O TAK ZWANYM SAMOOSZUSTWIE W ŚWIETLE ZNACZEŃ WYBRANYCH CZASOWNIKÓW
ON THE SO-CALLED SAMOOSZUSTWO (SELF-DECEPTION) IN LIGHT OF THE MEANINGS OF SELECTED VERBS

Summary/Abstract: This paper is dedicated to the analysis of semantic properties of three Polish verbs: okłamywać się, że [p] (to lie to oneself that [p]), oszukiwać się, że [p] (to deceive oneself that [p]) and wmówić//wmawiać sobie, że [p] (to convince oneself that [p]). The author presents arguments in favour of the thesis that these are separate lexical units, which cannot be reduced to appropriate addressative verbs. In their semantic structure, she distinguishes, apart from the agent (epistemic subject), also the position of the controller-sender (metasender), and uses a conceptual distinction between quotative speech (present in the structure of the examined units) and assertoric speech in her analysis. By clashing the properties of Polish exponents of ‘samooszustwo’ (self-deception) and two competing types of philosophical interpretation of the phenomenon, the author supports anti-reductionist approaches, which do not identify self-deception with a lie or deception. She emphasises that none of the lexical exponents referring to this phenomenon implies ‘oszustwo’ (a deception) or ‘kłamstwo’ (a lie). None implies such a characteristic of the agent as is a sine qua non condition for the occurrence of any of the two situations either. From the perspective of language, ‘samooszustwo’ (self-deception) is not deception. It is a kind of an irrational action that is inconsistent with the agent’s knowledge.

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