Metaethics: Aquinas, Hume and Moore
Metaethics: Aquinas, Hume and Moore

Summary/Abstract: This article concerns Aquinas’ practical doctrine on two philosophical difficultiesunderlying much contemporary ethical debate. One is Hume’s Is-ought thesis andthe other is its radical con-sequence, Moore’s Open-question argument. Theseethical paradoxes appear to have their roots in epistemological scepticism and ina deficient anthropology. Possible response to them can be found in that Aquinas’human intellect (essentially theoretical and practical at the same time) naturallyperforms three main operations: 1º) To apprehend the intellecta and universalnotions ens, verum and bonum. 2º) To formulate the first theoretical and practicalprinciples. 3º) To order that the intellectum and universal good be done and theopposite avoided. Thomistic philosophical response to both predicaments will notbe exclusively ethical, but will harmonically embrace ontology, anthropology andepistemology.

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