Априорни синтези и абдуктивен извод
A priory Syntheses and Abductive Inference

Summary/Abstract: The aim of the article is to present an interpretation of the abductive inference as one of the ways by which the Russell’s notion of logical experience can function (in a praxeological perspective), and can be treated as a priori synthesis (in nonclassical sense). The text critically problematizes the abduction in Pierce’s and Hanson’s works, with the purpose to show the way in which it is a problem, whose solutions can be searched in the light of nonclassical transcendental logic. Emphasizing the problem as being a multidimensional from such point of view, the following questions are critically observed: 1) how abductive inference is possible as an a priory synthesis, i.e. what are the specifics of the logical experience, which participate in abductive inference?; 2) How this experience is any different from the logical experience in the cases of inductive inferences?; 3) How the presented problem can be thought and being considered in the light of nonclassical transcendentalism? To mark some possibilities for answer to the last question the following strategy is undertaken: first form the Russell’s notion of logical experience as a focus of the philosophical logic, the analysis passes to a problem of a priory synthesizing and reaches the problem of mimesis (i.e. it is investigated how it is possible the problems of abductive inference and of the logical experience to be linked). The last section concerns the trials to search a general logical form of abductive inference and chances to be analyzed by a nonclassical approach.

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