Kremlin Communication Strategy for Russian Audiences Before and After the Full-Scale Invasion of Ukraine
Kremlin Communication Strategy for Russian Audiences Before and After the Full-Scale Invasion of Ukraine
Contributor(s): Monika Hanley (Editor)
Subject(s): Media studies, Government/Political systems, Security and defense, Military policy, Political behavior, Politics and communication, ICT Information and Communications Technologies, Peace and Conflict Studies, Russian Aggression against Ukraine
Published by: NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence
Keywords: Kremlin; Russia; Invasion of Ukraine; Media influence; Telegram; Russia’s Hybrid Media System; Domestic television;
Summary/Abstract: Particularly since the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the subsequent popularization of what has frequently been mischaracterized as ‘the Gerasimov doctrine’, Russia’s behaviour in the information space has often been viewed as part of its ‘grayzone’, ‘hybrid’, or ‘sub-threshold’ activities. However, the events of late February 2022 and the ensuing months have amply demonstrated that Russia’s information activities should also be viewed in the context of the country as a conventional, above-threshold threat. February 2022 may have marked the point at which Russia’s actions left the ‘grayzone’ and entered the realm of full-scale conventional warfare, but the information environment nevertheless remains a key facet of this conflict. On the Russian side, the Kremlin’s stranglehold on television media and the proliferation of Kremlin-aligned (or, at the very least, anti-Ukrainian) Telegram accounts have ensured public support for the war, which (ac-cording to polling by the Levada Center), re-mains high, at 72%—higher even than when the war first broke out, even as sanctions bite, military failures mount, and Russia’s manpower losses surpass those of all wars it has fought since the end of World War II combined. On the Ukrainian side, tropes such as the ‘Russian warship go f*ck yourself’ exchange at Snake Island have helped ensure public support among Ukraine’s allies for aiding the country’s war effort, casting Ukraine as a plucky under-dog against a larger foe which is simultaneously deadly and incompetent.
- Print-ISBN-13: 978-9934-619-47-2
- Page Count: 140
- Publication Year: 2023
- Language: English
CONCEPTUAL REFLECTIONS ON DISCOURSE FORMATION AND DISSEMINATION
CONCEPTUAL REFLECTIONS ON DISCOURSE FORMATION AND DISSEMINATION
(CONCEPTUAL REFLECTIONS ON DISCOURSE FORMATION AND DISSEMINATION)
- Author(s):Neville Bolt
- Language:English
- Subject(s):Media studies, Government/Political systems, International relations/trade, Security and defense, Political behavior, Politics and communication, ICT Information and Communications Technologies, Peace and Conflict Studies
- Page Range:13-16
- No. of Pages:4
- Keywords:War; aggression; NATO; Russia; Ukraine; Vladimir Putin;
- Summary/Abstract:There’s a fallacy shared by most who practise strategic communications. The common mistake is to talk of messaging and the possible effectiveness that attaching such messages to grievances and those who hold them can achieve. Messages like narratives are an overused term, put through the wash once too often and bleached of the intellectual col-our they once sported. It is as if by sending out a slogan, a cause-and-effect relationship can be brought to bear on a pre-identified audience. The danger inherent in this ‘post-it’ approach to communications is to place all hope on linear, one-way agency while ignoring the nature of the discursive context or what is frequently and unadvisedly called the information environment. As if communicators were caught in a call-and-response exchange or a dangerous thrust-and-parry. By this token, communications is forced into a zero-sum game, rather than the organic or fluid negotiation between contiguous discourses that it really is.
MICRO-PERSPECTIVE: THE RISE OF THE NEW COMMISSARS—AN ASSESSMENT OF RUSSIAN INFLUENCE CAMPAIGNS ON THE EVE OF THE WAR IN UKRAINE
MICRO-PERSPECTIVE: THE RISE OF THE NEW COMMISSARS—AN ASSESSMENT OF RUSSIAN INFLUENCE CAMPAIGNS ON THE EVE OF THE WAR IN UKRAINE
(MICRO-PERSPECTIVE: THE RISE OF THE NEW COMMISSARS—AN ASSESSMENT OF RUSSIAN INFLUENCE CAMPAIGNS ON THE EVE OF THE WAR IN UKRAINE)
- Author(s):Charlie Winter
- Language:English
- Subject(s):Media studies, Military policy, Political behavior, Politics and communication, ICT Information and Communications Technologies, Peace and Conflict Studies, Russian Aggression against Ukraine
- Page Range:16-23
- No. of Pages:8
- Keywords:Russian Influence Campaigns; War in Ukraine; Kremlin; social media platform; Telegram;
- Summary/Abstract:Shortly after 21.30 MST on 21 February 2022, Russian president Vladimir Putin declared that Moscow was set to recognise the Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) and Luhansk People’s Republic (LPR) in eastern Ukraine as independent territories. Moments later he gave the order for Russian ‘peacekeepers’ to deploy across the border into eastern Ukraine. Putin’s statement came just four days after a sustained surge in ceasefire violations by Russian and pro-Russian forces, which was reported by the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence on 17 February, and amid widespread, months-long speculation regarding the prospect of a full-fledged war on Kyiv.
MESO-PERSPECTIVE: FROM COMMISSARS TO ‘SWITCHERS’—PRO-RUSSIAN INFLUENCE ON TELEGRAM
MESO-PERSPECTIVE: FROM COMMISSARS TO ‘SWITCHERS’—PRO-RUSSIAN INFLUENCE ON TELEGRAM
(MESO-PERSPECTIVE: FROM COMMISSARS TO ‘SWITCHERS’—PRO-RUSSIAN INFLUENCE ON TELEGRAM)
- Author(s):Vera Michlin-Shapir
- Language:English
- Subject(s):Media studies, Military policy, Political behavior, Politics and communication, Studies in violence and power, ICT Information and Communications Technologies, Peace and Conflict Studies, Russian Aggression against Ukraine
- Page Range:23-31
- No. of Pages:9
- Keywords:Pro-Russian Influence on Telegram; social media; war against Ukraine; Kherson; Antonov Airport; Bucha;
- Summary/Abstract:After February 2022 the social media platform Telegram became ‘one of the most important informational vectors regarding the war’. The unprecedented spike in communications on the platform, which has been re-corded by ExTrac and discussed in the previous part, has given researchers a unique opportunity to examine Russia’s online media environment. While the ExTrac analysis focused on the quantitative increase of Telegram’s significance among Russian social media users, this part qualitatively analyses the content shared on the platform. It aims to shed light on the emergence of a new group of Russian online influencers—the so-called pro-war bloggers. Propelled into the limelight by a surge in online media, the Kremlin’s blocking of Western social media platforms, and increased demand from users for news about the war, these Telegram channels’ administrators formed an online eco-system which became instrumental in spreading pro-Russian narratives at home and abroad.
MACRO-PERSPECTIVE: STRATEGY WITHOUT DESIGN
MACRO-PERSPECTIVE: STRATEGY WITHOUT DESIGN
(MACRO-PERSPECTIVE: STRATEGY WITHOUT DESIGN)
- Author(s):Ofer Fridman
- Language:English
- Subject(s):Media studies, Government/Political systems, Political behavior, Politics and communication, ICT Information and Communications Technologies, Peace and Conflict Studies
- Page Range:32-35
- No. of Pages:4
- Keywords:Russia’s Hybrid Media System; Kremlin; Russian political-military strategists; Russia’s media system;
- Summary/Abstract:‘Modern Westerners,’ argues cultural psychologist Richard E. Nisbett, ‘like the ancient Greeks, see the world in analytic, atomistic terms; they see objects as discrete and separate from their environments; they see events as moving in linear fashion when they move at all; and they feel themselves to be personally in control’. Therefore, it is not surprising that the Western approach to strategy is dominated by the notion of linear progression towards objectives defined in advance, as Western ‘institutionalized habits focus only upon analytic and linear models’. Strategy is commonly perceived as a combination of ‘calculation and control to effect planned movement over a predictable but fast-moving environment in order to realize well-designed aims’. Consequently, the application of this linear thinking to the Kremlin’s behaviour has repeatedly led Western researchers to characterize President Putin as ‘astrategic’ or a ‘tactical’ player who is ‘adept at short-term tactical responses to setbacks, but less talented at long-term strategy’. Moreover, when applied to Russia’s hybrid media environment, these linear models would understand it in terms of pre-thought plans which were then orchestrated and coordinated to achieve the desired control over the media or the narrative.
REFLECTIONS ON DISCOURSE FORMATION AND INFLUENCE
REFLECTIONS ON DISCOURSE FORMATION AND INFLUENCE
(REFLECTIONS ON DISCOURSE FORMATION AND INFLUENCE)
- Author(s):Neville Bolt
- Language:English
- Subject(s):Government/Political systems, International relations/trade, Political behavior, Comparative politics, Geopolitics, Peace and Conflict Studies, Russian Aggression against Ukraine
- Page Range:36-47
- No. of Pages:12
- Keywords:Ukraine; Russia; Discourse Formation and Influence; Kremlin;
- Summary/Abstract:At this point the discussion broadens to include a wider consideration of how discourses move in relation to one another in societies. Discourse shaping seeks to create a new norm. As the philosopher Timothy Garton Ash observes: ‘The deepest power is that of determining what people consider normal. If you can persuade others that your way of doing things is normal, you have won. At the moment many mature democracies are experiencing the normalization of the anti-liberal far right.’ And ‘normalization’ as a term now widely employed, he reminds us, ‘came to prominence after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. It meant the attempt to return a European society to Soviet communist norms.’ Here we emphasise that any two-dimensional representation misses an important component in creating new norms. Communicators rarely seek to influence a single mainstream conversation but several aspects of the same conversation simultaneously.
RUSSIAN FEDERATION OFFICIAL STATEMENTS AND MEDIA MESSAGING ANALYSIS
RUSSIAN FEDERATION OFFICIAL STATEMENTS AND MEDIA MESSAGING ANALYSIS
(RUSSIAN FEDERATION OFFICIAL STATEMENTS AND MEDIA MESSAGING ANALYSIS)
- Author(s):Laima Venclauskienė, Karina Urbanavičiūtė, Viktoras Daukšas
- Language:English
- Subject(s):Media studies, Government/Political systems, Political behavior, Politics and communication, ICT Information and Communications Technologies
- Page Range:49-97
- No. of Pages:49
- Keywords:Russia; media messaging analysis; Government communication;
- Summary/Abstract:Strategic use of information is a long-term practice of the Kremlin. Concepts and methods which originated in the Soviet Union, though growing more sophisticated over time, became a blueprint for the current Russian government. Past and present leaders residing in Moscow have never been shy in calling information what it is to them—a weapon. Lenin’s Decree on the Press from 1917 warned that the press is one of the most powerful weapons, ‘no less dangerous than bombs and machine-guns’. In 2015 Russian minister of defence Sergey Shoigu repeated the same statement, saying that ‘the day has come when all of us recognize that the word, the camera, the photograph, the internet and information in general have be-come yet another type of weaponry, another branch of the armed forces’. The strategy is even more apparent when we look at the situation of the press in-side Russia (which, based on the level of restrictions and control, is not that far off from the Soviet past). As Vladimir Putin came to power in 2000, through a series of not so subtle operations (such as the takeover of the NTV channel3) and well-thought-out legal traps (the case of TV Dozhd’), media outlets which had even a fraction of independence fell under the control of the state.4 And since then the chokehold around the press has be-come tighter and tighter.
RUSSIA’S 2022 INVASION OF UKRAINE: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT AND THE INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT ON KREMLIN-CONTROLLED DOMESTIC TELEVISION
RUSSIA’S 2022 INVASION OF UKRAINE: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT AND THE INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT ON KREMLIN-CONTROLLED DOMESTIC TELEVISION
(RUSSIA’S 2022 INVASION OF UKRAINE: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT AND THE INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT ON KREMLIN-CONTROLLED DOMESTIC TELEVISION)
- Author(s):Max Levin
- Language:English
- Subject(s):Media studies, Government/Political systems, Political behavior, Politics and communication, Peace and Conflict Studies, Russian Aggression against Ukraine
- Page Range:99-123
- No. of Pages:25
- Keywords:Russia; War in Ukraine; Media control; Kremlin; information space;
- Summary/Abstract:This report is focused on the relation-ship between Russia’s actions in the physical environment and its behaviour in the information environment (with a particular focus on Kremlin-aligned television) in the period leading up to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. In the months before the invasion, many reports appeared in the media of Western countries claiming that Russia intended to invade Ukraine. Such reports were typically based on briefings from government sources (which were in turn ostensibly based on assessments made by intelligence agencies) or on open-source intelligence analyses. In either case, assessments were primarily founded on Russia’s behaviour in the physical domain3, such as movements of its troops and military equipment to areas adjacent to the Ukrainian border. This report is based on a desire to better understand how the information domain ought to fit into this dynamic of intelligence interpretation. It attempts to answer the following two questions...
PHANTOM PILLARS OF PRO-KREMLIN DISINFORMATION: A CASE STUDY OF RUSSIAN JOURNALISTS COVERING THE TOPIC OF WAR IN UKRAINE
PHANTOM PILLARS OF PRO-KREMLIN DISINFORMATION: A CASE STUDY OF RUSSIAN JOURNALISTS COVERING THE TOPIC OF WAR IN UKRAINE
(PHANTOM PILLARS OF PRO-KREMLIN DISINFORMATION: A CASE STUDY OF RUSSIAN JOURNALISTS COVERING THE TOPIC OF WAR IN UKRAINE)
- Author(s):Jakub Kubś, Aleksandra Michałowska, Viktoras Daukšas
- Language:English
- Subject(s):Media studies, Government/Political systems, Politics and communication, Peace and Conflict Studies, Russian Aggression against Ukraine
- Page Range:125-139
- No. of Pages:15
- Keywords:War in Ukraine presented in Russian media; Kremlin; disinformation; Russian journalism;
- Summary/Abstract:An analysis of the profiles of 27 Russian journalists who have published the largest number of articles about the war in Ukraine reveals serious doubts if those people even exist in real life. In the case of the Lenta.ru outlet, the investigation revealed the use of generative adversarial network (GAN) generated images as profile pictures of the journalists. Most of the authors could not be identified due to the lack of confirmed information about them, both on the agency’s websites and on the web in general. In the case of most of the journalists analysed, serious doubts about their credibility were raised, prompted by an unusually high number of daily publications and timestamps, i.e., very short intervals between consecutive content pieces. In some instances performance outpaced the human capabilities of the writer, suggesting that the journalistic profile is a sock puppet for a group of writers or an automated bot. It is also interesting to note the common practice in Russian outlets to remove names from visible parts of the article, but still leave the author in ‘front-end source’ code. One of the possible explanations for this is that real people prefer not to be identified with the content they spread.