Модалността на съжденията при Кант и преходът към чистата трансцендентална схема
Modality of Judgments in Kant and the Transition to the Pure Transcendental Schema

Summary/Abstract: In his system of the logical functions of understanding Kant includes modality as the fourth class together with quantity, quality and relation. Kant defines modality briefly, though with the clear indication that modality has to put the judgment in the “relation to the thinking in general”. The present paper will argue that Kant has reached a new definition of modality. However, this can be demonstrated in the logical reconstruction of the system of judgments with the consistent course through the four logical types of judgments included. The specific functions of these judgments are formed on the bases of the logical possibilities of subject, predicate and logical relation. These components are gradually intensified with their inner subdivision and are formed on all other objects in the field of thinking. These general judgmental areas of subject, predicate and relation subdivision constitute the modality in its class. The modality acts through separating and producing the most certain and hardest connection between the judgmental components on the base of modal ground for the object and on the calculation of the whole field of judgment. Modality is realized as the most complex and covered construction of judgment in its own judgmental area. Exactly this general schema of modality is the base for transition to the second analytic in Critique of Pure Reason – the transition as an immediate and inner connection between the Analytic of Concepts and the Analytic of Principles. The schema of modality is generalized and assembled in a new logical formation – the pure transcendental schema with its logical structure and principles. This search has to give the answer to “the most important task” of transcendental logic: how can we build the object of the pure understanding through the logical form of the synthetic judgments a priori.

• Details
• Contents