PLANTINGA ON MATERIALISM AND INTENTIONALITY
PLANTINGA ON MATERIALISM AND INTENTIONALITY
Author(s): Amir HorowitzSubject(s): Philosophy
Published by: Addleton Academic Publishers
Keywords: materialism; dualism; content; intentionality; indication; original intentionality; derived intentionality
Summary/Abstract: Alvin Plantinga (2006) presents an argument against materialism that is concerned with intentionality. His main contention is that according to materialism, intentionality is not a basic property of the brain or of any part thereof, and that intentionality cannot be determined by interactions among various physical items. I take issues with the latter claim, and argue that there is no reason to think that intentionality cannot be thus determined. I also suggest that Plantinga’s failure is anything but accidental: the phenomenon of intentionality is neutral with respect to the mind-body problem.
Journal: Analysis and Metaphysics
- Issue Year: 2011
- Issue No: 10
- Page Range: 113-120
- Page Count: 8
- Language: English
- Content File-PDF