Przegląd orzecznictwa NSA
An overview of judicial decisions of the Supreme Administrative Court

Summary/Abstract: The resolution of a seven-judge panel of the Supreme Administrative Court (SAC) of 25 March 2013, court file No. II GPS 1/13, OSP 2013, No. 10, item 102, concerns the issue of the autonomy of professional self-governing bodies and the role of the Minister of Justice in the procedure of obtaining entry in the list of advocates and legal advisers. The SAC held that when hearing appeals provided for in art. 68(6a) of Act of 26 May 1982 – The Law on Advocates ( Journal of Laws [Dz.U.] of 2009 No. 146, item 1188 as amended) and art. 31(2a) of Act of 6 July 1982 on Legal Advisers ( Journal of Laws [Dz.U.] of 2010 No. 10, item 65 as amended) that regulate appeals against the resolutions of relevant professional self-governing bodies on making an entry in the list of advocates or legal advisers, i.e. appeals against the resolutions of the Executive Committee of the Supreme Council of Advocates and the Executive Committee of the National Council of Legal Advisers, the Minister of Justice cannot apply art. 138(1)(2) of the Administrative Procedure Code (APC) and decide on the merits of the case. This is due to the fact that special provisions of the Law on Advocates and the Act on Legal Advisers do not grant the right to amend judgments from art. 138(1)(2) of the APC (to issue a reformatory judgment) in this regard to the Minister – a fact that is supported by constitutional tenets that underlie the establishment of self-governing bodies, which represent individuals who practice professions of public trust, and their independence within the scope of the tasks that have been entrusted to them. Meanwhile, the issue of the normative scope of the terms of ‘receiving notarial bar training’ was taken up by the SAC in the judgment of 2 October 2014 court file No. II GSK 1072/13 [in:] the Central Database of Administrative Court Judgments (CBOSA), in which the court held that bar training for notaries public – which consists in becoming acquainted with the entirety of the notary public’s work (according to art. 72(1) of Notary Public Law) – can be considered completed only upon the trainee fulfilling all obligations arising from the bar training program, including satisfying the requirement of general training (within the framework of seminar classes), verified in a way and manner provided for in the program. The position taken by the SAC in the resolution of a seven-judge panel of the SAC of 12 May 2014, court file No. I OPS 10/13, ONSAiWSA 2014, No. 5, item 70 is of great significance from the point of view of the right to a fair trial (access to an administrative court) and the principle of procedural justice. The court has adopted an unequivocal position that according to the legislation currently in force and effect – in view of the content of art. 46 of the Act of 20 August 2002 – The Law on Proceedings before Administrative Courts (LPAC) ( Journal of Laws [Dz.U.] of 2012, item 270 as amended) – in court and administrative proceedings pleadings filed to an administrative court that bear a secure electronic signature in the sense of art. 3(2) of the Act of 18 September 2001 on Electronic Signature ( Journal of Laws [Dz.U.] of 2003, item 262), including those filed through a public administration body or means of electronic communications, are inadmissible. Thus, pleadings drafted in electronic form, bearing a secure electronic signature, cannot be viewed as satisfying the formal requirement for pleadings provided for in art. 46(1)(4) of the LPAC. Procedural issues connected with filing complaints before an administrative court considered in the context of the LPAC have also been raised in the resolution of a seven-judge panel of the SAC of 18 December 2013, court file No. I OPS 13/13, ONSAiWSA 2014, No. 3, item 39. In the resolution, the SAC formulated a position according to which a claimant’s failure to attach the required number of copies of the complaint and the appendices in compliance with art. 47(1) of the LPAC is considered to be a formal defect of the complaint pursuant to art. 49(1) in conjunction with art. 57(1) of the LPAC, which precludes proper pursuit of the complaint, and which cannot be removed by way of the court producing copies of the complaint. An interesting legal question concerning the objective scope of access to public information was considered by the SAC in the judgment of 12 June 2014, court file No. I OSK 2514/13, [in:] CBOSA. The court interpreted the provisions of art. 1(2) of the Act of 6 September 2001 on Access to Public Information, which stipulate that the regulations of the Act do not infringe on the regulations of other statutes that provide for different principles and procedures to access information of public nature. The SAC held that the term ‘other statutes’ should be construed to include European Union law, provided that it contains relevant regulations.

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