The US post-1989 Strategy: Revisionist Powers and NATO’s East Flank
The US post-1989 Strategy: Revisionist Powers and NATO’s East Flank

Summary/Abstract: During the Cold War the American strategy is clear – to ‘contain’ the Soviet Union and the spread of communism globally. After 1989, the organising question becomes: what is the best direction for the US strategy to ensure that democratic gains are expanded? The fall of the Berlin Wall heralds the end of the Soviet domination of Central and Eastern Europe and reduces Russia’s influence globally. The US, NATO, and the greater Western Alliance stand as victors of a protracted campaign which often heats up as proxy wars: Korea, Vietnam, Cuba, Latin America, the Middle East. These wars are costly, but the pressure released reduces the chance of direct nuclear confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States. The strategy of containment guiding the US policy proves imperfect, and bloody proxy wars confirm it. Ultimately, the strategy is successful, and by the 1990s, America is the lone superpower leading an optimistic Western alliance. The 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the US homeland cause significant damage and loss of life, devastating America psychologically. They usher in a period of fear and dramatic response. America must retool its strategy on the fly, and the Global War on Terrorism consumes strategic attention. The distraction leaves space for a revisionist Russia and rising China. Tracing a selection of US post-Cold War strategy documents, this article explores US strategic thinking, until today’s global inflexion point of the renewed great power competition. The article particularly examines the developments on NATO’s eastern flank, and Poland’s role in the US strategy in the region, offering future strategy recommendations.

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