАЉЕВИНИ ЈУГОСЛАВИЈИ – ПРИМЕРИ НАЈВЕЋИХ ЈУГОСЛОВЕНСКИХ ФАБРИКА ТЕКСТИЛА
OДЛИКЕ КАПИТАЛА ТЕКСТИЛНЕ ИНДУСТРИЈЕ У КРАЉЕВИНИ ЈУГОСЛАВИЈИ – ПРИМЕРИ НАЈВЕЋИХ ЈУГОСЛОВЕНСКИХ ФАБРИКА ТЕКСТИЛА
(CHARACTERISTICS OF CAPITAL IN TEXTILE SECTOR IN THE KINGDOM OF YUGOSLAVIA: A CASE STUDY OF MAJOR YUGOSLAV TEXTILE MANUFACTURERS)
- Author(s):Jelena Rafailović
- Language:Serbian
- Subject(s):History, Economy, National Economy, Interwar Period (1920 - 1939)
- Page Range:173-208
- No. of Pages:36
- Keywords:textile industry; Kingdom of Yugoslavia; capital; Duga resa d. d.; Yugoslav textile factories Mautner; factories of the V. Ilić concern; Belgrade textile industry
- Summary/Abstract:Through a global and micro context, we portray the capital of the textile industry in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia between the two world wars in this paper. The accessible statistical data distinctly illustrates the capital status within the textile industry of Yugoslavia during the interwar period. The textile industry expanded significantly from an initial estimation of 25 operational factories in 1919 to a notable total of 491 factories by 1938. The invested capital experienced a notable surge, ascending from 466 million dinars in 1918 to 1,504,963,000 dinars by 1938. This pattern, reflected in the consistent increase of newly established factories and their accompanying capital amounts during their founding, aligned closely with the prevailing economic trends of the interwar era. By the end of the 1930s, proprietary corporations comprised 39%, joint stock companies constituted 26%, and public partnerships represented 21% of the industry’s structure. Among these, 312 factories (64%) were exclusively under Yugoslav ownership, amassing a combined capital of 573 million dinars (38%). Concurrently, 151 enterprises, whether with a majority or minority stake of foreign capital, accounted for the remaining 913 million dinars (61%) within their total capital of 1.486 billion dinars. An analysis of the balance sheets and available data regarding the ownership structure of significant textile enterprises in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, such as Duge rese d. d., Yugoslav textile plants Mautner, Jugočeske Kranj, factory of concern Ilić, and the Belgrade textile industry, results in several fundamental conclusions. The textile sector companies in Croatia and Slovenia display a greater capital endowment and demonstrate more pronounced growth in their overall operational balance. The ownership distribution among shareholders delineates a predominance of significant foreign capital stakes within the textile sector of Croatia and Slovenia, diverging from the ownership arrangement observed in other regions of the Kingdom, particularly the pre-war Serbian territory, where indigenous industrialists maintained substantial ownership stakes.
БОРБА ЗА КОНТРОЛУ КАПИТАЛА У ЈУГОСЛОВЕНСКОЈ СПОЉНОЈ ТРГОВИНИ: ПОКУШАЈ ОБУЗДАВАЊА МОЋИ СПОЉНОТРГОВИНСКИХ ПРЕДУЗЕЋА У СФРЈ СРЕДИНОМ 1960-ИХ
БОРБА ЗА КОНТРОЛУ КАПИТАЛА У ЈУГОСЛОВЕНСКОЈ СПОЉНОЈ ТРГОВИНИ: ПОКУШАЈ ОБУЗДАВАЊА МОЋИ СПОЉНОТРГОВИНСКИХ ПРЕДУЗЕЋА У СФРЈ СРЕДИНОМ 1960-ИХ
(THE STRUGGLE FOR CAPITAL CONTROL IN YUGOSLAV FOREIGN COMMERCE DURING THE MID-1960S: ENDEAVORS TO RESTRICT THE INVOLVEMENT OF FOREIGN TRADE ENTERPRISES IN THE SOCIALIST FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA)
- Author(s):Milan Piljak
- Language:Serbian
- Subject(s):History, Economy, National Economy, Economic history, Post-War period (1950 - 1989), History of Communism
- Page Range:209-233
- No. of Pages:25
- Keywords:foreign trade companies; capital; Nikola Đuverović; Genex; Progress; "Economic Policy"
- Summary/Abstract:Yugoslavia underwent a turbulent modernization process characterized by fluctuations and complexities. The initial two decades of its existence are often considered a peak or golden era, witnessing significant prosperity and development. However, the subsequent two decades marked a period of substantial growth and advancement, portraying a considerable increase in wealth and development. The perpetual conflicts between the communist elite and power centers persisted, albeit with less frequent documentation. Knowledge of these conflicts often surfaced when they escalated to a magnitude that precluded ignorance, leading to resolution within party forums. This resolution typically resulted in one side being politically dismantled, divested of functions, and deprived of influence within the prevailing system. We are observing a considerably diminished equilibrium of forces in this context, notably less pronounced compared to instances such as the reshuffiing of high-ranking officials within the ilas, Ranković, and republican leaderships at the onset of the 1970s. Furthermore, the contention revolved around the dynamics between members of the economic elite distinguished by their party and state status, vis-à-vis members of the economic elite who concurrently held positions, managed prosperous enterprises, and possessed access to substantial capital. In the article, our endeavor was to evaluate the power dynamics within a state entity at the ministerial level concerning influential stakeholders engaged in international trade management as significant buyers. Perhaps it is a golden age, despite the turmoil in the economy, society, and politics; everything in such a rigorous system that is well-founded and understandable to the general professional public is a result of the issues posed. Upon reviewing the legislation, the editorial team of Ekonomska politika convened a localized economic forum within their editorial office. This forum provided a platform for individuals from various sectors of the real economy to articulate their concerns regarding the proposed legal act, with some expressing skepticism about the anticipated improvements while others perceived the potential for freedom as an opportunity to foster more dynamic economies, unencumbered by excessive bureaucratic administration. Once more, despite the editors of the weekly publication condensing the discussions, a more comprehensive narrative, especially from the round table, remains elusive to us. Even if Miki Savićević’s evaluation regarding personal animosities holds validity, it seems implausible that Nikola Džuverović could have endeavored to impede the assumption of control over the infrastructure of the enterprise group, responsible for approximately 80% of the nation’s export and import revenue, encompassing a population of 18,549,133 people, without any form of support or backing. We can only speculate that certain corporations within the real sector perceived Džuverović’s actions as an opportunity to fortify their standing during negotiations with international trade entities. From a geographical standpoint, we suggested the possibility of Džuverović garnering support from the republics, considering the concentration of foreign trade strength in Belgrade. This circumstance might offer an explanation for the selection of a notably conservative individual as the primary figure in international commerce. Regrettably, the conclusive aftermath of the conflict remains unresolved. It is unsurprising that a minority group played a decisive role in the majority of decisions. Details regarding Džuverović’s subsequent career trajectory are sparse; notably, he did not occupy any prominent positions. Subsequently, he served as a member of the SSRNJ Federal Conference Presidency. However, the foreign trade enterprises continued to maintain their wealth and influence, persisting until the collapse of the state.
„СВАКО СВОЈЕ ДЕВИЗЕ ЧУВА“ УНУТРАШЊИ АСПЕКТИ СПОЉНОГ ДУГА СФРЈ 1980–1983.
„СВАКО СВОЈЕ ДЕВИЗЕ ЧУВА“ УНУТРАШЊИ АСПЕКТИ СПОЉНОГ ДУГА СФРЈ 1980–1983.
(“EACH PROVINCE AND REPUBLIC MAINTAINS ITS OWN RESERVES”: INTERNAL ASPECTS OF THE SFRY’S EXTERNAL DEBT, 1980–1983)
- Author(s):Slobodan Selenić
- Language:Serbian
- Subject(s):History, Economy, National Economy, Business Economy / Management, Post-War period (1950 - 1989), Accounting - Business Administration, Socio-Economic Research
- Page Range:235-276
- No. of Pages:42
- Keywords:Yugoslavia; republics; provinces; National Bank of Yugoslavia; external debt; foreign exchange; liquidity; Privredna Banka Zagreb
- Summary/Abstract:During the early 1980s, evident indications of a crisis impacting the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia emerged, among which the significant external debt, amounting to approximately $19 billion in 1980, stood as one of the most serious concerns. This debt was intricately linked to various aspects of domestic politics and interrelationships among the Federation, republics, and provinces. Subsequent to the implementation of the 1974 Constitution, the republics and provinces were granted considerable au- tonomy, leading to instances where some exceeded their allocated borrowing quotas, as defined by internal agreements within the nation. Between 1979 and 1980, the anticipated balance was exceeded by over 1.3 billion dollars, with Croatia surpassing it the most (approximately 800 million dollars). Profound internal repercussions stemming from the external debt encompassed the collapse of the country’s legal foreign exchange market in the spring of 1980. This led to the insolvency of several banks, notably major ones in Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, and the two Serbian provinces (Vojvodina and Kosovo). The insolvency of the Zagreb Economic Bank constituted a critical concern, leading to Croatia’s incapacity to maintain liquidity in 1982 without assistance from the Federation, the National Bank of Yugoslavia, and banks situated in other regions of the nation. The negligent and unlawful actions undertaken by the Zagreb Economic Bank, resulting in delayed debt repayments to several international banks, inflicted damage upon Yugoslavia’s corporate and political reputation on a global scale, notably impacting relationships with Western countries. Commencing in 1980, a handful of solvent banks, predominantly the banks of Serbia (Beobanka and Jugobanka) and, to a lesser extent, Ljubljanska Banka, discharged hundreds of millions of dollars in obligations owed by banks and economic organizations located in other regions of the country. When the federal government sought to enact legal mandates compelling banks and economic entities to deposit a fraction of their foreign exchange into accounts held at the National Bank of Yugoslavia, aiming to fulfil the state’s commitments to foreign nations and facilitate oil imports in 1981 and 1982, banks nationwide violated these laws and defaulted on their obligations to the Federation and foreign entities. Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and central Serbia were the only regions that largely fulfilled their obligations. The deficit in foreign exchange was covered by tapping into foreign exchange reserves, which had dwindled to 1.3 billion dollars by the summer of 1983.
