Epistemic Infinitism, the Reason-Giving Game, and the Regress Skeptic Cover Image
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Epistemic Infinitism, the Reason-Giving Game, and the Regress Skeptic
Epistemic Infinitism, the Reason-Giving Game, and the Regress Skeptic

Author(s): Erhan Demircioğlu
Subject(s): Epistemology, Analytic Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Language
Published by: KruZak
Keywords: Epistemic infinitism; the epistemic regress problem; skepticism; inferential justification; Peter Klein;

Summary/Abstract: Epistemic infinitism is one of the logically possible responses to the epistemic regress problem, claiming that the justification of a given proposition requires an infinite and non-circular structure of reasons. In this paper, I will examine the dialectic between the epistemic infinitist and the regress skeptic, the sort of skeptic that bases his attack to the possibility of justification on the regress of reasons. I aim to show that what makes epistemic infinitism appear as well-equipped to silence the regress skeptic is the very same thing that renders it susceptible to a powerful skeptical assault by the regress skeptic.

  • Issue Year: XX/2020
  • Issue No: 58
  • Page Range: 81-102
  • Page Count: 22
  • Language: English