Is it possible to have a factless constructivism? The disagreement between
John Rawls and G.A. Cohen about what counts as principles of justice Cover Image

ESTE POSIBIL UN CONSTRUCTIVISM ELIBERAT DE CONSIDERAŢII FACTUALE? CONTROVERSA DINTRE JOHN RAWLS ŞI G.A. COHEN CU PRIVIRE LA STATUTUL PRINCIPIILOR DREPTĂŢII
Is it possible to have a factless constructivism? The disagreement between John Rawls and G.A. Cohen about what counts as principles of justice

Author(s): Bogdan Olaru
Subject(s): Philosophy, Ethics / Practical Philosophy
Published by: Editura Academiei Române
Keywords: principles of justice; original position; justice as fairness; constructivism; John Rawls;

Summary/Abstract: G.A. Cohen has produced one of the most sharply focused examinations of John Rawls’s political philosophy. Cohen has pointed out that Rawlsian constructivism made the concept of justice depend on factual considerations, like those pertaining to the functioning of free market or those linked to features of human psychology. The same method is also the cause of merging justice with other values or social ideals, like efficiency or stability. One reason for these confusions is the preferred construction procedure, the idea of selecting the principle of justice in the original position. This idea sets unjustified constraints to the concept of justice. Cohen states that this procedure cannot offer fundamental normative principles about what justice requires but only rules of regulation for a liberal society. At the same time, Cohen anticipates the possibility of a factless constructivism. In this study I analyze this possibility and come to a conclusion which is different from what Cohen predicts that this version of constructivism will yield. A revised original position in line with the idea of removing facts from the normative theory of justice will not provide the convergence towards egalitarianism assumed by Cohen. I will argue that the revision a factless constructivism might propose can be justified if it better secures the impartiality of the debate. The principles chosen in the original position and each distribution resulted afterwards should not be affected by arbitrary factors from a moral point of view, such as aspects reflecting a kind of natural lottery. Principles of justice have to be more than a way to secure equal initial distributive shares. They should function as instruments that can mitigate arbitrary influences exerted upon future distributions as well.

  • Issue Year: LXIII/2016
  • Issue No: 5
  • Page Range: 113-128
  • Page Count: 16
  • Language: Romanian, Moldavian
Toggle Accessibility Mode