The Disappearance of Macroethics: The Formation of Modern Legal Science and the Disappearance of the Foundation of Legal Thought Cover Image

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The Disappearance of Macroethics: The Formation of Modern Legal Science and the Disappearance of the Foundation of Legal Thought

Author(s): Ivan Pađen
Subject(s): History of Law, Political Theory, Political Sciences, Philosophy of Law
Published by: Fakultet političkih znanosti u Zagrebu
Keywords: Macroethics; Modern Legal Science; Legal Thought:

Summary/Abstract: The modern notion that morality is a set of norms or values addressed to strictly interpersonal relations is a result of seemingly unrelated changes which have taken place in philosophy, sociology and legal thought. The first is the displacement of the classical ethical paradigm by the modern one. According to the classical paradigm, one has not only duties to others but also the duty of self-perfection, which is, in the final analysis, the obligation to develop oneself to the potential benefit of the widest possible community. The new paradigm withdraws morality from the area of self-regarding acts, thus excluding relations between unspecified individuals and, a fortiori, between social groups from the scope of morality. The second change was introduced by Kant’s idea that law and morality are two distinct ways of being bound to do one’s duty, namely, from outside and from within. The underlying assumption of this distinction is that an action can be dissociated from its incentives, which can be external and/or internal, and that one can study one kind of incentives — notably law — independently of the other. The third change is the nineteenth century distinction between society and community. Society was conceived of as being constituted by modern secular law, whereas community was seen us being constituted by conventional morality. The fourth change as the positivisation of jusnaturalist doctrines in modern constitutions and civil codes. Since doctrines of natural law were no longer needed as a critical instance outside positive law, they faded away. The immediate result of these changes is, as noted above, the notion that morality is concerned with strictly interpersonal relations. A further consequence is the tenet of legal positivism that law can be defined independently of. i.e. separated from, morality. The ultimate consequence is the disappearance of the foundation of legal thought.

  • Issue Year: XXV/1988
  • Issue No: 02
  • Page Range: 72-88
  • Page Count: 17
  • Language: Croatian