Duopoly, Optimal Proportion of State-Owned Shares and International Cross-Ownership
Duopoly, Optimal Proportion of State-Owned Shares and International Cross-Ownership

Summary/Abstract: This paper constructs a duopoly model to study the optimal international cross-ownership and state-owned shares proportion when domestic state-owned enterprise competes with foreign-funded enterprise in home market or against local enterprise in foreign market under Cournot competition. The results indicate that whether to implement international cross-ownership or not and the proportion of state-owned depend on the implementing subject of cross-ownership, competitive environment, the efficiencies of state-owned and private capitals, and so on. The proportion of state-owned shares may influence the action of international cross-ownership in some cases. Complete nationalization is optimal choice under specified condition. These conclusions have certain significance for the formulation of privatization policies in various countries and the merger and reorganization of enterprises in the international scope.

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