Deviant Hinge Epistemology and Epistemic Angst
Deviant Hinge Epistemology and Epistemic Angst

Summary/Abstract: Deviant Hinge Epistemology is a view on the epistemic justification of empirical beliefs which grows not only out of Wittgenstein's considerations from On Certainty, but incorporates a larger amount of the views expressed by the later Wittgenstein and also some further developments by other philosophers (Elizabeth Anscombe's action theory and Wilfrid Sellars's critique of empiricism, in particular). I try to prove the virtues of Deviant Hinge Epistemology by applying it to Pritchard's Closure-Based Sceptical Paradox and showing how it can be solved without either falling into Mooreanism, or making hinges nonpropositional.

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