Financial Reporting Material Misstatements, Earnings Conservatism and Managerial Replacement Decisions Cover Image

Financial Reporting Material Misstatements, Earnings Conservatism and Managerial Replacement Decisions
Financial Reporting Material Misstatements, Earnings Conservatism and Managerial Replacement Decisions

Author(s): Jo-Ting Wei
Subject(s): Economy, Financial Markets
Published by: Τεχνολογικό Εκπαιδευτικό Ίδρυμα Ανατολικής Μακεδονίας και Θράκης
Keywords: Misstatement Disclosure; Financial Reporting Credibility; Earnings Conservatis; Manager Replacement;

Summary/Abstract: Purpose: Based on signal theory and legitimacy theory, this paper examines whether firms with financial reporting misstatements (restatements) would prefer conservative financial reporting to send signals regarding their determinants of improving financial reporting credibility and legitimate organizational image in Taiwan. This paper further examines whether these firms reduce the demand for conservative financial reporting after replacing managers in the reveal of restatements.

  • Issue Year: 14/2021
  • Issue No: 1
  • Page Range: 7-21
  • Page Count: 15
  • Language: English
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