A Discriminative Ontology for Future Selves
A Discriminative Ontology for Future Selves
Author(s): Juraj OdorčákSubject(s): Philosophy, Social Sciences, Education, History of Philosophy, Philosophical Traditions, Epistemology, Logic, Ethics / Practical Philosophy, Special Branches of Philosophy, Contemporary Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Science, Vocational Education, Adult Education, Phenomenology, Hermeneutics, Inclusive Education / Inclusion, Ontology, Distance learning / e-learning
Published by: Национално издателство за образование и наука „Аз-буки“
Keywords: personal survival; self-concern; future self; perdurantism; endurantism;ontology;
Summary/Abstract: The article presents a critique of the commonly held assumption about the practical advantage of endurantism over perdurantism regarding the problem of future-directed self-concern of a person. The future-directed self-concern of a person crucially depends on the possibility of the right differentiation of diverging futures of distinct persons, therefore any theory of persistence that does not entail a special non-branching relation of a person to only their future self seems to be counterintuitive or unrealistic for practical purposes of personal persistence. I argue that this pragmatic rationale about future-directed self-concern is equally challenging for both theories of persistence. Moreover, I indicate, that both of these theories fall and stand on the practical feasibility of hidden ontological presuppositions about specific second-order notions of concerns of persons for their future.
Journal: Философия
- Issue Year: 30/2021
- Issue No: 4
- Page Range: 372-381
- Page Count: 10
- Language: English
- Content File-PDF