Sovereignty and Autonomy of the Moral Subject
Sovereignty and Autonomy of the Moral Subject

Summary/Abstract: RESEARCH OBJECTIVE: The following article aims at clarifying the relation between the notion of autonomy of the moral subject and its sovereignty. THE RESEARCH PROBLEM AND METHODS: The notions of sovereignty and autonomy attributed to the moral subject seem to be used as synonyms. Yet in the political theory the two terms seem to have slightly different meaning. Is it justified to use these notions related to the moral subject as synonyms or should they rather be distinguished? Using the descriptive analytic and comparative method the author examines the chosen sources considered as most important reference points for the matter. THE PROCESS OF ARGUMENTATION: The article begins with the presentation of the conception of autonomy formulated by I. Kant as the most influential for the whole modernity. This conception can have a “moral realist” and “creative anti realist” interpretation. Afterwards it presents the contemporary interpretation of autonomy by Kristine M. Korsgaard representing the “creative anti-realist” view. This creative anti-realist interpretation is confronted with its two critiques by John E. Hare and Charles Larmore. RESEARCH RESULTS: The result of the discussion in the article is the proposition to name the modern radical creative anti realist interpretation of autonomy the sovereignty of the moral subject and thus distinguish between the notion of sovereignty and autonomy. CONCLUSIONS, INNOVATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS: This view of autonomy is connected with the naturalistic world view which by many modern philosophers is accepted without further questioning, whereas it is not the only possible position. We should keep questioning the so called “metaphysics of the modern world” and formulate an alternative which gives a more adequate place to the moral reasons in the world.

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