K problematike aspektuality nevedomých mentálnych stavov u Searla
To the Issue of Aspectuality of Unconscious Mental States in Searle's Thinking

Summary/Abstract: Searle bases his analysis of the topic of unconscious intentional mental states on his conception of aspectuality as a universal attribute of intentionality. According to him, unconscious states are, in essence, purely neurophysiological configurations of cerebral architectures with the dispositional capacity to generate conscious mental states. This leads to a fundamental discrepancy between the epistemic description from the scientific, objectivity-oriented third-person point of view and the aspectuality of intentional states based on the first-person view, which he seeks to resolve in the exposition of his connection principle. Present study points to some ambiguities in Searle’s approach, dealing with the implicit presence of the philosopheme of apperception in his understanding of aspectuality.

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