FOOL ME ONCE, SHAME ON YOU, FOOL ME TWICE, SHAME ON ME: THE ALLEGED PRISONER’S DILEMMA IN HOBBES’S SOCIAL CONTRACT
FOOL ME ONCE, SHAME ON YOU, FOOL ME TWICE, SHAME ON ME: THE ALLEGED PRISONER’S DILEMMA IN HOBBES’S SOCIAL CONTRACT

Summary/Abstract: Hobbes postulates a social contract to formalize our collective transition from thestate of nature to civil society. The prisoner’s dilemma challenges both the mechanicsand the outcome of that thought experiment. The incentives for reneging are supposedlystrong enough to keep rational persons from cooperating. This paper argues that theprisoner’s dilemma undermines a position Hobbes does not hold. The context and parametersof the social contract steer it safely between the horns of the dilemma. Specifically,in a setting as hostile as the state of nature, Hobbes’s emphasis on self-interestplaces a premium on survival, and thereby on adaptability, which then promotes progressiveconcessions toward peaceful coexistence. This transforms the relevant modelof rationality from utility maximization to utility satisficing, thus favoring the pursuit ofa mutually satisfactory outcome over that of the best personal outcome. The differencenot only obviates the prisoner’s dilemma but also better approximates the state of naturewhile leaving a viable way out.

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