George Berkeley: immaterializmussal a józan észért
George Berkeley: with Immaterialism for Common Sense
Author(s): Krisztián PeteSubject(s): Philosophy
Published by: Korunk Baráti Társaság
Keywords: George Berkeley; John Locke; René Descartes; modern science; material substance; naive realism; representational realism; idealism; immaterialism; common sense; atheism; scepticism
Summary/Abstract: George Berkeley is often thought to be the leading proponent of subjective idealism and is commonly held to have endorsed scepticism about the existence of an external world. I am trying to exhibit that neither of the claims is correct: Berkeley was not a subjective idealist and certainly not a sceptic. Contrary to Locke and Descartes, who were interested in providing a philosophical groundwork for modern science, Berkeley’s main concern was to reconcile the modern scientific findings with common-sense knowledge. He conceived common sense as the field of knowledge which lies farthest from scepticism and is composed of the most unquestionable convictions (like the existence of the external world and of God). The idea was that any philosophy that reasons towards these commonsensical judgements can be used effectively against sceptics and atheists. So, he retained from Locke and Descartes that the direct objects of our perceptions are ideas and combined it with his empiricism to come up with his infamous principle: “Esse est percipi.” Since we believe in the existence of the external world, and the common objects are nothing but collections of ideas, we have no other choice but to conclude to the existence of a Christian God. His immaterialist and idealist theses provide the best explanation for the truth of our common-sense beliefs, which are furthermore compatible with the scientific findings, hence providing us with the best way to answer scepticism and atheism.
Journal: Korunk
- Issue Year: 2019
- Issue No: 08
- Page Range: 34-40
- Page Count: 7
- Language: Hungarian